1. Durchsetzungsmechanismen erga omnes Charakter menschenrechtlicher Verpflichtungen
CASE CONCERNING THE BARCELONA TRACTION, LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY, LIMITED
(Belgium v. Spain)
Judgement, 19 July 1964
“33. When a State admits into its territory foreign investments or foreign nationals, whether natural or juristic persons, it is bound to extend to them the protection of the law and assumes obligations concerning the treatment to be afforded them. These obligations, however, are neither absolute nor unqualified. In particular, an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
34. Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of protection have entered into the body of general international law (Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23); others are conferred by international instruments of a universal or quasi-universal character.”

2. erga omnes Charakter menschenrechtlicher Verpflichtungen
ICJ, CASE CONCERNING ARMED ACTIVITIES ON THE TERRITORY OF THE CONGO
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda)
Judgement, 3 February 2006
“64. The Court will begin by reaffirming that “the principles underlying the [Genocide] Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without any conventional obligation” and that a consequence of that conception is “the universal character both of the condemnation of genocide and of the co-operation required ‘in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge’ (Preamble to the Convention)” (Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23). It follows that “the rights and obligations enshrined by the Convention are rights and obligations erga omnes” (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 616, para. 31).“

3. Durchsetzung von Menschenrechten durch Gegenmaßnahmen ('counter-measures')
ILC Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
Art. 48. Invocation of responsibility by a State other than an injured State
1. Any State other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the responsibility of another State in accordance
with paragraph 2 if:
(a) the obligation breached is owed to a group of States including that State, and is established for the protection of a collective interest of the group; or
(b) the obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole.
2. Any State entitled to invoke responsibility under paragraph 1 may claim from the responsible State:
(a) cessation of the internationally wrongful act, and assurances and guarantees of non-repetition in accordance with article 30; and
(b) performance of the obligation of reparation in accordance with the preceding articles, in the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached.
(…)
Article 49. Object and limits of countermeasures
1. An injured State may only take countermeasures against a State which is responsible for an internationally wrongful act in order to induce that State to comply with its obligations under Part Two.

4. Durchsetzung von Menschenrechten durch Gegenmaßnahmen ('counter-measures')
ILC Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
Article 50. Obligations not affected by countermeasures
1. Countermeasures shall not affect:
(a) the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force as embodied in the Charter of the United Nations;
(b) obligations for the protection of fundamental human rights;
(c) obligations of a humanitarian character prohibiting reprisals;
(d) other obligations under peremptory norms of general international law.
Article 51. Proportionality
Countermeasures must be commensurate with the injury suffered, taking into account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the rights in question.
Article 54. Measures taken by States other than an injured State
This chapter does not prejudice the right of any State, entitled under article 48, paragraph 1, to invoke the responsibility of another State, to take lawful measures against that State to ensure cessation of the breach and reparation in the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached.

5. Ansatz der ‘responsibility to protect’
World Summit Document, A/RES/60/1 vom 24. Oktober 2005
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.

6. Ansatz der ‘responsibility to protect’
S/RES/1674 (2006) vom 28. April 2006
4. Reaffirms the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity;(…)
S/RES/1970 (2011) vom 26. Februar 2011
(Präambel)
(…)
Recalling the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect ist population,(…)

7. Vertragliche Verpflichtungen zur einzelstaatlichen Durchsetzung
Art. 4 Anti-Folter Konvention
(1) Jeder Vertragsstaat trägt dafür Sorge, dass nach seinem Strafrecht alle
Folterhandlungen als Straftaten gelten. Das gleiche gilt für versuchte Folterung und für von irgendeiner Person begangene Handlungen, die eine Mittäterschaft oder Teilnahme an einer Folterung darstellen.
(2) Jeder Vertragsstaat bedroht diese Straftaten mit angemessenen Strafen, welche die Schwere der Tat berücksichtigen.
Art. 1 Völkermordkonvention
Die Vertragsparteien bestätigen, dass Völkermord, ob im Frieden oder im Krieg begangen, ein Verbrechen gemäß internationalem Recht ist, zu dessen Verhütung und Bestrafung sie sich verpflichten.

8. Vertragliche Verpflichtungen zur einzelstaatlichen Durchsetzung
ICJ, CASE CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE
(BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA v. SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO)
Judgment, 26 February 2007
“429. First, the Genocide Convention is not the only international instrument providing for an obligation on the States parties to it to take certain steps to prevent the acts it seeks to prohibit. Many other instruments include a similar obligation, in various forms: see, for example, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984 (Article 2); the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, of 14 December 1973 (Art. 4); the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel of 9 December 1994 (Art. 11); the International Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings of 15 December 1997 (Art. 15). The content of the duty to prevent varies from one instrument to another, according to the wording of the relevant provisions, and depending on the nature of the acts to be prevented. The decision of the Court does not, in this case, purport to establish a general jurisprudence applicable to all cases where a treaty instrument, or other binding legal norm, includes an obligation for States to prevent certain acts. Still less does the decision of the Court purport to find whether, apart from the texts applicable to specific fields, there is a general obligation on States to prevent the commission by other persons or entities of acts contrary to certain norms of general international law. The Court will therefore confine itself to determining the specific scope of the duty to prevent in the Genocide Convention, and to the extent that such a determination is necessary to the decision to be given on the dispute before it. This will, of course, not absolve it of the need to refer, if need be, to the rules of law whose scope extends beyond the specific field covered by the Convention.”

9. Vertragliche Verpflichtungen zur einzelstaatlichen Durchsetzung
ICJ, CASE CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE
(BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA v. SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO)
Judgment, 26 February 2007
“430. Secondly, it is clear that the obligation in question is one of conduct and not one of result, in the sense that a State cannot be under an obligation to succeed, whatever the circumstances, in preventing the commission of genocide: the obligation of States parties is rather to employ all means reasonably available to them, so as to prevent genocide so far as possible. A State does not incur responsibility simply because the desired result is not achieved; responsibility is however incurred if the State manifestly failed to take all measures to prevent genocide which were within its power, and which might have contributed to preventing the genocide. In this area the notion of “due diligence”, which calls for an assessment in concreto, is of critical importance. Various parameters operate when assessing whether a State has duly discharged the obligation concerned. The first, which varies greatly from one State to another, is clearly the capacity to influence effectively the action of persons likely to commit, or already committing, genocide. This capacity itself depends, among other things, on the geographical distance of the State concerned from the scene of the events, and on the strength of the political links, as well as links of all other kinds, between the authorities of that State and the main actors in the events. The State’s capacity to influence must also be assessed by legal criteria, since it is clear that every State may only act within the limits permitted by international law; seen thus, a State’s capacity to influence may vary depending on its particular legal position vis-à-vis the situations and persons facing the danger, or the reality, of genocide. On the other hand, it is irrelevant whether the State whose responsibility is in issue claims, or even proves, that even if it had employed all means reasonably at its disposal, they would not have sufficed to prevent the commission of genocide.”