International Defence Enterprise Architecture Specification (IDEAS)

International Defence Enterprise Architecture Specification (IDEAS)
Experiment ’08: Exchanging Coalition Operations Planning Architecture Data

Experiment & Exercise Overview Components of the Experiment
Briefing Outline IDEAS Overview Experiment & Exercise Overview Components of the Experiment Data Methods Presentation

IDEAS Overview

The IDEAS Group International Defense Enterprise Architecture Specification for exchange Australia, Canada, UK, USA Sweden & NATO (observers) Established 2005 UK is leading the technical work, using UK methodology (BORO) and joint MOD/Contractor team Objective — To deliver a unified specification for the exchange of military architectures between coalition partners.

Requirements and Assumptions
Australia, Canada, UK and USA have a history of military coalition Each nation is pursuing its own version of net-centric warfare How do we ensure coalition interoperability ? Need to understand: Each others’ capability and functionality How to interface with coalition systems To do this we need to be able to share architectures Each nation has its own architecture framework Requirement to share architectural information between nations to enable interoperability at the operational and system levels Need a standard data format for architectural interoperability Nations using different tools and data formats Semantic integration issues inhibit interoperability Coalition military operational planners will benefit from IDEAS

Mission, Goals, and Priorities
To facilitate pre-mission planning through exposure of national processes and capabilities expressed through a common ontology. To establish an ontology for expressing the procedures and capabilities of each nation and put in place a mechanism to interchange architecture information that describe those procedures and capabilities. To improve force planning capability through: Reduced timescale for mission planning Enhanced data: Interoperability Reusability Understandability Visibility Shareability

Usage – Exchange Scenario
IDEAS File UK Capability Architecture (e.g. in MooD / Sparx) Loaded into Canadian System (e.g. System Architect) UK & Canada in combined ops (e.g. Herrick) and Canadians need to interface to UK systems

Approach Use each nation’s architecture framework as input
Analyse the common elements between frameworks Using the BORO Methodology to de-conflict the different national approaches Develop integration model (ontology) Re-apply national terminology Provides an interfacing mechanism – each nation can continue to work with their own terminology and data whilst still conforming to IDEAS Implement Repository (US Experimenting on IDEAS Repository) XML Data Exchange

Products IDEAS model; includes all layers of the model and the RDFS / OWL Specifications IDEAS model documentation; includes business rules IDEAS experimentation procedures IDEAS experimentation reports IDEAS marketing material IDEAS training material IDEAS exercise plan, procedures and reports IDEAS productionisation / industrialisation Software; various

Side Benefits UK requirement for a standard dictionary to support MODAF architectures Being developed as the “MOD Ontology” by ICAD Plan is to leverage the IDEAS model to provide the top level of the ontology Interest in ontology is developing all over Govt. DG-Info uniquely placed with expertise in formal ontology development Usage being investigated for data integration in Logs and Casualty tracking – i.e. the benefits and possible uses go well beyond enterprise architecture BORO methodology being used to re-engineer and de-conflict legacy systems Again, DG-Info (through ICAD) are thought leaders in MOD

Experiment & Exercise Overview
Selected a scenario: Casualty Management Selected a set of architecture data to exchange Exercise Candidates Avoidance of friendly fire incidents due to procedural mismatches Others TBD?

Experimentation First experiment, exchange architecture data regarding the processes, agents, information flows, and sequences of activities (OV-5, 6c) involved in Battlefield Human Casualty Management. Using US & Canadian doctrine documents as “test data” Want to show “value added” military utility, e.g., Inconsistencies in processes, sequence, timing, event triggers, information flow and reporting, … Knowing ahead of time could lead to adjustments or just understanding so there won’t be surprises during execution

Manual Coalition Ops Planning Processes “As-Is”
AUS Plan CAN Plan GBR Plan USA Plan etc.

US vs. CA Casualty Management Flowcharts
Canada United States

Implication • 3 mental data parses • 3 mental comparison per country =
• 12 mental data parses IAW national background • 12 mental comparisons

“To-Be” enabling technologies & tools considered in the experiment
Visualization Environment Decision Environment Relational DB Query Environment SQL Query OWL/RDFS DB Data Mining Environment RDFS Database IDEAS Data Exchange Format (RDFS)

Automation Assistance via IDEAS
Automated Compare CA EA UK EA AU EA 1 data parse IDEAS US EA • 4 mental data parses of our native doctrine (instead of 12) • 0 mental comparisons (instead of 12) against an consistent ontology vice a national background

Experiment & Exercise Overview

Components of Experiment
Data Methods present

Components of the Experiment: DATA

How is IDEAS Different ? All country’s IT history is littered with grand plans for data integration Failures due to insufficient stakeholder engagement – i.e. attempting to “foist” a data architecture on unwilling parties Failures due to inadequate analysis techniques – usually based on process modelling Failures due to inability to properly compare different sources of information Failures due to “Country-Centric” approach ignoring coalition partners IDEAS is different because: It does not seek to impose a particular terminology, way of working, or data architecture on the users and stakeholders It brings in the opportunity for international coalition interoperability It fosters a “view from nowhere” approach – soft systems practitioners will be familiar with this idea It is strongly founded in set theory, allowing it to provide a more accurate representation of real-world

What Makes IDEAS Different ?
The BORO Methodology - Provides a precise, mathematical approach to comparing information Very easy to understand, and stakeholders readily commit to use the methodology Guaranteed to produce a correct representation, and is fully transparent at every stage – stakeholders are involved so buy-in is kept all the way through Set Theory Traditional data modelling is generally not founded in mathematic principles IDEAS uses formal set theoretic tools to accurately represent the structure of real-world concepts The Naming Pattern Once the analysis is complete, the terminology used by the stakeholders is mapped back onto the resulting model Enables stakeholders to continue working with their own terminology Allows seamless integration of legacy systems

IDEAS Structure Provides a common semantic foundation for multiple uses The common foundation enables interoperability across domains and applications All traces back up to IDEAS, so also offers possibility of international interoperability Data sources act as requirements on the ontology, feeding up the stack into the areas of stronger governance – “standardisation by adoption”

Data Analysis Steps The BORO Analysis breaks down the data into its fundamental elements These are then re-assembled under the appropriate ontological pattern Finally, the names used by the original systems / parties are re-assigned to achieve seamless interoperability

The Naming Pattern The ontology itself is concerned with the nature of things Relies on the only thing that is irrefutable, the physical extent of something It is useful to ignore names when developing the ontology, as they carry too much baggage and confusion – people tend to cling onto names of things rather than trying to work out if things are the same or not Once the semantic de-confliction is done, the names can be re-assigned, in context of their owners – and this is how interoperability is achieved

Sample Diagrams from IDEAS Model

Components of the Experiment: METHOD

Training and skills mismatch Systems mismatch
Examples of Analyses Doctrine mismatch Tactics, techniques, and procedures Training and skills mismatch Systems mismatch Communications Processing Data formats Capabilities gaps and overlaps Scope for ’08 experiment

Many Aspects of C4I Interoperability
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION Interoperability PROCEDURAL/DOCTRINAL Interoperability Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TT&P), Training PHYSICAL RF Waveform Modulation Compression Technique (JPEG, etc.) DATA TRANSFER Protocol (Pull, push, etc.) Bulk/Change Publish/Subscribe etc. SECURITY Crypto (Procedural) Over the Air Rekeying Sanitizers MLS DATA FORMATS Bit oriented Formats (TADIL A, J, K, etc) Character oriented Formats USMTF HTML, XML, XSI, etc. Air control procedures (Navy vs. Air Force) Tactical datalink conops, etc. Joint/Coalition tactics and training Joint/Coalition C2W (mop 6, 30) Joint surveillance Conops (IFF, etc) etc. PRESENTATION Symbology GIS types (e.g., PPI vs map/chart) Filtering Formats INFORMATION SEMANTICS Battlespace Objects (e.g., GCCS and Combat System “track files” vs analysis data like ASAS vs. IEW data) Prior Intelligence (e.g., OOB vs. IPB, Characteristics and Performance) Geophysical (e.g., NGA vs. tactical) Logistics (e.g., field vs. “reachback”) etc. ALGORITHMS Tracking and correlation algorithms Target ID SYSTEM Interoperability

Use Cases Lessons Learned
Components of the ’08 Experiment on Procedural Interoperability: Use Cases Use Cases Scud missile attack (Saudi Arabia) Attack on the U.S.S. Cole (Yemen) Operation Desert Storm (Persian Gulf) Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) Operation Focus Relief (Nigeria) Operation Allied Force (Kosovo) Lessons Learned

Use Case Examples Based on a “Quick-Look” analysis 1
Use Case Examples Based on a “Quick-Look” analysis 1. Scud missile attack (Saudi Arabia)

1. Scud missile attack (Saudi Arabia)
Casualty Management Process problems experienced: Planning: Scud missile hit the warehouse at Aujan compound at 8:45 p.m Call that would bring military police support and air ambulances to the scene was not phoned in until 9:07 p.m. (22 minutes after the blast). Within minutes of blast, Saudi civil defense system was activated. Saudi ambulances were randomly removing the living and the dead into the Saudi trauma system. By 9:20 p.m. (35 minutes after the blast), an Army bus left Aujan with four wounded soldiers for an Army hospital. The facility at which the vehicle arrived was a barracks, not a medical installation (the building had once served as a clinic and sported a large Red Crescent on the outside). At 9:40 p.m. (45 minutes after the scud hit), the first Army medical evacuation helicopter landed at Aujan; the wash of the blades sending shards of glass, fiberglass, metal, sand, and debris everywhere. No planned site had been marked.

1. Scud missile attack (Saudi Arabia), cont.
Casualty Management Process problems experienced (cont.): Communications The local Saudi civil defense system responded but was only communicating within its own network. Weapons and personal items were secured by the Saudi hospital staff, not US. The majority of US casualties (61) were taken to the local Saudi trauma center, not US facilities 1 died on the operating table, and 1 died in the intensive care unit after extensive treatment for a severe head injury

1. Scud missile attack (Saudi Arabia), cont.
Casualty Management Process problems experienced (cont.): Coordination Many Saudi ambulances were rapidly on site and removing soldiers before the US military was even notified. Both US and Saudi hospitals were working on their own disparate disaster plans No joint planning occurred between military and civilian assets. Civilians did not understand or utilize the military concept of echelons of care.

Use Case Examples Based on a “Quick-Look” analysis 2. Attack on the U
Use Case Examples Based on a “Quick-Look” analysis 2. Attack on the U.S.S. Cole (Yemen)

2. Attack on the U.S.S. Cole (Yemen)
Use of in-flight medical teams Instrumental in saving the lives of the USS COLE crew members Most critically injured sailors were initially treated by French surgeons in Djibouti then aero-medically evacuated for definitive care to the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center using the US Critical Care Air Transport Teams. Like the Forward Surgical Teams, these air transport teams are highly trained assets, critical to stabilizing and rapidly evacuating casualties to a higher level of care. Cultural and language proficiency Two French-speaking members of US Critical Care Air Transport team worked successfully with French colleagues in response to the bombing of USS Cole, providing the best possible care for the casualties.

Use Case Examples Based on a “Quick-Look” analysis 3. Operation Desert Storm (Persian Gulf)

3. Operation Desert Storm (Persian Gulf)
Contingency Planning Biological agents: Both the US and UK regarded anthrax and botulinum toxin as potential threats, but only UK thought it likely that Iraq would use plague. France did not identify any imminent biological warfare threat, and planned casualty care and management processes accordingly. Chemical warfare: All three countries agreed that the Iraqis might use some form of chemical warfare, but they drew different conclusions about the specific agents that Iraq was most likely to employ, and planned casualty care and management processes accordingly. Nuclear threats: The US concluded that Iraq had nuclear weapons production facilities but had limited information on device development; The UK and France identified no nuclear or radiological threat, and planned casualty care and management processes accordingly. Threat assessment criteria Not spontaneously shared among Coalition members. Example: French commanders were told of US concerns regarding a biological threat only when the French made inquiries about media reports of US troops receiving anthrax vaccine. Example: Contemporary US doctrine lacked clear provisions for real-time warning of US ground troops or friendly forces about impending US or Coalition strikes against hazardous targets, such as suspected Iraqi biological warfare, nuclear or chemical industry facilities.

3. Operation Desert Storm (Persian Gulf)
Treatment US, UK and France varied not only in the extent to which they used drugs and vaccines, but also in the drugs and vaccines they chose and in their policies on consent to administer them. Differences existed in the selection of medical countermeasures for threats that were mutually recognized Use of drugs and vaccines varied within the national forces as well as among the three forces. Warning and Reporting Different warning and reporting practices were in use across the Coalition’s member forces. Some US forces in the Gulf War did not comply with NATO Allied Tactical Pamphlet 45 with respect to warning and reporting, which was the procedure in use by UK forces.

Use Case Examples Based on a “Quick-Look” analysis 4. Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan)

4. Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan)
Causes of Casualties Fighting forces suffer more casualties from disease and non-battle injuries than from direct enemy contact. 75% of Operation Enduring Freedom casualties are the result of disease and non-battle injuries, with 25 percent of the patients being wounded in action.

Use Case Examples Based on a “Quick-Look” analysis 5. Operation Focus Relief (Nigeria)

5. Operation Focus Relief (Nigeria)
Need for Forward Surgical Teams US placed a forward surgical team on the ground in Nigeria to support the Special Forces train and equip mission. While attempting to defuse an unexploded light anti-tank weapon, one soldier lost his life and another was critically wounded. The injured soldier was operated on and stabilized by the forward surgical team, and then evacuated to Theater medical center in Landstuhl, Germany for definitive care. Without a large field hospital, this soldier’s life was saved using highly trained medical specialists and responsive patient movement systems. Given the demands for these teams, they are routinely in short supply

Use Case Examples Based on a “Quick-Look” analysis 6. Operation Allied Force (Kosovo)

6. Operation Allied Force (Kosovo)
Coalition partner medical initiatives Multinational Integrated Medical Unit initiative in Kosovo Each of the five Kosovo sectors operated by the U.S., United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy has a significant hospital, but across the Kosovo province, an average of only 15 percent of these hospital beds are utilized at a given point in time. At Camp Bondsteel, in Multinational Brigade East sector of Kosovo, US has developed, along with the British Forces, a medical facility staffed by both American and British health care providers. It provides world-class medical support to all NATO and coalition forces in the British and American sectors of Operation JOINT GUARDIAN. The agreement that established this facility has been used by the U.S. Central Command as a template for coalition medical operations in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM,

Lessons Learned Based on a “Quick-Look” analysis

Lessons Learned Reporting Accuracy and Timeliness Reporting Process
Accurate reporting is vital During Operation Desert Storm, a Casualty Area Command, based on unconfirmed reports, made erroneous notification to next of kin that two soldiers had been killed in a helicopter accident During the scud attack, the cameramen from CNN were rapidly on the scene to record the event. The broadcast to the United States that a scud had struck an Army Reserve unit in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, was aired before military authorities in Saudi Arabia could respond. Soldiers could quickly phone home to reassure worried families, but the dead or wounded could not call. The casualty reporting system could not keep up with this instantaneous communication. For many families, the delay in notification of the status of their loved ones for additional days brought added hardship. Reporting Process Reporting through unofficial channels causes confusion and creates unnecessary stress. During Operation Desert Storm, soldiers from divisions called their home stations to alert rear area personnel to casualties that their unit had sustained. The home station in turn called DA Casualty who in turn called the Casualty Area Command in Saudi Arabia. The incident had not yet been reported; no one in the casualty reporting chain had been alerted to the incident.

Lessons Learned (Cont.)
Host nation considerations Casualty management must be tailored to the host nation’s infrastructure and resources Need to be culturally aware and language proficient Coalition support and interoperability will grow best with cross cultural understanding and clear communications Two French-speaking members of our Critical Care Air Transport team worked successfully with French colleagues in response to the bombing of USS Cole in October 2000, providing the best possible care for the casualties. Transport Many critically ill patients require in-flight care provided by specialized critical care transport teams

Political considerations Each nation contributes according to its own interest and judgment of risk Political complexity has a number of effects on the military command process and the command system. Our troops must deal with coalition forces, local leaders and government agencies Partner nations must develop coalition medical doctrine and training. This does not necessitate a coalition medical service, rather the working of partner nations to a common process plan. Military medicine plays a key tactical and strategic role in winning "hearts and minds.“ Medical care “reach” Expert care must be deployed as far forward for rapid, accurate triage, resuscitation A longer medical "reach" must be employed to evacuate rapidly out of harm's way. This must be achieved by small, task-organized units, working jointly and with coalition forces, able to reorganize and redeploy rapidly.

Communication Satellite interconnection of military hospitals Especially critical when functioning in a host nation country, particularly when customs and language are very different. During Desert Storm, one U.S. Army surgeon on duty operated with assistance from a vascular surgeon from The Netherlands, an anesthesiologist from Hungary, and a scrub nurse from Poland. Integration of the local civil defense radio system with the military medical regulating system could facilitate the dispatch of medical evacuation assets into any mascal process. Use of Telemedicine Teleradiology Telesurgery Televideo consults to doctors & corpsmen But can be confusing

Supplies Controlled and non-controlled drugs Potency? Shelf life? Reagents (blood-related items, e.g., plasma) Surgical dressings Medical instruments Supplies inventory

Resources: During scud attack, better communication and prior planning could have adjusted resource use: Calling between the civilian and military communities was problematic. Direct communication was impossible. Army ground ambulances did not carry radios. Not all Saudi ambulances had radios. Medical evacuation helicopters could communicate with their headquarters but not with the 173rd Medical Group communications center. There was no plan regarding how all of the potential participants would communicate. Supplies were expended and operating rooms prepared at the military hospitals for patients that never arrived.

Equipment and Techniques Familiarity with partner nation equipment, processes and techniques of medical care 405th Combat Support Hospital, U.S. Army Reserve, shared medical duties with members of the NORDPOL Brigade, composed of Norwegian, Danish, and Polish troops. Deployable medical systems Many of the systems and equipment of our partners may prove superior to some of ours.

Tracking Need to better track the individual soldier as well as large numbers. During the initial hours of Scud attack, it was impossible to account for all of the wounded, seriously ill, and very seriously ill personnel. The location of all of the casualties was not known for at least 48 hours.

Access to Information Medical personnel require detailed and accurate medical information delivered rapidly. Such might be called “Precision Medical Intelligence”. US Electronic medical record information can be fragmented across many files or data sources. Data may be stored in different types of structures, such as text files or databases, and have different field definitions and field value options. These differences result from differences in clinical practice and computer facilities At present, UK military medical records are held on non-networked computers or on paper. Service personnel may often have more than one record as they move between different locations during their career. UK deploying DMICP (Defence Medical Information Capability Programme) in August 2008 – WILL U.S. HAVE ACCESS? DMICP will provide instant access to casualties’ medical records to aid diagnosis and improve and speed up treatment. After 2008, a version of the system will be available in field hospitals, on board ships and on the battlefield via laptop and other portable equipment under development. Casualties to be issued with a chip loaded with their health records as a back-up until they reach a military medical or NHS facility Coalition countries must share information on patients, equipment, expertise, and staff.

Training All soldiers must be trained in basic first aid and have minimal medical supplies accessible Need for one combat life-saver in every vehicle and in every squad. Every operations order should include a basic mascal plan regardless of type or location. Planners cannot assume that medical assets will always be readily available. The survivors of the scud attack repeatedly complained that they did not have anything to help the wounded. Bandages, splints, and dressings were not available. Unit members were unaware of an emergency plan. The location of a landing zone, protection of the perimeter, self-defense, and chain of command initially did not happen. A functional checklist, strip maps of key hospitals/clinics, training in first aid, and unit-level (rear elements, medical and nonmedical) practice for a mascal may save lives and reduce confusion.

A complete “war plan-medical”: Would integrate all of the medical facilities/staff and emergency preparedness systems Contingency planning: Would allow for better utilization of medical supplies, specialty physicians and nurses, and facilities depending on the location and requirements of wounded individuals. Lessons from History History taught the Israelis a grim lesson: "After only a short period without any terrorist activities, people tend to forget about the dangers and to question the need for training, exercises and budgets."

Components of the Experiment: PRESENTATION

We know differences exist in the processes…
Process A CONDITIONS? IE-03 IE-04 IE-05 IE-06 SEQUENCES? RESOURCES? IE-01 IE-02 IE-08 Activity 3 Activity 5 TIMING? EVENTS? Activity 1 Activity 2 Activity 6 Activity 4 IE-07 TRIGGERS? IE-09 So how do we present them? Process B CONDITIONS? IE-06 IE-07 IE-03 IE-04 IE-05 SEQUENCES? RESOURCES? IE-01 IE-02 Activity 3 IE-08 IE-09 EVENTS? TIMING? Activity 1 Activity 2 Activity 6 Activity 4 TRIGGERS?

Process Comparison Presentation
Provide rigorous representation of the process data flow and sequencing (OV-5 and OV-6c) precise data representations. Identify Alternative Visualization and Analysis Techniques Provide Candidate Visualization Techniques (Enable Analysis of Doctrine and Process Differences)

Current Status Initial Process Representation and Comparison
Receive Casualty Assign CNO Notify NOK Establish Liaison Teams Notify Upper Echelon Coordinate with CAO Manage Estate Assign CAO Withhold media release 24 hours Authorize Media Release Receive Casualty Assign AO Notify Upper Echelon Establish Committee Notify NOK Manage Estate Provide semi- hourly SITREPS Authorize Media Release

Summary Exchanging architecture data during coalition operations planning process: Can automate interoperability comparisons to: Reduce resource requirements Speed the process Potentially detect issues that may have been missed De-bias national interpretations of other doctrines Depends on a precise data exchange standard IDEAS grounding in a formal ontology provides such precision A limited experiment in ’08 will demonstrate some of these benefits An exercise in ’09 is planned to show these in a broader context

Backups

To solicit suggestions and inputs
Why Are We Here? To update JFCOM on current initiatives of the multi-national “IDEAS” Group To solicit suggestions and inputs To solicit inputs on areas of concern to JFCOM for future initiative planning

Current Interoperability Initiative
What are we trying to do? Demonstrate the military utility of flexible and interoperable exchange of architecture data. What aspects of interoperability is this experiment series focused on? Doctrinal and procedural interoperability. Interoperability between a diverse and ever evolving set of automated architecture design tools. What challenges are we addressing ? Providing precise and unambiguous representation and exchange of coalition doctrine and procedures utilizing the precision and discipline that the DoDAF and MODAF architecture standards and products require. Enabling clear and unambiguous visualization of the differences in multi-national doctrine and procedures. Enabling near real-time collaboration and analysis of associated interoperability problems in a multi-national, geographically dispersed environment.

Current Interoperability Initiative (Cont.)
What is the current scope (Experiment 08)? Exchange and collaborative analysis of Process data flow (OV-5) and Event Trace/Sequences (OV-6c) data. Demonstrate candidate visualization tools and techniques. Evaluate the precision of the data exchange. What are the current enabling technologies? Evolving technologies in Internet exchange techniques and ontology's allowing increased precision in data interoperability (i.e. XML, XSI, WXSD, RDF/OWL, etc.). Precise data models representing the architectural data. Emerging improvements in visualization and business intelligence tools. How does such an exchange help a coalition ops planner? Brings out unknowns ahead of time, e.g.: Enables the identification of automation opportunities and process improvements

Current Experiment Direction
Compare and contrast coalition processes Nations agreed on a Military Casualty Management example scenario. Who are the players? (AU, CA, UK, US) Other examples - JFCOM input needed Candidate NATO Operational Processes of concern. Known doctrine/process differences (identify country Process differences causing potential interoperability problems) Known doctrine/process successes (identify existing country Process successes resulting in favorable interoperability results)

Military Utility - Current Example: Military Casualty Management
Purpose To demonstrate potential military operational utility of enabling interoperable exchange of Doctrine and Procedural casualty management data utilizing precise DoDAF/MoDAF architecture data. Approach Contrast “as-is” processes with with potential “to-be” methods Show relevance to procedures, tools, methods, etc., that coalition planners would actually use Objective To seek out automation opportunities and document how the Coalition Ops Casualty Management Planning scenarios are done today: Identify manual, time consuming processes? (paper, , faxes, phone calls, meetings, …) Enable discovery of issues in the field (on-the-job interoperability)

Military Utility - Current Example: Military Casualty Management
Expected Results Common data standards allowing for coalition collaboration utilizing XML-based schemas Tool-independent data exchange mechanisms Visual decision aids for coalition planners making use of rigorous layout of procedures, sequences & timing Risks Disparate doctrine, development procedures & LOEs Methodology way over the heads of most COTS vendors need to embrace development of accommodating tools

Demonstrate Multi-National data exchange and collaborative analysis.
EXERCISE ’09 Demonstrate Multi-National data exchange and collaborative analysis. Implement techniques in a diverse tool set Evaluate Precision of data exchange Demonstrate ability to identify manual, time consuming processes? (paper, , faxes, phone calls, meetings, …) Demonstrate the ability to discover issues in the field (on-the-job interoperability)

Current Efforts and Progress to Date
????? *truly different, names assumed aligned or mapped Mock-up AU-CA-UK-US Casualty Management process comparison displays (currently underway): Exchange data via RDFS, allowing for the creation of classes of resources that share common properties Highlight different processes, sequences, information flows, event triggers between coalition partners Develop potential side-by-side comparison analysis Post on IDEAS FTP site for review US review with Joint Forces Command Thereafter examine tools for potential process comparison functionality

Dynamic Comparison Scenario Model execution “Notifying Next of Kin”
Casualties are received and sent to be processed and transported

Both UK and CA begin Process & Transport activities…
UK P&T activity begins Casualties are received and sent to be processed and transported CA P&T activity begins

CA completes P&T activity and begins process of assigning AO while UK continues P&T process…
Casualties are received and sent to be processed and transported CA completes P&T activity and begins process of assigning AO

UK Process completed in 1hr, 50 min
UK process is completed in 1 hr., 50 minutes while CA continues AO Assignment process… UK Process completed in 1hr, 50 min CA process continues

Process Comparison Example UK NOK notification process completed in 1 hr., 50 minutes CA NOK notification process completed in 2 hrs., 30 minutes UK NOK notification process completed in 1 hr., 50 minutes CA NOK notification process completed in 2 hrs., 30 minutes Coalition average: 2 hrs., 10 min

Summary Experiment Goals
Enable multi-nation casualty management to be more compatible Establish common data standards allowing for multi-national collaboration utilizing XML-based schemas Expose real-world interoperability issues experienced by planners and warfighters Identify alternative visualization and analysis techniques

Potential Tool Interoperability with SysML
• ..... SV4 OV2 OV7 TV2 AP233/XMI Systems Modeling Tool Model/Data Interchange Other Engineering Tools

Comparing Processes In two or more distinct processes … Process A
Activity 3 Activity 5 Activity 1 Activity 2 Activity 6 Activity 4 Process B Activity 3 Activity 1 Activity 2 Activity 6 Activity 4

Comparing Processes Similarities must be easy to identify … Process A
Activity 3 Activity 5 Activity 1 Activity 2 Activity 6 Activity 4 Process B Activity 3 Activity 1 Activity 2 Activity 6 Activity 4

Comparing Processes As well as differences in those processes …
Process A Activity 3 Activity 5 Activity 1 Activity 2 Activity 6 Activity 4 Process B Activity 3 Activity 1 Activity 2 Activity 6 Activity 4

Comparing Processes What about the information exchanged? Process A
IE-03 IE-04 IE-05 IE-06 Process A IE-01 IE-02 IE-08 Activity 3 Activity 5 Activity 1 Activity 2 Activity 6 Activity 4 IE-07 IE-09 IE-06 IE-07 IE-03 IE-04 IE-05 Process B IE-01 IE-02 Activity 3 IE-08 IE-09 Activity 1 Activity 2 Activity 6 Activity 4

Comparing Processes Again, differences exist between the processes and must be identified… IE-03 IE-04 IE-05 IE-06 Process A IE-01 IE-02 IE-08 Activity 3 Activity 5 Activity 1 Activity 2 Activity 6 Activity 4 IE-07 IE-09 IE-06 IE-07 IE-03 IE-04 IE-05 Process B IE-01 IE-02 Activity 3 IE-08 IE-09 Activity 1 Activity 2 Activity 6 Activity 4

What about other considerations?
CONDITIONS? IE-03 IE-04 IE-05 IE-06 SEQUENCES? RESOURCES? Process A IE-01 IE-02 IE-08 Activity 3 Activity 5 TIMING? EVENTS? Activity 1 Activity 2 Activity 6 Activity 4 IE-07 TRIGGERS? IE-09 CONDITIONS? IE-06 IE-07 IE-03 IE-04 IE-05 SEQUENCES? RESOURCES? Process B IE-01 IE-02 Activity 3 IE-08 IE-09 EVENTS? TIMING? Activity 1 Activity 2 Activity 6 Activity 4 TRIGGERS?

OK, so we found differences, how do we present them?
Process A CONDITIONS? IE-03 IE-04 IE-05 IE-06 SEQUENCES? RESOURCES? IE-01 IE-02 IE-08 Activity 3 Activity 5 TIMING? EVENTS? Activity 1 Activity 2 Activity 6 Activity 4 IE-07 TRIGGERS? IE-09 Process B CONDITIONS? IE-06 IE-07 IE-03 IE-04 IE-05 SEQUENCES? RESOURCES? IE-01 IE-02 Activity 3 IE-08 IE-09 EVENTS? TIMING? Activity 1 Activity 2 Activity 6 Activity 4 TRIGGERS?

Current Status Initial Process Representation and Comparison
Receive Casualty Assign CNO Notify NOK Establish CLTs Authorize Media Release Notify Upper Echelon Assign CAO Manage Estate Receive Casualty Assign AO Notify Upper Echelon Establish Committee Notify NOK Provide semi- hourly SITREPS Authorize Media Release Manage Estate

Goal: Interoperability at Multiple Levels of the Architecture

International Defence Enterprise Architecture Specification (IDEAS)

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