1. Theorist COL (R) John Warden United States Air Force
MAJ Bruce U. Roett Jr. 7 August, 2015 TOA 112
“Mother of all targets” clip to illustrate the theory.

2. Agenda Why John Warden Biography/Context
Theory explanation and analysis
Theory’s impact on doctrine
Conclusion/Take-Aways
Bibliography

3. Why John Warden
Provocative nature of thoughts: air force as an element of national power, air force zealot or strategic thinker?
Lack of any current operational theory of warfare for the use of air force.
Success of Desert Storm Air Campaign and premier authority on air force strategy.
“Why should we start out with airpower has limits in our mind instead of airpower has no limits?” –John Warden, “Strategy and Airpower”

4. Biography Context Air force as an element of national power
1965-United States Air Force Academy graduate
1969-Over 250 combat sorties in Viet Nam piloting an OV-10 Bronco
1975-Directorate of Plans- Pentagon
1988-The Air Campaign, Planning for Combat
1989-Checkmate at Pentagon
1991-Key planner for Desert Storm
1991-Special Assistant to Vice President Dan Quayle
1992-Commandant at the Air Command and Staff College
1995-”The Enemy as a System”
2011-”Strategy and Airpower”
Strategic bombing mission during World War II
Nuclear deterrence mission during Cold War
Ghost of Operation Rolling Thunder
1982-Air Land Battle Doctrine
Fielded forces mission
Air Force looking for identity
1991-Success of Desert Storm
Strategic use of air force doctrine
National level missions permeated Air Force prior to his commission.
Blue sphere=motivation to establish air force as strategic tool based off of his biography and context (blue arrows).
-Tactical employment of air force in Viet Nam flying over 250 tactical missions.
-Operation’s serial use of air power against inconsequential tactical targets (started as strategic threat and ended as tactical air interdiction).
-Air Land Battle further solidified air force’s role as support arm to ground forces.
-Fielded forces mission and searching for an identity.
Red sphere=creation of strategic air force doctrine to connect operational air power to strategic objectives (red arrows indicate works).
Green sphere=test of the doctrine (green arrows indicate tests).
Mention his position as Commandant at ACSC enabled him to develop and permeate his ideas.
Test of doctrine

5. Enemy System Theory Enemy as a system Time value of action
Five-ring model
Explain how theory is broken down into three areas.

6. Enemy as a System Divide enemy into sub-systems
Leverage point identification
Clausewitz’s interrelation
Waltz’s three-images
Ryan’s system approach
Overarching theory of war
Explain how describing the enemy as a system allows planners to visualize the enemy in terms of leverage points that can each yield different results.
Show support of theory.
-Clausewitz: interrelation between all actions affects political probabilities and guides the scope of war.
-Waltz: connection between leader and state.
-Ryan: usefulness in utilizing a systems approach.
3 positive supporting theorists generates a conclusion that this aspect of Warden’s theory can serve as an overarching theory of war.

7. Time Value of Action Identify enemy’s ability to react
Serial and parallel domain
Return on investment for attacking subsystems
Clausewitz’s maximum concentration
Army Operating Concept 2015’s multiple dilemmas
Delbruck’s time and space
Theory of warfare
Explain how ascribing time value of action provides a clearer comprehension of enemy’s ability to react, evolve, and counterattack leading to the design of a plan that remains inside of the enemy’s reaction time.
Show support of theory.
-Clausewitz: maximum concentration at as many points as possible at a single time to deprive the enemy of reaction time.
-AOC 2015: present multiple dilemmas in a simultaneous and overwhelming manner.
-Delbruck: operations in time and space.
2 positive supporting theorists and a supporting current doctrine generate a conclusion that this aspect of Warden’s theory can serve as a theory of warfare.

8. Five-Ring Model Rank ordering of subsystems
Decreasing in importance from inside out
Machiavelli’s army
Clausewitz’s descriptiveness
Clausewitz’s centers of gravity
Neither theory of war or warfare
Fielded Forces
Population
Infrastructure
Processes
Leaders
Explain how the five-ring model narrows a planner’s scope in the design process and risks overlooking subsystems.
Show support of theory.
-Machiavelli: belief that army was imperative to the state.
-Clausewitz: descriptive over prescriptive theory.
-Clausewitz: importance of centers of gravity in crafting operational campaigns.
1 positive supporting theorist does not overcome 2 negative reviews of which indicates a conclusion that this aspect of Warden’s theory can neither serve as a theory of war or warfare.

9. Theory’s Impact on Doctrine/War Plans
Past:
Targeting and effects based operations
Desert Storm
Current:
Joint Publication 3-0
Air Force Doctrine Document 1
Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3
Air Force did not institute Warden’s theory as doctrine despite Desert Storm’s success but his five-ring model influenced targeting doctrine and served as the impetus for effects based operations. Warden’s five-ring model was instrumental in the success of Desert Storm.
JP 3-0 and AFDD 1 use the term strategic attack as a main function of air force.
AFDD 2-3 Irregular Warfare discusses system analysis similar to Warden’s theory of enemy as a system to explore counter-insurgency operations.

10. Conclusion/Take-Aways
Warden’s theory is not a solid framework for strategic planning
Five-ring model fails as a theory
Enemy system as a theory of war
Time value of action as a theory of warfare
Potential for the five-ring model as a theory of war and warfare
Future implication of cyber domain
Summarize analysis of three aspects of theory.
Explain how a sterile five-ring model can serve as a theory of war and when each individual conflict derives its own specific rings, time value of action, and return on investment, it becomes a valid theory of warfare.
Illustrate an example of cyberattack on the various rings, foreshadowing Warden’s assertion that a single service can be an element of national power.

11. Bibliography
Abruzzino, David R. “Old Wine in New Bottles, Douhet, Warden, and Counterinsurgency,” Small Wars Journal (July 2013). Accessed August 1, in-new-bottles-douhet-warden-and-counterinsurgency. Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited and translated by Peter Paret and Michael Howard. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Field Manual 100-5, Operations. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, Halberstam, David. War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals. London: Bloomsbury, Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Art of War. Translated by Peter Whitehorne. London, UK: Sign of the Phoenix, TRADOC Pamphlet , The U.S. Army Operating Concept. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, Waltz, Kenneth N. Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis. New York: Columbia University Press, Warden, John A. The Air Campaign, Planning for Combat. Washington, DC: National Defense University, Warden, John A. “The Enemy as a System.” Airpower Journal VIV, no. 1 (Spring 1995). Accessed August 1, Warden, John A. “Strategy and Airpower.” Air & Space Power Journal XXV, no. 1 (Spring 2011). Accessed April 27, /2011_1.asp.

12. Bibliography
Ryan, Alex. “What is a Systems Approach.” arXiv: v1 [nlin.AO] 10 Sep Delbrück, Hans. History of the Art of War. Translated by Walter J. Renfroe. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990.

13. Questions?