1. Prof. Panayotis Tsakonas University of the Aegean
The Migration/Refugee Crisis in the Mediterranean EU Perspectives and Strategies
Prof. Panayotis Tsakonas
University of the Aegean

2. The News is Bad and the Prospects are Bleak
No precedent for such a large and abrupt flow of war refugees
No prospects for the refugees early return home
# Quite the Opposite if adding to the equation the current situation in the Middle East, i.e. post-conflict Afghanistan and conflict-ridden Iraq & Syrian imbroglio #
Climate change will further exacerbate existing threats/challenges and/or create new ones

7. Climate Change as a Threat
Contributes to violent conflict and disputes from the local to the international level
Leads to state fragility, radicalization and degrading state capacities to ensure public order and stability
which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability
Degrade human security and livelihoods via increased risks of disasters, food insecurity, energy poverty etc.
A threat multiplier, which may create or exacerbate insecurities and tensions from the individual to the international level

8. Dealing with the phenomenon
# Cannot Stop it #
# Cannot Solve it #
# Can only attempt to better manage it #
Yet in a highly complicated and unpredictable security environment

9. A complex security environment

11. EU Confronts the Migration/Refugee crisis

12. Already since 2012: % of the irregular migrants detected at the EU’s external borders were detected at the Mediterranean
In 2013:
70% of detections at the
EU maritime borders
(whereas at the same period in
2012, such detections accounted
only for 40%)

14. The Migration Routes Five (5) major routes across the Mediterranean
The most travelled depends largely on
pressures in migrants’ home countries
the response at the EU's external borders

17. Dangerous and Fatal Journeys

18. Loss of human lives

20. March 2015 The first wake-up call for lethargic Europe
EU’s Confession of Inefficacy and Failure
“The situation in the Mediterranean is a tragedy”
Special meeting of the European Council, 23 April 2015 – statement

22. July/August 2015 The second wake-up call
Things can get worse with the “Mediterranean tragedy”

23. 2015 (first 8 months): Refugees and migrants crossing the Mediterranean: exceeded 300,000 (almost 200,000 people landing in Greece and 110,000 in Italy) (the whole year): 219,000 people crossed the Mediterranean. 

29. From South to Central and North Europe ROUTES

31. SHOW INCREASE IN 2015 IN THE EASTERN MED ROUTE
Through GREECE (via Kos and Lesvos)

32. EU policies vis-à-vis illegal migration prove ineffective

33. “The Perception – Implementation Gap” National instruments:
"Decision" "Talk"
Since early 1990s: migration is perceived and approached as a threat (“Fortress Europe”)
Migration and border policing are "securitized" and "operationalized"
DISCOURSE
ACTION
"Policies on paper" "Implementation"
Short-term
Deterrence and Management of EU External Borders
Medium and Long-term
"Externalization of EU instruments and policies"
EU instruments:
FRONTEX, EUROSUR, EUROPOL etc.
Security
Prioritization of Threats and Challenges into EU’s External as well as Internal Security documents; linkages with terrorism, WMD, illegal trafficking, crime, failed states etc.
Institutionalization of cooperation with countries of origin and transit countries
"Five Year Programs" (Tampere, The Hague, Stockholm): "Common European Asylum System"
linking JHA with EU's external action
Development
Address the root causes; aid for development of the countries of origin
“New Migration Partnership Framework”
Through EU's Med. Institutional Initiatives, i.e. EMP, ENP (Action Plans)
National instruments:
Operation "Mare Nostrum", Evros Fence etc.

34. EU Policies and Actions
Forthcoming "verbal policy" & "new institutional initiatives"
#Tough-talk vs. soft and ill-defined action#

35. (EU HRFASP F. Mogherini – Commissioner D. Avramopoulos)
4 March: EU Commission launches its work on a “European Agenda on Migration”
20 April: 10 points for immediate action
(EU HRFASP F. Mogherini – Commissioner D. Avramopoulos)
Expanding emergency nautical rescues, destroying traffickers' boats and an "emergency mechanism for the resettlement" of refugees
23 April: EU Council special meeting: 4 Measures
The EU will "do everything possible to save people from dying at sea"
28 April: A new European Agenda on Security
13 May: (EU Commission) A European Agenda on Migration
Rules for access to the European Union (who will take how much quota of immigrants and which kind of immigrants get access to the EU)

36. EU Policies and Actions
Forthcoming "verbal policy" & "new institutional initiatives"
#Tough-talk vs. soft and ill-defined action#
Series of subsequent and extraordinary meetings, reflect
the lack of a comprehensive plan/strategy
#The EU is Governed by Summits#

37. Special EU Council Meeting, June 2015
Emergency Ministerial Meeting of Home and Justice Affairs,
14 September 2015
Special EU Council Meeting, 23 September 2015
Meeting of the Western Balkans Migration Route, 25 October 2015
EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan, 29 November 2015
Special meeting ……..

38. EU Policies and Actions
Forthcoming "verbal policy" & "new institutional initiatives"
#Tough-talk vs. soft and ill-defined action#
Series of subsequent and extraordinary meetings, reflect
the lack of a comprehensive plan/strategy
#The EU is Governed by Summits#
Institutional Decisions vs. National (In)action
# “It's the implementation, stupid”
Need to do, what we agreed at all fronts#

39. Rise of nationalist political parties and/or governments (Hungary, Slovenia, the Czech Republic), who are in favor of tightly controlled borders that would leave Muslims outside
# Politically toxic Islam is “the elephant in the room”#
EU is divided along new fault lines
# “Responsible members", i.e. those supporting "compulsory solidarity" and the "buck-passers", i.e. those in favor of "voluntary solidarity“, not willing to accept any burden-sharing scheme#

42. Relocation Resettlement EU-Turkey Agreement (March 2016) “1: 1”
Total number from Greece and Italy: 1.145
(target: 6.000)
Resettlement
Since the beginning of the program (20/7/2015) were resettled in 15 EU member-states
EU-Turkey Agreement (March 2016) “1: 1”
Target: refugees
Record: sent back to Turkey (900 to EU members)

43. Institutional Decisions vs. National Actions
FUNDING
Since Sep. 2015: EU institutions committed 2.8 billion euros to tackling the crisis (500 million euros are earmarked for the Syria Trust Fund, 1.8 million for the Africa Trust Fund and 500 million for humanitarian assistance) and Member-States pledged only about a half a billion euros (18 million for the Syria Trust Fund, 12 million for the Africa Trust Fund and 416 million for humanitarian aid)
Shortfall of 2.35 billion euros. 
OPERATIONAL FRONT
FRONTEX asked for additional 775 officers: 10 countries dispatched 447
European Asylum Support Office requested additional 374 experts: 6 member-states provided 81
Only 6 countries notified their reception capacities for the relocation of people to their territories
Hungary is refusing to even send liaison officers to Greece and Italy (based on the relocation deal to which it was forced to agree)
COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM
Almost all EU members fail to implement important provisions pertaining to either one or all elements
of the Common European Asylum System
September 2015: EU Commission launched 40 new infringement procedures against 19 member states on top of the 34 cases already open

44. EU Policies and Actions
Forthcoming "verbal policy" & "new institutional initiatives"
#Tough-talk vs. soft and ill-defined action#
Series of subsequent and extraordinary meetings, reflect
the lack of a comprehensive plan/strategy
#The EU is Governed by Summits#
Institutional Decisions vs. National (In)action
#It's the implementation, stupid"
Need to do, what we agreed at all fronts#
Delicate compromise deal with Turkey

47. EU Policies and Actions
Forthcoming "verbal policy" & "new institutional initiatives"
#Tough-talk vs. soft and ill-defined action#
Series of subsequent and extraordinary meetings, reflect
the lack of a comprehensive plan/strategy
#The EU is Governed by Summits#
Institutional Decisions vs. National (In)action
#It's the implementation, stupid"
Need to do, what we agreed at all fronts#
Delicate compromise deal with Turkey
Half-measures (EBCG and …some of NATO)

48. In search of a comprehensive strategy
Implement more rapidly the agreed in Sep.2015 ( ) relocation scheme
Still in the very beginning: less than 1000 refugees relocated so far //
Germany’s attempt to form a “Coalition of the Willing”
Implement the agreed European Common Asylum System
Reform “Dublin II”
Repeated promises given by the EU Commissioner to be implemented since spring 2016
Enabling refugees to access legal travel routes --thus eradicating
the very rationale of the smuggling networks
Through a form of “extra-territorial asylum processing”
Create “sanitary zones” or “hot-sports” in the major refugee hosting countries, e.g. Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon;
Establish small consular posts (e.g. Bodrum/Turkey or Zuwara, Libya) quickly screening
refugees and allow them access to Europe (provide “humanitarian visas”)

49. Additional Data

51. EU Council decisions: Inadequate, Ineffective
Failure of ambition
concerns on the goals it sets out
and the means it suggests the EU will use to achieve those goals
EXAMPLES
Use of force against smuggling rings in northern Africa
the mission's scope and goals will be difficult to define, and its success remains dubious.
several EU members will oppose the use of force in Libya at a time when the bloc is pushing for a diplomatic solution to the country's civil war.
there will likely be disagreement over who should staff the mission and whether the United Nations should approve it
Fail to agree on redistribution of asylum seekers
Disagreements stated by Britain, Denmark, Latvia (against a mandatory system of resettlement)

52. EU Commission Recommendations – June 2015 Strong Opposition
Directly accepting 20,000 refugees from crisis-stricken regions in the coming two years, and using a quota system to distribute them across the 28 member states.
The burden on EU countries like Italy, Greece and Malta, on whose coasts most of the refugees land, was to be reduced. Some 40,000 people were to be "taken off their hands," also with the help of a fixed distribution scheme.
Quotas’ (“distribution key”) criteria, e.g. receiving countries population, economic strength [income, unemployment rate], the number of refugees already accepted.
Can Solidarity be Voluntary?
EU members from East and Central Europe (Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) blocked the sharing plan and say NO to “Compulsory Solidarity” and NO to “mandatory Quotas”
RESULT: the 28 EU nations (of a half-billion people and the world's most powerful trading bloc) have proved unable to share 40,000 Syrians and Eritreans arriving in Greece and Italy)

53. Changing hearts and minds
Germany
It suspended deporting asylum-seekers from Syria
under the EU’s controversial Dublin Regulation (i.e.
migrants can only apply for asylum in the first EU
member state they enter, and face deportation if they
try to apply in another) Started processing applications
from Syrians even if they have made their way through
other EU countries.
“The Shenghen zone "cannot exist" if other EU states
continue to fail to take their share of asylum seekers”
“We can handle the influx of at least asylum
seekers per year”
France
“We must implement a unified asylum system”
“Migrants should be shared more evenly among EU states”

54. Germany’s immediate contribution
In 2015 alone Germany expects to take in 800,000 refugees, many of them fleeing war and conflict in Syria, northern Africa, Afghanistan and Iraq
6 billion euros in additional spending for federal, state and local efforts are planned for 2016
To speed asylum processing, the federal office for migration and refugees will further boost hiring
It is participating in the rescue operations in the Mediterranean as part of the EU Naval Forces mission (EUNAVFOR Med), which will target human trafficking.
Germany is working together with UN Special Envoy Léon to rebuild state structures and to facilitate the formation of a national unity government in Libya

55. Governed by Summits (subsequent and Extraordinary)
Emergency Ministerial Meeting of Home and Justice Affairs,
Brussels, 14 September 2015
AGREE
Move the EU’s naval operation against human smugglers – EUNAVFOR Med– to the first step of phase 2”.
Install the so-called “hotspots” (mostly in Italy and Greece) to increase the EU’s capacity to better identify and register migrants at their point of entry into the European Union
Implement a plan –decided in June 2015 by EU Heads of states-- to relocate 40,000 refugees (i.e. migrants in need of international protection).
DISAGREE
The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania opposed and Poland and Latvia showed significant skepticism on the Commission’s plan to relocate an additional 120,000 refugees

56. …finally decided to: Agreed on an Action Plan with Turkey
Special EU Meeting, Brussels, 23 September
Ratify the plan to redistribute 120,000 refugees from Hungary, Italy, and Greece to other EU countries (EU members elaborate on a “compulsory quotas” scheme)
Increase humanitarian aid to Syria’s neighbors
EU funding to refugee hosting countries ($1.3 billion requested by the UNHCR) for providing temporary protection
Agreed on an Action Plan with Turkey

57. In search of a comprehensive strategy
Define the short and medium-term goals and objectives
Re-prioratization of goals in a new EU Security Strategy Document (EU Global Strategy 2016?);
EU bolstering its external action (“European Border Guards”) for better managingthe refugee/migration flows etc.
Define the means available
What kind of synergies with NATO ? (Is NATO on-board?)
Is there a role for current EU Med. initiatives, i.e. UfM, ENP?
How to constructively engage a “pivotal Turkey”?

58. Policy Recommendations
Short and Medium-Term Actions
OPERATIONAL ACTION (Short-term)
Place strong emphasis upon effective police actions against people smugglers (high priority to disrupt the burgeoning smuggler networks in Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and Turkey)
Draft a list of countries deemed "safe" enough that their citizens would not be eligible for asylum, such as EU membership candidate countries in the Balkans
INSTITUTIONAL ACTION (Short and Medium-term)
Establish a comprehensive common asylum system (change “Dublin II”)
Enabling refugees to access legal travel routes
Through a form of “extra-territorial asylum processing”
Create “sanitary zones” in the major refugee hosting countries, e.g. Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon;
Establish small consular posts (e.g. Bodrum/Turkey or Zuwara, Libya) quickly screening refugees and allow them access to Europe (provide “humanitarian visas”)
Asylum applications could be submitted to a central EU Agency (e.g. EU Migration, Asylum and Protection Agency) for examination and approval; able to make centralized, EU-wide decisions on asylum applications
Increase humanitarian aid in the countries of origin
Define the means available for achieving those objectives
Mkmkm

59. Turkey’s migration control policy: Not helpful
Readmission agreement with Greece (2001)
Not very supportive, e.g : From around 72,000 readmission
requests Greece addressed, Turkey admitted around 7,000 requests and it
eventually delivered less than 1,500 immigrants
Readmission agreement with the European Union (2013)
Not a direct, immediate and viable solution: at work after 3 years, conditional on a ‘trade-off’ (readmission obligations for visa liberalization)
At present, no readmission of nationals from countries Turkey has not signed bilateral agreements with
(5 Oct. 2015) EU Commission proposes a “Draft Action Plan” (manage the situation in Turkey & prevent irregular migration flows from Turkey)
Implementation of the Plan is expected to accelerate the visa liberalization process
Turkey’s EU accession process
Still on hold Freezing of Chapter 24 “Freedom, Justice & Security”

62. EU Asylum Attractive Countries

63. Asylum Attractive countries

64. Jan-Jul 2015. Jan-Jul 2014. EU-28. 437. 384. 269. 320 Europe (38). 583

65. Effects on EU’s Policy Efficacy
Partly effective
border-management:
lack of solidarity among member-states and ESDP limits
lack of implementation of agreements signed with EU's neighbors
European Neighborhood
Policy (ENP)
is unfit to address a complex phenomenon
"Tough-Talk" Objectives vs. Ill-defined and Soft Action
Capabilities - Realities Gap [limits of EU competence]
Divergence in national asylum policy practices among member states
Voluntary vs. Compulsory Solidarity
Divergence in EU members interests on "quotas system"