Defense Exportability

Defense Exportability
` Technology Security & Foreign Disclosure Export Control Defense Exportability

Introduction Topics International Acquisition & Exportability (IA&E)
Technology Security & Foreign Disclosure Export Control Defense Exportability “Exportability” in IA&E Planning and Implementation Key Takeaways International Cooperative Programs Sales & Transfers Technology Security & Foreign Disclosure Defense Exportability

Int’l Acquisition Transactions Status Quo -- Macro View
FMS Export Control Capabilities & Tech Willing to Transfer Inquiry, Partnership Discussion or Request for Purchase US Strategy & Policy TSFD DCS Int’l Acquisition Transactions ? ICP Desired Capabilities & Tech Foreign Strategy & Policy Other Defense Acquisition System

Fundamental Security Considerations Type of Authorizations
TSFD Basics Fundamental Security Considerations Access Protection + Release Conditions Not transfer or use for other purposes without U.S. consent Provide substantially the same degree of protection as U.S. Type of Authorizations TSFD Disclosure Authorizations Foreign Visits

USG/DoD TSFD “Theory”

TSFD Key Players & Processes
International Interaction USG-wide Policy DoD-wide Policy Top Level TSFD approvals USG/Interagency Nat’l Sec Council Intel Community State Dept Commerce Dept Homeland Sec Dept USD (Policy) USD (AT&L) USD (Intelligence) ASD(NII) USG/OSD/ Joint Staff Level Proposed Policy Changes Component Policy Implementation guidance & decisions Military Departments SAF/IA DASA(DE&C) & G-2 NIPO DoD Component Level DoD Agencies: DSCA, DTSA, MDA, DTRA, DISA, etc. MAJCOMs PEOs/PMs Implementation Technical Details AFSAC. AFMC AETC, etc. USASAC AMC, etc. NETSAFA SYSCOMs, etc. Labs, Warfare Centers, and Many Others CoCOM Country Team Level

Categories of Information
Classified Military Information (CMI) Information originated by or for the DoD or its agencies or is under its jurisdiction or control; and that requires protection in the interests of national security Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) Unclassified information that requires safeguarding or dissemination controls, pursuant to and consistent with applicable law, regulations and Government-wide policies Foreign Government Information (FGI) Information provided to the USG by a foreign government (s) or international organization or produced jointly with expectation that information, the source, or both are to be held in confidence DoDM Vol 1-4; DoD Information Security Program

USG/DoD TSFD Processes
MILDEP Processes DoD Lead: Various MILDEP-specific various MILDEP Process Other DoD Processes Org.-specific various Few documented processes Interagency process LO/CLO AT&L Primary AT SAP SAPCO Specialized DSC AT&L + Policy Intel USD(I) Data Links/WF DoD CIO PNT/GPS COMSEC NSA & DoD CIO GEOINT NGA MTCR Policy NDP EW None No single process NVD/INS DTSA

DoDD 5111.21, “ATTR SSG and TSFDO” (New October 2014)
OSD TSFD Initiative Arms Transfer and Technology Release (ATTR) Senior Steering Group (SSG) created in 2008 and formally established in 2012: Overarching DoD authority to ensure clear senior-level direction; USD(P) & USD(AT&L) co-chairs Serves as appeals board and mediation body TSFD Office (TSFDO) supports ATTR SSG efforts: ATTR SSG Executive Secretariat and assesses/recommends changes to policies Develops/implements procedures and checklists, coordinates documentation and policy, conducts outreach DoDD , “ATTR SSG and TSFDO” (New October 2014)

OSD Oversight Secretary of Defense Arms Transfer & Technology Release
–––––––––––––––––––––––– Deputy Secretary of Defense Under Secretary (Policy) Under Secretary (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) Director, International Cooperation (AT&L IC) Arms Transfer & Technology Release Senior Steering Group (ATTR SSG) Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure Office (TSFDO)

National Disclosure Policy Overview
Provides a framework and mechanism for implementing the security requirements of: Arms Export Control Act (AECA) Executive Order 13526 NSDM 119 DoDD , “Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations”

NDP-1 Interagency document that implements NSDM 119 within the Executive Branch Issued by the Secretary of Defense with concurrence of other Departments and Agencies Sets forth specific criteria and conditions that must be satisfied before a decision is made to disclose CMI Delegates to the Executive Branch authority to release CMI to eligible governments & international organizations Disclosure authority delegated to Heads of Departments and Agencies with jurisdiction over the information Disclosure decided on a case-by-case basis and approval of the originator required

Disclosure Authorizations
Officials with disclosure authority must consider: Originator of information NDP disclosure criteria and conditions Supports U.S. foreign policy, military & security objectives Does not jeopardize U.S. military security Foreign recipient has the intent and capability to provide the equivalent degree of protection Results in clearly defined benefits to the U.S. Information limited to satisfy authorized purpose Delegated Disclosure Authority Levels (from NDP-1 charts) NDPC Policy Statements Countries / Technologies / Weapon Systems … Avoid making false impressions!

Other Key TSFD Policy Sources
NSDD 189* Established principle that USG/DoD fundamental research should remain unrestricted to the maximum extent possible If national security requires control, information should be classified DoDI and DoDD ** Establishes DoD policy for marking and managing technical documents, including DoD program and technical information, and provides for CUI controls (if appropriate) over their distribution, release, and dissemination Helps implement DoDD by providing DoD acquisition community document originators with guidance on what must be controlled as CUI USG and DoD policy regarding the identification and protection of DoD technology and RDT&E information as been around for many years, but it’s application in the S&T area can sometimes prove challenging since DoD fundamental (also known as basic) research is normally conducted and published in the public domain. S&T managers, and the S&T workforce in general, is responsible for identifying, safeguarding, and protecting DoD S&T information beyond fundamental research efforts through either Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) or classification measures. Experience has shown that the S&T community – as a result of DoD information security training – has a good handle on identification and safeguarding of classified information in the workplace. The S&T community is also generally familiar with the steps necessary to obtain DoD Component foreign disclosure authorization to transfer classified S&T information to representatives of allied and friendly nations, but we will review the policies and procedures in this area in the next few charts just to make sure. S&T community members, however, are often less familiar with the policies and procedures for identification, marking, and dissemination of CUI as outlined in DoDI and its “parent” DoDD These two documents provide key information regarding identification and protection of CUI in both domestic and international environments. S&T community personnel handling CUI information must comply with this DoD policy guidance as well as any amplifying DoD Component guidance regarding CUI release to foreign nationals. *NSDD 189, National Policy on the Transfer of Scientific, Technical and Engineering Information, 21 Sep 1985 **DoDI , Distribution Statements on Technical Documents, 23 Aug 2012 and DoDD , Withholding of Unclassified Technical Data from Public Disclosure, 6 Nov 1984

Protection of CUI Addressed in DoDM , Volume 4, “DoD Information Security Program: Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI)” Application of FOUO Markings to CUI Access to CUI (within the DoD and disseminated outside the DoD) Physical protection of CUI

Foreign Visit Authorizations
Verifies clearance, need to know, and sponsor Purposes of Visit Requests: Facilitate administration (scheduling/venue) Vehicle for disclosure/export authorization decisions Vehicle for security assurance Types of Visits: One-time – single visit, <30 days, specific purpose Recurring – intermittent visits usually up to 1 year Extended – single visit for 2-3 years / program Types of Assignments: Foreign Liaison Officer (FLO) Defense Personnel Exchange Program (DPEP) Cooperative Program Personnel (CPP) … Avoid making false impressions!

USG/DoD TSFD “Practice”

International Programs Security Planning
Effective planning for foreign participation in an international program starts early-on Failure to plan for security requirements and accomplish them in a timely fashion can adversely affect cost, schedule, and performance In order to achieve effective security planning Identify information/technology requiring protection Identify & specify what can be shared & with whom Document how it is to be protected, to include what cannot be shared

Obtaining TSFD Approvals
Who has foreign disclosure authority over the CMI and/or CUI to be released? Should the TSFDO and ATTR SSG be informed or involved? Has Classified Military Information (CMI) disclosure authority been delegated? (NDP Charts, Policy Statements, etc.) Is an Exception to National Disclosure Policy (ENDP) required for CMI release? Supported by the DoD Component Approved through the ENDP process Are other USG/DoD processes or releases required? (if so, TSFDO consultation is recommended)

MILDEP Int’l Program Organizations (IPOs)
SECDEF DEPSECDEF Secretary of the Army Secretary of the Air Force Secretary of the Navy Assistant Secretary for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology Deputy Under Secretary for International Affairs Assistant Secretary for Research, Development, and Acquisition Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Exports and Cooperation Director, Navy International Programs Office There are Similarities and Differences Among Them!

Foreign Disclosure Officer (FDO)
Military or civilian personnel authorized by the DoD Component DDA to make foreign disclosure decisions Based on delegated authority, FDOs make program-level disclosure decisions on release of CMI and CUI FDOs must ensure: Proposed disclosure is in support of a lawful and authorized USG purpose Parent Component is the originator of the information Proposed release decision is within their delegated authority Other DoD Components having joint or shared interest have been consulted Decision is consistent with false impressions policy Make the FDO part of the program team!

Delegation of Disclosure Authority Letter (DDL)
Issued by DoD Component Designated Disclosure Authority (DDA) in consultation with PM and TSFD stakeholders Documents classification levels, categories, scope, and limitations on information that DoD personnel can disclose to foreign entities on a program Delegates disclosure authority to lower level organizations within the Component Should be prepared as soon as foreign participation is planned in a program U.S.-only document not to be shared or discussed with foreign personnel

Defense Security Service
Defense Security Service (DSS) Mission Administer the National Industrial Security Program Support national security and the warfighter Oversee the protection of U.S. and foreign classified information in the hands of industry DSS Operational Directorates Industrial Security Field Operations (Field Agents) Programs and Policy – Foreign Ownership, Control or Influence (FOCI); National Interest Determination (NID); and International Division Education and Training (Courses and webinars) Counterintelligence (Awareness and Elicitation issues)

Fundamental Considerations Type of Authorizations
Export Control Basics Fundamental Considerations Foreign Policy Country of Origin Technology Sensitivity Destination Recipient Key Principles Control U.S.-origin sensitive technology & equipment Promote regional stability Human rights Prevent proliferation to problem end-users and international terrorists Comply with international arms control and technology transfer commitments Type of Authorizations State Commerce Other

Export Control Legislation
Arms Export Control Act Authority to promulgate regulations governing commercial exports of defense articles and services was delegated to the Secretary of State Implemented by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) Legal basis for the United States Munitions List (USML) – defense articles and services Export Administration Act Authority to implement given to the Department of Commerce Implemented by the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) Legal basis for the Commerce Control List (CCL) – dual-use items, “600 Series” items transferred from USML and “Country Chart”

USG Export Control System
Federal Regulations:  ITAR – Defense Articles and Services  EAR – “Dual Use” Articles and Services Key Organizations : State Department -- Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) Commerce Department – Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) DoD – Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA)

Export Examples Shipment to Foreign Destinations (Including Canada)
Shipment to Foreign Entities in U.S. (e.g., Embassies) Foreign Travel Hand-carry Technical Services Electronic Transmission Symposia Presentations Published Articles Computer Networks (Internet, Intranet, Web Sites) … Laptops Conversation Business Meetings International Mail Telephone Conversations Foreign Visitors: Facility Tours Meetings Foreign Employees Trade Shows (U.S. & Overseas)

ECR USML to CCL “Migration”
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) Military Items State Department US Munitions List (USML) Categories Export Administration Regulations (EAR) Commercial & Dual Use Items Commerce Department Commerce Control List (CCL) 600 Series Less Sensitive Items Four Reform Major Areas: (See ) Single export control enforcement coordination center (established) Single USG IT system for export control (nearing completion) Single export control list (USML to CCL migration) Single licensing agency (requires legislation – very unlikely to occur)

Export License vs Disclosure Process
INDUSTRY Traditional Industry View STATE DTSA MIL SERVICES Up to 120 days 1-2 years Not Well Understood by Industry Start Disclosure Approval Precedes Export License Submission

Export Control Planning for ICPs
Technology Release Roadmap (TRR) Prepared if a substantial amount of ICP activity is envisioned Provides early planning for technology releases to foreign industry Describes when the critical events regarding TSFD planning and implementation should be addressed Projection of when U.S. industry export approvals may be required to support initial ICP efforts TRR sections Timeline of key projected export approvals against the program acquisition schedule Definition of the technologies involved in each export approval List of U.S. contractors (exporters) as well as foreign entities (end users) for each export approval

International Acquisition & Exportability (IA&E)
Defense Exportability Sales & Transfers Technology Security & Foreign Disclosure International Cooperative Programs

DoDI 5000.02 (Enclosure 3, paragraph 13) New
Program Protection “Program protection also supports international partnership building and cooperative opportunities objectives by enabling the export of capabilities without compromising underlying U.S. technology advantages.” Program managers will describe in their [Program Protection Plan] PPP the program’s critical program information and mission-critical functions and components … [including] planning for exportability and potential foreign involvement. Countermeasures should include anti-tamper, exportability features, security … and other mitigations …” DoDI (Enclosure 3, paragraph 13) New

Systems Engineering Protect Critical Technology
Enhance the Exportability of Defense Systems Facilitate International Cooperative Programs Promote Allied and Friendly Nation Interoperability

Critical Program Information
CPI is defined as the elements or components of an RD&A program that, if compromised, could: Cause significant degradation in mission effectiveness Shorten expected combat-effective life of the system Significantly alter program direction Enable an adversary to overcome the technology CPI includes: Critical information, elements, or components Classified or unclassified technology “Crown jewels” requiring extraordinary protection

Program Protection Plan (PPP)
Single source document Comprehensive protection Objective: Prevent exploitation of U.S. technology or the development of countermeasures to U.S. defense systems When: As soon as CPI is identified, should be approved at Milestone A; must be updated at subsequent Milestones Responsibility: PM Approval: MDA

Differential Capability
DEF Dimensions Differential Capability Design, develop, and test modifications to the DoD configuration that incorporate partner/customer nation unique capabilities and remove (and confirm the removal of) U.S.-only capabilities/CPI to create one or more exportable versions of the system Anti-Tamper (AT) System engineering activities designed into the system architecture to protect CPI against: Unwanted technology transfer Countermeasure development Capability/performance degradation through unauthorized system intrusion/modification Deter, impede, detect, and respond to exploitation of CPI in DoD systems resulting from combat losses or export sales

Anti-Tamper (A-T) A-T and FMS A-T Disclosure Guidelines
ATEA coord. on LOR responses for systems containing CPI A-T mechanisms and costs must be included in the LOA Compliance with A-T requirements certified to DSCA ATEA must approve A-T Plan prior to LOA offer Satisfactory V&V testing completed before export A-T Disclosure Guidelines Fact of A-T implementation should be unclassified Advising foreign partners that system contains A-T measures is usually best course of action Measures used to implement A-T will normally be classified and should not be disclosed

Defense Exportability Features (DEF) Pilot Program
FY11 NDAA directed SECDEF to “carry out a pilot program to develop and incorporate technology protection features in a designated system during the R&D phase of such system.” Program Scope/Status Identify MDAPs for which there is significant anticipated export demand and whose technical aspects are amenable to DEF Pilot program to provide funding to evaluate exportability and facilitate planning for, design, and incorporation of exportability features during RDT&E AT&L selects candidate programs from MILDEP nominations FY12 NDAA change Industry to share at least half the cost of developing and implementing program protection features FY14 NDAA extended pilot program through October 2020 FY15 NDAA gives SECDEF flexibility to determine cost share Defense Exportability is Part of BBP 2.0

Developing Exportable Configurations
At the Development RFP Release Decision and Milestone B, the MDA should determine if one or more exportable configurations should be developed Informed by feasibility studies; requirements included in RFP Funding sources must be identified Most Programs Employ a Combination of Funding Sources ICP funding (various alternatives) Industry (various alternatives) FMS or DCS customer nation funding DSCA Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF) Title 10 funding (specific authorization & appropriation)

FY12 DEF Pilot Programs Programs MILDEP Contractor Milestone
Joint Proximity/Height of Burst Fusing (HOBF) Army Picatinny Arsenal Non-MDAP Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense (AIAMD) Northrop Grumman Post-B Indirect Fires Protection Capability, Increment 2 – Intercept (IFPC2-I) AoA Pre-A Common Infrared Counter Measures (CIRCM) BAE Systems Pre-B MQ-4C Triton (formerly Broad Area Maritime Surveillance, BAMS) Navy Three Dimensional Expeditionary Long Range Radar (3DELRR) Air Force Raytheon Lockheed Martin 42

FY13-14 DEF Pilot Programs Programs MILDEP Contractor Milestone
Next Generation Jammer (NGJ) Navy Source Selection Post-A Air & Missile Defence Radar (AMDR) Post-B P-8A Poseidon Boeing Post-C E2D Advanced Hawkeye Northrop Grumman Post-FRP Small Diameter Bomb II (SDB II) Air Force Raytheon MQ-9 Reaper General Atomics Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) Lockheed Martin Joint Ground to Air Missile (FY14) Army Lockheed Martin (LM) Pre-B Armed Aerial Scout and Ground Combat Vehicle N/A 43

How Many Configurations?
Few Simpler design and test Simpler production and logistics Easier upgrades More affordable Many Greater customer choice Treats countries differently Tailored logistics and upgrades More expensive DoD and partner/customer nations must compromise to achieve optimal outcomes for all (easy to say, hard to do)

Defense Exportability Activities
IOC A C B LRIP Technology Maturation & Risk Reduction. Production & Deployment DRFPRD Materiel Solution Analysis CDD-V CDD ICD Draft Operations & Support Materiel Development Decision FRP Sustainment Disposal FOC Engineering & Manufacturing Development CDR CPD PDR Exportability Assessment Projected sales Technology complexity Exportability Feasibility Studies Conducted with program contractor Included in TMRR contract Funded by program or DEF PE Industry provides 50% Exportable Designs Funded by program, cooperative program or customer, or industry (or combination) May be multiple configurations Exportable Version Production Funded by customer Exportable Version Depot & Spares Activities Require MDA Approval

Int’l Acquisition Transactions Looking Forward -- Macro View
Add Inquiry, Partnership Discussion or Request for Purchase FMS Export Control Capabilities & Tech Willing to Transfer US Strategy & Policy Initial TSFD & DEF TSFD DCS Int’l Acquisition Transactions ? ICP Desired Capabilities & Tech Foreign Strategy & Policy Other Engage Earlier Defense Acquisition System

The Dilemma Will these new TSFD/DEF initiatives help?
Provide required capabilities quickly to allies and friends Protect the “crown jewels” of U.S. defense technology Will these new TSFD/DEF initiatives help?

Reference Charts

TSFD process approvals are normally required for DoD-related gov’t and industry international acquisition activities TSFD processes run independently under leadership of different USG/DoD Departments, Agencies & organizations PMs/IPT members should work with DoD Component Foreign Disclosure Offices (FDOs) to identify/initiate required actions NDP DoD Lead: OUSD (P) EO 12356 - 1 DoDI Primary Process LO/CLO AT&L 12968 13526 S SAP DoDD 5230.8 COMSEC NSA & NII C 5200.5 NSD 42 CJSI A DSC DSD Memo 10/27/0 8 SP & DUSD TSP& 2/26/09 Specialized MTCR DSCA/ Policy ITAR 121.16 M process Intel USD(I) DODD DIA DPR 00 217 99 JP 2 01 DCID 6/7 ICD 113 Data Links PNT/ GPS DODI NSPD #39 MNIS CENTRIX JS 8110.1 Geo spatial Products NGA 1/8 No documented EW TBD 3222.4 O MILDEP Processes Various specific various Normally Requires Coordination with Multiple Organizations USG/TSFD foreign disclosure decision making is a complex process. There are 13 TSFD processes that could adversely affect S&T international engagement and cooperation efforts if not properly planned for and addressed. General information on these TSFD processes may be found in DoDD , “Arms Transfer and Technology Release Senior Steering Group and Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure Office, dated October 14, 2014”. Fortunately, DoD Component IPOs are quite familiar with these TSFD processes, and normally work with S&T managers and organizations within their DoD Component to identify pertinent TSFD requirements and obtain necessary TSFD approvals and (if applicable) related export control approvals. For S&T ICP International Agreements, IEAs/DEAs, and ESEP assignments, TSFD review and approvals are an integral part of these processes. The TSFD aspects of foreign visits to DoD facilities are addressed as part of the foreign visit approval process discussed in the previous chart. TSFD approvals associated with U.S. S&T community visits to foreign locations are normally addressed by DoD Component-specific policy and procedural guidance available from the parent S&T command’s Foreign Disclosure Office (FDO) and/or DoD Component IPO. Finally, as noted in previous charts, early identification of CPI and critical technology components by S&T community personnel that support systems development efforts often helps identify which TSFD processes pertain to development of defense exportability features for new and upgraded DoD systems and equipment. Consult/Coordinate with Local/DoD Component FDOs

NDPC Membership Special Members Director, National Intelligence
General Members State Defense Army Navy Air Force CJCS Special Members Director, National Intelligence Director, Central Intelligence Department of Energy Department of Defense: OUSD(P) OUSD(I) OUSD(AT&L) CIO OATSD (NCB) Defense Intelligence Agency National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency National Security Agency Missile Defense Agency

Country Charts Annex to NDP-1
Military Materiel and Munitions Applied Research and Development Info and Materiel Production Information Combined Military Operations, Planning, and Readiness U.S. Order of Battle North American Defense Military Intelligence Country A Country B Country C 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 S C TS Organization, Training, and Employment of Military Forces

Visit Request Process – Foreign Visits System (FVS)
Defense Visit Offices Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Defense Foreign Liaison (PO-FL) Department of the Air Force Foreign Disclosure and Technology Transfer Division (SAF/IAPD) Department of the Navy Navy International Programs Office (NIPO-10) Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence Directorate of International Relations (DAMI-IR) Visit Request Cognizant Foreign Disclosure Office DoD/ Commercial Visit Location Foreign Embassy Approval/Denial Non-Sponsor Recommendation

Foreign Personnel Assignments
All visit requirements apply Additional requirements also apply Three basic types of assignments: Foreign Liaison Officer (FLO) Program – national representatives, usually for FMS or operations Defense Personnel Exchange Program (DPEP) – reciprocal personnel exchange to familiarize Cooperative Program Personnel (CPP) Program – assigned in support of a cooperative program

U.S. Visits Overseas U.S. DoD Personnel … U.S. Contractor Personnel …
Follow DoD Foreign Clearance Guide (FCG) Submission normally 30 days in advance Submission of appropriate clearances: Theater Clearance – U.S. military facility Country Clearance – Host Govt. or contractor facility Special Area Clearance – restricted visits U.S. Contractor Personnel … Per the FCG for DoD-sponsored visits Per the ITAR and NISPOM DISCO procedures apply

Program Security Instruction (PSI)
Details the security arrangements for an ICP Harmonizes security requirements of participants’ national laws and regulations Implements security-related international agreement provisions Format contained in Multinational Industrial Security Working Group (MISWG) Document #5 Forming a PSI working group and preparing the PSI in parallel with agreement negotiation/signature is recommended Security Classification Guide (SCG) may be attached to the PSI

CUI Markings Information that has been determined to qualify for CUI status shall be indicated by markings Marking information FOUO does not automatically qualify it for exemption from public release pursuant to the FOIA CUI disseminated outside the DoD shall also bear a marking that states that the information may be exempt from mandatory disclosure in accordance with the FOIA

Arms Export Control Act
Encourages restraint but recognizes that nations have valid defense requirements Recognizes most nations need help in acquiring defense capabilities and the need for defense cooperation among U.S. friends and allies Authorizes arms exports under direction of the President; Secretary of State shall administer or control Recipients must adhere to U.S. terms regarding: Transfer Use Protection

ITAR – “Parts & Pieces” Part 120 Definitions
Part 121 U.S. Munitions List (USML) Part 122 Registration Part 123 Defense Articles Part 124 Agreements and Defense Services Part 125 Technical Data and Classified Defense Articles Part 126 General Policies and Provisions Part 127 Violations and Penalties Part 128 Administrative Procedures Part 129 Registration and Licensing of Brokers Part 130 Political Contributions, Fees and Commissions

ITAR Export Authorizations
Numbered License (DSP-5, DSP-83, etc.) Agreement (MLA, TAA, DLA) Exemption (Self-executing or Triggered) Can be revoked, suspended, or amended by DDTC for a variety of reasons Identifies the export, the article/technical data, any intermediate consignee, the end-user, and the end use License is valid for 4 years; agreement normally 10 years; records must be maintained for 5 years

What is an Export? (120.17) Sending/taking defense articles out of U.S. in any manner Transferring registration, control, or ownership to a foreign person of any aircraft, vessel, or satellite covered by the USML in U.S. or abroad Disclosing (including orally and visually) or transferring any defense article or technical data: To an embassy, agency or subdivision of a foreign government in U.S. To a foreign person in U.S. or abroad Performing a defense service on behalf of or for the benefit of a foreign person whether in U.S. or abroad

Defense Article (120.6) Any item (hardware, services, technical data) identified in Part 121 (the United States Munitions List (USML)) The USML contains 21 categories of articles, services and related technical data that are designated as defense articles and thus subject to export controls Department of State (DoS) designates with Department of Defense (DoD) concurrence

How? Why? Technical Data (120.10)
Information which is required for the design, development, production, manufacture, assembly, operation, repair, testing, maintenance or modification of defense articles Can include: Classified Information Information covered by invention secrecy order Software defined in Part 121.8 Does not include: General scientific, mathematical or engineering data taught in schools, or otherwise in the public domain; or Basic marketing information on function or purpose or general system descriptions of defense articles How? Why?

USG Export Control Reform
Launched by the President in August 2009 Major overhaul of U.S. export control process System rooted in Cold War era Basic principles … “simple yet comprehensive,” and higher walls around fewer items Challenge is balancing foreign policy with technology security priorities State of the Union and QDR, early 2010 Secretary Gates’ speech (April 2010) “We need a system that dispenses with the 95% of ‘easy’ cases and concentrate our resources on the remaining 5%”

Defense Service (120.9) The furnishing of technical assistance, including training, to foreign persons, whether in the United States or abroad, in the design, development, engineering, manufacture, production, assembly, testing, repair, maintenance, modification, operation, demilitarization, destruction, processing or use of defense articles

Export Control Websites
ECR General Information About ECR – Areas of Reform – For Exporters State Department (DDTC) Background – ECR Announcements – ECR Implementation Status – Decision Tools – FAQs Commerce Department (BIS) Reform tab … ECR Teleconference – Decision Tree Tools – ECR FAQs

System Security Engineering
Integrating process for mitigating and managing risks to advanced technology and mission-critical system functionality Provides the functional discipline within SE to ensure that security requirements are included in the engineering analysis Should include an assessment of security criteria that sets limits for: International Cooperative Programs Foreign Military Sales Direct Commercial Sales From this assessment; engineering, hardware, and software alternatives (i.e. export variants and anti-tamper provisions) should be identified that would permit such transactions

Program Protection Plan (PPP) -- DAG Chapter 13.2. --
System development document focused on identification and protection of CPI as well as mission critical functions and components Milestone A and B PPPs should include areas such as: Program’s potential for ICP efforts (including S&T) and future foreign sales Initial TSFD and defense exportability activities including: Candidate CPI identification for domestic and export configurations Potential defense exportability system security design risk mitigation measures (anti-tamper, differential capabilities) Summaries of threats/risks/cost using format contained in OUSD(AT&L) Memo of July 18, 2011 S&T Community may participate in system development-related: IAC and ICP S&T activities that support system development objectives Defense Exportability Features (DEF) feasibility study efforts Since S&T community members may be asked to help system development Program Managers and their Integrated Product Team (IPTs) prepare PPPs, we have included a chart on this subject in this presentation. Per DoD 5000 series policy, an initial PPP must be prepared for Milestone A. This initial PPP should be refined and updated the program moves forward through subsequent system development Milestones. Chapter 13.2 of the DAG provides specific guidance on PPP preparation, including hyperlinks to these two documents: AT&L’s guidance memo on PPPs: PPP format: DoDI , Critical Program Information (CPI) Protection within the Department of Defense, defines CPI as elements or components of a Research, Development, and Acquisition (RDA) program that, if compromised, could cause significant degradation in mission effectiveness; shorten the expected combat-effective life of the system; reduce technological advantage; significantly alter program direction; or enable an adversary to defeat, counter, copy, or reverse engineer the technology or capability. If tasked to do so, S&T community members should assist PMs/IPTs in identifying potential CPI and critical technology components using the criticality analysis approach contained in the PPP guidance documents cited above.

PPP Template Per USD(AT&L) Memo of July 18, 2011 … Introduction
Program Protection Summary CPI and Critical Components Horizontal Protection Threats, Vulnerabilities & Countermeasures Other System Security Related Plans/Documents Program Protection Risks Foreign Involvement Processes for Mgmt and Implementation of PPP Processes for Monitoring and Reporting Compromises Program Protection Costs Appendices A – E DAG Chap. 13 provides additional guidance on PPP development

EMD Exportable Design & Development
Exportable configurations should be developed during EMD or LRIP if there is a firm commitment such as: One or more signed ICP international agreements One or more signed FMS LOAs A USG-approved export of proposed U.S. industry DCS transactions DSCA use of Special Defense Acquisition Funding (SDAF) in anticipation of FMS cases (under consideration) Title 10 funding specifically authorized/appropriated for exportable D&D work No Standard Approach PMs Should Pursue All Available Alternatives

Handouts

MILDEP Processes DoD Lead: Various MILDEP-specific various MILDEP Process Other DoD Processes Org.-specific various Few documented processes Interagency process LO/CLO AT&L Primary AT SAP SAPCO Specialized DSC AT&L + Policy Intel USD(I) Data Links/WF DoD CIO PNT/GPS COMSEC NSA & DoD CIO GEOINT NGA MTCR Policy NDP EW None No single process NVD/INS DTSA

TSFD “Macro-Process” OSD High Level Decisions (~200/yr)
Specialized Routine Decisions (~500/yr) DoD Component Routine Decisions (~85,000/yr)

Developing Exportable Configurations
At the Development RFP Release Decision and Milestone B, the MDA should determine if one or more exportable configurations should be developed Informed by feasibility studies; requirements included in RFP Funding sources must be identified Most Programs Employ a Combination of Funding Sources ICP funding (various alternatives) Industry (various alternatives) FMS or DCS customer nation funding DSCA Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF) Title 10 funding (specific authorization & appropriation)

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