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Governance, resources and conflict: North-Kivu case (DRC)
By Dr Aloys Tegera
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Roads to hell are paved with good intentions!
International initiatives to regulate Eastern DRC mineral sector have proved disastrous for local livelihood. How necessary was paragraph 1502 included in a US Act reform of Wall Street finances and meant to regulate mineral sector in DRC? What are benefits? What are damages? And what are ways forward?
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“NO BLOOD ON MY PHONE” The Colombo – Tantalite (Coltan) boom of year 2000 in Eastern DRC turned murky from its inception by a catch phrase “No blood on my phone” Clearly there was a war context but also there was a simplified assertion that war in Eastern DRC was all about minerals financing warlords Guilt and shame raised by “No blood on my phone” campaign were to bear fruits but at the same time paralyzed local livelihood and economy End consumers stopped sourcing from Eastern DRC in the name of putting an end to war and stabilizing the region. A de facto embargo was imposed.
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“NO BLOOD ON MY PHONE” suite
Motivations from “No blood on my phone” campaign were fine and understandable: upholding human rights for war victims, political ecology focusing on environmental and social impact of mineral exploitation, economic liberalism claiming that market should regulate the trade and not armed militia
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“NO BLOOD ON MY PHONE” suite
Yet, the colombo – Tantalite (Coltan) boom of year 2000 had nothing to do with Congolese rebellions. International market had anticipated an increase in laptop computers, mobile phones and smart phones production The two biggest mines of Colombo-Tantalite Wodgina in Autralia and Bernic Lake in Canada were bound by long term contracts and not accessible by various smelters in competition Thus, DRC became the ideal venue because of cheap artisanal mining
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“NO BLOOD ON MY PHONE” suite
Mining activities are not the root cause of DRC armed conflicts On the contrary, the slow death of the DRC mining industry has pushed the country in a deep crisis starting with the collapse of copper price back in 70s with severe consequences: Shortage of hard currency Lack of economic opportunities for young generations Jobless youth easily recruited by armed militia Fierce competition between local economic actors on few remaining resources. Ethnic manipulation as the cake get smaller and the rise of ethnic political exclusion Democratic opening of the 90s and fear of minority customary political power These elements combined constituted a powder keg in need of a trigger to detonate and within a context of a failed state violence and armed conflicts were inevitable.
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“NO BLOOD ON MY PHONE” suite
With the death of mining industry, the artisanal mining took over Substance Tin/T Coltan/T The Dodd Frank law of July 2010 was a final blow to artisanal mining. By imposing end consumers to prove due diligence of their supply chain none of them could and they chose to stop sourcing from Eastern DRC and a de facto embargo was put into place.
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IMPACT OF THE DODD FRANK LAW
Consequences of the de facto embargo were enormous : Thousands of artisanal miners were jobless and without revenue Young artisanal miners joined armed militia where an AK 47 is also seen as an economic survival tool Trade connected to mining sites collapsed and livelihood deteriorated Jobless youth resorted to alternative source of income such as marijuana farming The rise of profitable control and monopoly for some companies ensuring traceability and transparency such as ITRI Deserted artisanal mining areas such as Bisie in Walikale can now be accessed by industrial exploitation initiative
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REGULATION INITIATIVES AND LIMITS
Several regulation initiatives were introduced for better traceability and transparency Among them the OECD guidelines, ITRI tagging, ICGL certification, non conflict smelter’s programme of EICC/Gesi and the latest EU regulation initiative These initiatives contributed to reopen some mining sites but face a major obstacle they have all avoided: the role of the State to impose law and order
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“REGULATION INITIATIVES AND LIMITS suite
Insecurity is at the heart of conflict minerals crisis and the question is how to decriminalize eastern DRC minerals while criminality is entertained by an absent State in various national sectors? No initiative can replace the role of the State to impose law and order, to provide security to mining sites and transportation routes, to discipline its army officers involved in mining activities, to ensure that legal taxes are paid and illegal taxes are eliminated The current DRC government is incapable to impose law and order and the question is where these initiatives can hook the little results they can achieve if any? It is hard to accompany someone sitting and there is no peace building without State building But profit can be made in a chaos context. The 480 $ levy on each mineral ton exported is benefitting ITRI tagging and raising resentment and anger from local business actors. A monopoly ITRI is unlikely to let go.
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WAYS FORWARD State building is an imperative in paving away to fair and equitable trade. This cannot be ignored or avoided by various initiatives There is a need for a constructive cohabitation between the industrial mineral exploitation and artisanal mining. The total out put of the last 16 years was artisanal mined. They cannot be push aside without provoking further conflicts Minerals are no renewable resources. It is imperative to promote savings for after mines, especially for artisanal miners.
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THANK YOU FOR YOUR PATIENCE
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