1. Impact of forestry interventions on land conflicts and land tenure in Eastern Africa
Esbern Friis-Hansen, Senior Researcher
Rasmus Hundsbæk Pedersen, Postdoc

2. From land grabbing to unpacking land-based investments?
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3. Background: The land grabbing debate
Triple crisis over finance, fuel and food:
Increased level of FDI into natural resources In developing countries (esp. Africa), preceded by liberalisation.
Flurry of activity, publications, among scholars and NGO activists.
Convergence of critique of contemporary capitalism and neocolonialism.
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4. Land grabbing revisited
Around 2013: land grabbing revited:
Scale: From 203 million ha (2012) to 42.4 million ha (2016) (Land Matrix).
Other actors than FDI involved, unpacking required.
Debates over methodologies and definitions.
= Cotula (2013): The great African Land Grab?
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5. Today: Plural approaches to studying land-based investments
Diversity of drivers and actors: more focus on domestic actors and political economy.
Context matters: more complex links between local-national-international.
Distribution of costs and benefits requires unpacking (though social diversification seem trend across).
Interplay between commoditisation, authority, rights, infrastructure.
Land grabbing label reserved to a narrower set of cases.
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6. Scale and actors of timber rush
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7. Scale and actors of timber rush
OWNERSHIP
Coverage (ha)
0-3 years
3-8 years
> 8 years
Farmers and domestic investors
150,159
7.7%
64.2%
28.2%
Companies
20,573
3.7%
50.1%
46.2%
Government
36,182
5.6%
40.2%
54.2%
Total
206,914
6.9%
85.6%
34.5%
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8. Pace, Scale and Drivers of Timber Rush
Market volume; Market access; Land and labour availability; Culture; Cost-benefit;
Land use factors influencing village plantation
Actors
Land access & process
Value chain
Villagers
Alternative landuse options
Land properties
Infrastructure
Access procedures
Land reforms
Institutions
Governance
Relations (villagers- domestic investors)
Asymetric economy
VC input-output
VC relations
VC governance
VC standards Changes in product, process and fuction
Institutional context
Domestic investors
Foreign investors
Impact
Farmer-investor land conflicts
Agriculture or trees
Income from sale of trees
Labour market
Wider growth from value chain

9. Forest land use
Villagers plant trees on slopes og infertile land, but also on flat fertile agricultural land
Domestic investors plant trees between the villages and on former common land
Land use planning and local bylaws are insufficient institutions for regulating land use
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10. Land conflicts and institutions
Relations between domestic investors and the villages are envolving over time. Positive when land is sold, less so after some years when land become more scarce and prices increase
Strong increase in conflicts over ownership to land between domestic investors and multiple local people claiming ownership after initial sale
Significant increase cases at ward and district land courts
Shifting village government have conflicting interests in land transactions
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11. Decentralized through mobile sawmills
Timber value chain
Value of trees in the field 2000$ per acre; Value as processed sawn planks $
Decentralized through mobile sawmills
Timber traders operate unregulated cartels.
Taxation of timer trade is minimal
No policy policy facilitation of value chain
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12. Timber value chain F DIIS ∙ DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES12

13. Timber Rush and Food security
Trees replace food crops
Less land for hire for the poor
Sale of trees for buying food
Casual labour market ensure food security for the ‘able poor’
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14. Political economy of forest fire
Forest fire is the major risk for village plantations
Villagers only help fight fires for domestic investors that they have good relations to
No institutional enforcement of firebreaks, no modern firefighting equipment, no consequence for starting fires
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15. Towards a new rural social fabric ?
Domestic investors are members of the village and asked to make voluntary contributions to village projects
Domestic investors create jobs
Social relations between investors and village government are of mutual importance
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16. Unpacking large-scale natural ressource investments
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