1. 4TH MANFRED LACHS INTERNATIONAL Montreal, Quebec, Canada
Space and security relationships issues from a political and technological point of view
Florence Gaillard-Sborowsky
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique
4TH MANFRED LACHS INTERNATIONAL
27-28 May 2016
Montreal, Quebec, Canada

2. Interplay between space and security is not new
But despite this long history space powers have often had troubles to find a common ground
implicit comprehension of the space security, lack of definitions of the main notions in the field (threat, risk, vulnerability, space security etc.)
some preconceived notions on security in space also often because of its disconnection from the ASAT’s programs reality
Impact the core fondations on which the rules of law at international level could be built

3. Space security from political science: lessons learned for international rules framework
Space security notion emerges on the international scene since the 80s
Emergence of new problems transforming the relationships between space and security leading to anew term ‘space security’. Actors intend to bring together : militarization , weaponization, debris, satellite meteorology etc.
But Space security is widely discussed, more rarely defined. What means space security ?
Space security is a "sub-concept" of the security concept
Methodological point of view from security studies : potential guidelines to delimit space security
Space security for whom?
For what values?
How far?
At what price?
Over what period?
What threats or/and risks? qualification is essential

4. Current situation of the security in space from technological standpoint
What are the technologies’ realities ?
3 broad categories of effort :
development of ground-based weapons designed to damage or destroy ground installations
development of ground-based weapons targeting objects in orbit
space weapons (possibly co-orbital) can destroy a spatial target
Historical and chronological review of ASAT’s technologies proposed, studied, tested, developped and in service :
programs specifically anti-satellite
not specifically anti-satellite programs but tested as anti-satellite
not specifically anti-satellite programs but considered / proposed as anti-satellite

5. programs specifically anti-satellite
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6. not specifically anti-satellite programs but tested as anti-satellite

7. not specifically anti-satellite programs but considered/ proposed as anti-satellite

8. Major trends in the development of American and Soviet-Russian systems:
Weapons system
United States
URSS/Russia
specifically
Not specifically
Total
Project/
Studies
Tested
In service
Kinetic Energy
Ground
Airborne
Space 3 2 1 10 5 7 12
2+2 ?
Total KE 9 8 4 25
Directed Energy
1 ?
Total ED 14 32 6 13

9. Current potentially operational systems:
US  : MIRACL+AEGIS (ground) 
Russia : IS-Mu (space) + relaunch of KONTAKT program and Sokol Eshelon (airborne)
Threat credibility :
United States : only country to have a complete doctrinal vision of the use of their ASAT capabilities + associated means + corresponding budget. US have the majority of military satellites in orbit and therefore could be threatened, but no other space nations has sufficient ASAT destroying capabilities.
Russia : most of the programs officially stopped
China : 2007 essay, continued technologies demonstrations (without ASAT destruction and ABM) in 2010, 2013, and 2015
India : hostility in principle to the militarization but desire the skills recognition

10. Motivations for ASATs:
Specific position of the United States : securing space while preparing for war?
Third-party countries’ position is paradoxical as the US cannot be convinced to abandon the principle of installing weapons in orbit. They have no alternative but to consider engaging in the way they denounce. It disadvantages them and formalizes the US approach’s legitimacy, they initially wanted to prevent.

11. Lessons learned for international framework and the rules of law
A problematic relationship between the national and international level
Reflected in three main tensions :
“Province of all mankind" versus "Sovereignty"
"Global Commons" versus "Ownership"
"Peace use" versus « Secure use"
At collective level, preferred effective approaches tend to increase transparency and confidence building measures among space powers
International convergence on risk rather than threats
Prerequisites