1. The Korean Peninsula as a nuclear flashpoint
Joshua H. Pollack
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS)
Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey (MIIS)
April 27, 2017 (

2. Key points: escalation risks
US is committed to the defense of South Korea
But North Korea is willing to harass South Korea with small-scale, surprise attacks
What if the US intervenes?
North Korea threatens to preempt allied war plans with theater nuclear forces
South Korea threatens to preempt the North Koreans by attacking their leadership with conventional weapons (“decapitation”)
North Korea’s counter: to threaten the South Korean leadership

3. North Korean warnings: March 1994 crisis
1994: “This will not be a situation like the [1991] Iraq war. We will not give you time to collect troops around Korea to attack us. We will not attack the South first, but if it is clear are you going to attack, then we will attack.”
In March 1994, according to a declassified USG report, related a warning delivered by the North Koreans at Panmunjom.

4. North Korean warnings: April 2003 policy declaration
“Only the physical deterrent force, tremendous military deterrent force powerful enough to decisively beat back an attack supported by any ultra-modern weapons, can avert a war and protect the security of the country and the nation. This is a lesson drawn from the Iraqi war.”
On April 6, 2003, the day of the fall of Baghdad to coalition forces, the North Korean MFA released a statement embracing a policy of deterrence, which it described as requiring the ability to repel an attack.
North Korean warnings have become more explicit as they have become more open about possessing nuclear capabilities.

5. Explicit warning #1
“The ballistic rocket drill was conducted in a simulation of striking the ports of the enemy territory where foreign armed forces of aggression are deployed by firing and exploding nuclear warheads from the preset altitude above the target areas.”
(Rodong Sinmun, March 11, 2016)
Twice in 2016 and again this March, in the weeks prior to US-South Korean joint exercises, North Korea conducted theater ballistic missile tests that it described as simulations of nuclear airbursts above ports or airfields where US forces would arrive, delivered preemptively. These are the most explicit statements of North Korean nuclear doctrine to date, but consistent with earlier indications.

6. Explicit warning #2
“Simulating preemptive strikes on the ports and airfields in the operational theater of South Korea through which nuclear war equipment of the US imperialists are brought in, the firing drill… examined the working specifications of the detonation control devices of the nuclear warheads installed on the ballistic rockets at the designated altitude over the target area.” (Rodong Sinmun, July 20, 2016)

7. Explicit warning #3
“Hwasong Artillery untis of the Strategic Force of the KPA conducted a ballistic rocket launching drill… tasked to strike the bases of the US imperialist forces of aggression in Japan in times of a contingency.” (Rodong Sinmun, March 7, 2017)
Twice in 2016 and again this March, in the weeks prior to US-South Korean joint exercises, North Korea conducted theater ballistic missile tests that it described as simulations of nuclear airbursts above ports or airfields where US forces would arrive, delivered preemptively. These are the most explicit statements of North Korean nuclear doctrine to date, but consistent with earlier indications.

8. A closer look: July 2016 exercise

9. A closer look (ctd) KCNA, July 20, 2016
Here’s another picture they released from the same event, showing Kim Jong Un overseeing the test.
Notice two things: First, he’s seated in a tent that obscures his exact position. Second, there’s a map in front of him.
Let’s look more closely at the map.
KCNA, July 20, 2016

10. A closer look (ctd) KCNA, July 20, 2016
Here’s another view that shows the arc more clearly.
This test took place shortly before the start of the US-South Korean joint exercises, which the North Koreans routinely denounce as preparations for a surprise attack. Also, just days before, the North Koreans assailed their enemies for conducting a port call of the guided-missile submarine USS Ohio at Busan.
So the message is pretty clear: they were rehearsing a nuclear attack on US forces entering Busan. This is a warning that they’re ready if we try to attack them.
KCNA, July 20, 2016

11. ROK Missile Forces: Hyunmu-2 ballistic missiles
This is the NHK-II, also called the Hyunmoo-2. It is a solid-fueled short-range ballistic. The original range of the missile was 300 km, although the South Korea increased the range of the NHK-IIB to 500 km following a revision in the US-ROK missile guidelines. An 800 km version is planned.

12. ROK Missile Forces: Hyunmu-3 cruise missiles
And this is the launcher for the Hyumoo-3 cruise. It is a land-attack cruise missile with a range of about 1000 km. These capabilities are deployed. The ROK has stated that it has about sixty launchers for surface-to-surface missiles. Assuming 4-6 missiles per launcher, that is about missiles. And recent press reports that they will “greatly” increase the number of missiles starting with the deployment of an 800 km-range version of the NHK-II.

13. South Korea’s “three-axis” strategy
Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD)
Kill Chain
Preemptive strikes against mobile missiles in the field
Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR)
Described as involving the complete destruction of entire districts of Pyongyang where the enemy leadership may be hiding, “as soon as the North shows any signs of using a nuclear weapon.”

14. This is why. Starting in April 2012, South Korea has begun responding to unsettling North Korean actions or threats by displaying its own conventional, precision-strike capabilities, and threatening to use them against Kim Jong Un.
Do you see that red cruise missile hitting an exact point on this target structure? The shape of that structure is instantly recognizable to experienced North Korea watchers.
South Korean Hyunmu-3 cruise missile striking a target (frame from video released by the ROK Ministry of National Defense, April 19, 2012)

15. Kumsusan Palace, Pyongyang (Mausoleum of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il)
You’ll notice the resemblance. Several times a year, Kim Jong Un is obliged to pay his respects to his ancestors here. The South Koreans were subtly or not-so-subtly telling Kim Jong Un that they know where to find him if they want to.
And that sort of threat is apparently why KJU doesn’t like having his favorite viewing spots for missile tests and other outdoor activities mapped out.
By the way, after North Korea’s fifth nuclear test in August, the South Koreans were more explicit than usual, telling the media that they have a new plan called “Korea Massive Punishment & Retaliation,” which they described as involving the complete destruction of entire districts of Pyongyang where the NK leadership may be hiding, “as soon as the North shows any signs of using a nuclear weapon.” So they’re not necessarily counting on finding one exact spot.
I’ll now hand off to Jeffrey for further discussion of the South Korean missile program.
Kumsusan Palace, Pyongyang (Mausoleum of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il)

16. Concluding questions
What happens if the US flows forces into the region during a crisis?
What happens if North Korea responds conventionally?
What happens if North Korea uses nuclear weapons against US forces in the region?