1. Storage Fields in CA and Lessons Learned from Aliso Canyon Gas Storage Leak
Matthewson (Matt) Epuna
Program and Project Supervisor
California Public Utilities Commission
This presentation product does not constitute the opinion of the Commission.

2. CA UNDERGROUND GAS STORAGE RESERVOIR REGULATORY STRUCTURE
Before and After October 23, 2015:
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) Regulates the horizontal gas pipeline (Gas Flow Lines) from the Wellhead to the Transmission pipeline(Flow Lines – upstream, Transmission and Local Distribution Center (LDC)
California Department of Conservation, Division of Oil, Gas, and Geothermal Resources (DOGGR) Regulates the vertical piping from the Wellhead to the tubulars/wellbore from the Wellhead to the production/injection zones
A certificate of public convenience and necessity or certificate of public convenience regulatory compliance

3. CPUC STORAGE FIELD REGULATION
CPUC RULES AND REGULATIONS APPLIED TO GAS STORAGE FIELDS:
CA Public Utilities Code (CA PU Code) (Under CA Law, the Public Utilities Commission is authorized to supervise and regulate every public utility in the state)
General Order (G.O.) 112-F Referenced 49 CFR Parts 191,192, 199 and 40
G.O 58 A & B
Commission Decisions & Directives

4. DOGGR’s STORAGE FIELDS REGULATION
DOGGR’s APPLICABLE RULES AND REGULATIONS:
California Laws for the Conservation of Oil, Gas, and Geothermal Resources
California Code of Regulations (Title 14, Division 2, Chapters 2, 3 and 4)
Emergency Regulations Orders

5. Gas Storage Fields in California
Year Established
Field
Working Gas (BCF)
1941
La Goleta
21.5
1942
Playa Del Rey
2.4
1973
Aliso Canyon
86.0
1975
Honor Rancho
24.2
Kirby Hills
15.0
1976
McDonald Island
82.0
1979
Los Medanos
18.0
Pleasant Creek
2.3
1997
Wild Goose
75.0
2001
Lodi
17.0
2010
Princeton
11.0
Gill Ranch
20.0
Total
385.4

6. ALISO CANYON INCIDENT TIMELINE
On Oct 23, 2015, SCG discovered a leak near SS-25 Well.
On Oct 24th, 2015, the first top kill operation conducted. (Six total attempts were made with the last one on November 25th None of them were effective)
On Nov 16, 2015, Relief Well #1 (P39A) Spud.
On Dec10, 2015, DOGGR Supervisor issued Order 1106
On Feb 12, 2016, SS-25 was controlled from P39A.
Between Feb 15-18, 2016, SS-25 confirmed sealed.
March 4, 2016, DOGGR Supervisor issued Order 1109
On Dec issued Order 1106 not to inject into the storage reservoir until order is lifted
On March 4, 2016 Issued Order 1109 to perform comprehensive Safety Review

7. During Well Kill Operations
Well Kill Operation – Southern California Gas Co. (SCG), Boots & Coots and CA DOGGR
Incident Command Structure (ICS)- LA County FD
Air Monitoring for Methane & Other Constituents- SCG, CARB, SCAQMD and LA County Department of Public Health
Residents Relocation (approx. 8,000 residents relocated), and Cleaning of affected homes – SCG
Closed 2 Elementary Schools and Relocated Students & Instructional activities – School District
Projected Cost of Kill Operations, Recovery and Investigation is in Excess of $500 M

8. INVESTIGATIONS
There Are Three Active Parallel Investigations and Safety Review:
CPUC Investigation – Determine Cause, Verify Compliance and Prevent Recurrence Per G.O. 112-F and PU Code
DOGGR Investigation - Determine Cause, Verify Compliance and Prevent Recurrence Per its Rules and Regulations
BLADE ENERGY PARTNERS – Perform complete Root Cause Analysis (RCA)
DOGGR Safety Review – Per Division Supervisor’s Emergency Orders (Conduct Batteries of Tests)
CPUC, no later than July 1, 2017, open a proceeding to determine the feasibility of minimizing or eliminating use of the Aliso Canyon natural gas storage facility
to determine the feasibility of minimizing or eliminating use of the Aliso Canyon natural gas storage facility

9. LESSONS LEARNED
Regulators, SCG and Stakeholders Take Away the Following Lessons Learned:
Importance of Gas Storage to LA Basin (Reliability impacts on Electric Generators and Industrial Customers)
Establish in early stage a Unified Incident Command Structure (ICS)
ICS Commander to designate Access Control & Restrictions
Establish Roles and Responsibilities and designate Contacts
Establish Effective and Efficient Communication Systems
Establish Effective Response Systems to Address Public Concerns
Establish and Coordinate Environmental Monitoring with Affected Agencies

10. LESSONS LEARNED Cont’d
Establish Plan to Educate Responding Agencies about Underground Gas Storage Operations especially before an Emergency
Establish Inter Agency Coordination
Urgent Need to Update Rules and Regulations to Address:
Well Construction Standards
Integrated Storage Well Risk Management Program
Advance Monitoring and Testing Program that includes MIT
Improved Inspection Regime and Frequency
Comprehensive Emergency Response Plans and Notification
Land Use Permitting

11. LESSONS LEARNED Cont’d
Urgent Need to Mandate Implementation of Storage Well Integrity Management Program, Identical to Transmission Pipeline Integrity Management Program (TIMP) that Addresses:
Data gathering and Integration
Threats and Hazards Identification
Risk Analysis & Prioritization
Remediation and Implementation of Preventative and Mitigative Measures
Continual Well Integrity Evaluation and Reassessment of Threats and Hazards
Limiting Injection and Withdrawal through Production Tubing Only (prohibition of injection and withdrawal through Casing annulus)

12. For Additional Information:
Thank you!
For Additional Information: