1. How can 2011 experience help 2017 response?

2. WHY WE ARE HERE. – NEVER AGAIN!!
IASC Real Time Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to the Horn of Africa Drought Crisis. Somalia Valid. May 2012.

3. NO REGRETS!
2011 experience with using predictions to trigger large scale response.

4. The period >250,000 people died
Note increase in funding in Dec-Mar then lull.

6. Jan. 28th 2011 FSNAU Jan – Jun 2011 Projection
Most people know that the response was late in 2011.
Most people also know that there were plenty of good early warning.
FSNAU/FEWSNET projections were ‘most likely scenario’.
If early warnings indicate high risk of famine use worst case scenario not most likely scenario
Jan. 28th 2011 FSNAU Post Deyr 2010
Jan. 28th 2011 FSNAU Jan – Jun 2011 Projection
Jul FSNAU Post Gu 2011

7. Use Most Likely Scenario for Planning
In less severe circumstances use most likely scenario.
The same may apply for Somaliland and Puntland.

8. Raised mortality in January April
Raised mortality in January April. If this is the same now we are already in a crisis and life saving actions are required now.
Large increase in April/May (start of failed rainy season.). Market impacts.
Mortality among populations of southern and central Somalia affected by severe food insecurity and famine. FAO/FEWSNET May 2013.

9. Timing of FSNAU/IPC Surveys.
Data collected:
Somalia Deyr – Nov. & Dec. Kenya SRA Jan. & Feb
Somalia Gu – May & June. Kenya LRA Jul & Aug
Reports:
Somalia Deyr – Jan/Feb Kenya SRA Feb
Somalia Gu – July Kenya LRA Aug
Somalia – Possibly very large change in Food Security and Nutrition conditions between data collection and reporting points i.e. Somalia December – July. Kenya January - August

10. Lesson Learnt
FS, nutrition and mortality conditions can change very fast (weeks)
When early warnings indicate high risk of famine use worst case scenario for planning.
Even in June 2011 IPC analysis for rural areas was indicating extreme conditions but not famine
Rural Populations June 2011

11. Mortality/Severity Famine Declaration Deyr FSNAU Funding Gu FSNAU
Implementation
2.5 month response time
2.5 month response time
Timing of life saving and livelihood protection

12. Possible crisis timeline.
Linear
Mortality Reduction
Famine timeline
Possible crisis timeline.
Progression of a crisis seems to be non-linear. And non-sequential FS leads to undernutrition and disease leads to death. This might be true for an individual but not for a geographic area.
Perhaps more linear during more normal seasonal fluctuations.
Non linear curve represents collapse in coping strategies. Particularly in April with peak in July.
Early response Objective not mitigation or pre-famine but to reduce the peak of mortality/morbidity in July

13. Early Warning.

14. What does this mean for 2017 “most likely case scenario” predictions for the coming season?

15. Nutrition Situation January 2011 FS Situation Jan 2011
Food Security and Nutrition maps different in Jan/Feb Indicating different aspects of vulnerability in 2011.
FS analysis may not show the underlying vulnerability/resilience of an area in the same way as undernutrition does.
In this case Nutrition and not FS in January (Data collected in Nov/Dec) is an early warning indicator of severe crisis and famine in July but other factors such as long term vulnerability, poor resilience, human capital and connectedness all came into play for famine to happen in these areas.
Point is that food insecurity, malnutrition and death do not progress in linear way at least not in extreme circumstances. Mediated by resilience, connectedness, vulnerability,, events e.g. insecurity, access to markets etc. One population may need a much smaller shock to tip it into famine than another.
Need to use much more of a cross sectoral and political social analysis in addition to FS and Nutrition assessment and predictions.
Nutrition Situation January 2011
FS Situation Jan 2011
Famine Situation July 2011

16. What does that mean for 2017.

17. Lesson Learnt (Kenya and Somalia)
Crisis is not just related to the last 2 seasons and their impact on FS and Nutrition, includes long term vulnerability, connectedness short term impacts of conflict etc.
Causes of famine or crisis are not a simple linear process from FS through undernutrition to mortality.
Underlying vulnerability is a key driver of speed of change and influence on how FS shocks and other shocks cause degradation/collapse of livelihoods.
i.e. Do not just look at FS and Nutrition maps to plan. Need joint cross sectoral needs and response analysis. Include socio-political analysis.

18. Summary of Lessons Learnt (Somalia)
Past data and experience shows:
Livelihood collapse happens very quickly
When early warning shows high risk use worst case scenario for planning
Peak in needs is between IPC data analysis points (May),
Crisis causes and its outcomes/impacts are not only drought or FS related
Crisis is already started.
To be at maximum response at same time as maximum need requires 2-3 months. Feb-Apr

19. “NO REGRETS!”

20. Needs Assessment, Analysis & Planning.
RTE Report highlights the following issues.
IASC Real Time Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to the Horn of Africa Drought Crisis. Somalia Valid. May 2012.

21. Needs Assessment and Analysis
Experience and knowledge is available to inform joint, cross sectoral needs analysis. Needs assessment is not exclusively dependant on access for data collection or on long term surveillance
If progression of crisis is non-linear, and mediated by factors such as vulnerability, socio- political economy etc, FSNAU/FEWSNET type analysis can only contribute to a wider analysis to decide what to do where and when.
Local information systems better than in 2011 but still weak and with gaps. BUT large amount of knowledge about livelihoods and crisis exists in agencies (especially on the ground), FEWSNET/FSNAU, SWALIM, etc.
Involve outside experts and ensure Somali inclusion (Government, NGO, private sector diaspora) to allow their influence over analysis and decision making.

22. Needs Assessment and Response Analysis
EXAMPLE 1

23. Epicentre of needs Bay, Bakool, M Juba, L and M Shabelle, Hiraan.
Centre of 1992 and 2011 famine
FEWSNET/FSNAU FS Alert Jan 17th 2017

24. UNHCR: Somali Situation. Ethiopia Update. 1st – 24th Jan 2017
Two increases in refugees movement in 2010/11. December, January and May July. Rains related.
IOM DTM Feb 2nd 2017

25. Access and Political Issues
2011
Reduced humanitarian space,
Evidence of politicisation of humanitarian aid – where and to whom is humanitarian aid delivered/ controlled /used.
2017
What has changed for areas of highest vulnerability?

26. Needs Based Political Decisions
Scenario for Southern Somalia
Populations most at need impact of drought AND long term vulnerability/poor resilience
Bay, Shabelle’s, Bakool, minorities
Same as population with least Humanitarian access.
Status quo - probable outcome is significant distress displacement to Somali urban areas esp. Mogadishu and Ethiopia.
Large variations now and in the future within regions listed

27. Response Options
If impossible to significantly increase humanitarian access to crisis epicentre – Prepare for significant IDP and refugee response.
Increase access to crisis epicentre – significant political implications.
Review of phased approach to risk appetite of humanitarian agencies.
Partnerships review
Innovative approaches, esp. market based, to get access.
Negotiated access?

29. Key issues in increasing access to crisis epicentre.
Access for Somali’s principally means access to markets massive price inflation. How to maintain and stabilize vulnerable Somali access to markets?
Access is not a 100% issue of physical access.
e.g. cash transfers and other market based approaches
Access is not just a traditional humanitarian agency issue needs to take into account LNGO, OIC, Diaspora, private sector and communities themselves.

30. Cash Transfers
Not just for epi-centre but across whole area.
Significant gains were made during the 2011/2012 crisis on increasing market-based programming. Cash is and should be seen as a viable and desired option for response during, not only during a crisis but also pre-crisis when tagged indicators start to indicate a problem (Tufts 2014)

31. Safety Nets
Food AND Cash safety net at scale comprehensively prevented slide from vulnerability to disaster in 2011/12 and 2016.
Kenya has cash safety net. Scale and flexibility?
RTE Synthesis Report. H Slim June 2012

32. Needs Assessment and Analysis
EXAMPLE 2

33. Water

34. Historically low water levels.
Implications of very low river levels to epicentre of crisis
Poorest riverine communities (including marginalised groups)
Commercial agricultural activities (irrigation)
Coping strategy for agro-pastoral and pastoral communities (Livestock and work)
Several strategic towns (Johar, Beletweyn) rely on water pumped from the river (through infiltration galleries). If these fail, large numbers of people will revert to open wells  high risk disease
Implications for WASH, Health, Food Security, Shelter, Nutrition
Water access as well as food access is a basic driver of crisis in arid lands.

35. Cholera outbreak
> 2000 suspected cases, 32 deaths. Baidoa worst affected
Considering the available surveillance data, even with the reduction in the number of cases reported this week there is strong evidence that the cholera outbreak is spreading to new villages and districts, and some districts are reporting increased number of cases and deaths.
Most of the districts reporting the cholera cases are along the Shebelle River and there is a severe water shortage due to dryness of the river.
? Where did outbreak start – IDPs arriving in Baidoa or residents with poor sanitation and hygiene?
Rapid spread of disease likely where children weakened by malnutrition and water shortage results in poor hygiene practice. Diarrhea and Measles were the big killers in 2011.

37. Key Recommendations (RTE)

38. Summary of Lessons Learnt
Vital to include joint needs analysis as common basis for response strategy and planning
In addition to FS and nutrition assessment need to include other sectors and socio-political analysis.
Need to ensure Somali participation in needs analysis process (Government, NGOs, diaspora and private sector)
Response should not wait for needs analysis.
Needs analysis is iterative as change is primary characteristic of crisis in Somalia and Kenya.

39. Capacity to Deliver

40. Capacity Capacity Includes Delivery capacity (partnerships, HR)
Logistics capacity (planning and coordination)
Administrative capacity

41. Capacity Situation Analysis
Need increases in spurts.
Response delivery becomes increasingly complex and wide scale throughout crisis.
Early 2011 capacity limited.
2011 capacity became an issue 2 months after famine declaration.
Exacerbated by access and risk issues

42. Capacity Constraints
Delays in response (e.g. partner identification, clearing and contracting, contingency planning and funding allocation bureaucracy ).
Increased costs of response (3rd party monitoring, commodity price increase)
Significant increase in reputational costs (Somali and International)
Programme underspends or undelivered resources still being utilized in 2013.
Risk transfer to LNGOs with no support to manage risks. Long term impact on humanitarian system in Somalia
Lack of accountability to Somali’s

43. Key Recommendations

44. Key Recommendations.

45. Key Lessons Learnt
Capacity to deliver, partnerships and risk appetite need to be reviewed based on worst case scenario needs analysis.
Be as local as possible in decision making on actual response.
In parallel to changes in response processes, administrative processes need to be adapted to be fit rapid, flexible and resilient e.g. clusters and agencies need to spend time on needs analysis and response rather than planning and logistics planning.
Ensure Somali local capacity is fully integrated in all levels of analysis, decision making and response.

46. REGIONAL ROLE

47. Crisis is regional Causes and effects regional and cross border.
Refugees
Pastoralists
Conflict
Water access (livestock, humans and commercial uses esp Shabelle and Juba rivers).
Pasture access (Karamoja, Hawd)
Response will be regional and cross border incl.
Supplies crossing borders,
Regional stockpiles
Information and data (regional and cross border essential for country planning and response

48. Key Regional RTE Findings

49. Key Regional RTE Recommendations
Formalize …. multi-stakeholder regional meeting into a regular forum to provide a strategic framework and guidance on cross border (refuges, humanitarian access) issues and regional issues (donor engagement and overview of response).
Within the region greater engagement by humanitarian agencies with regional institutions and multi-lateral banks … will be required.
Use regional analysis to inform and connect country teams to ensure regional nature of crisis is included in country analysis, planning and response.

50. KENYA SPECIFIC

51. Early Warning And Early Action
2011 “CNN” effect. Response started in earnest in May 2011.
2017 Response started earlier.
Aim to achieve scale and effectiveness.

52. Needs Analysis & Scenario Planning.
RTE Recommendations.
Rapid inter-sectoral joint needs analysis
Use Crisis Calendar approach to be proactive and forward looking.
Constant updates needed in a highly changeable environment (Causes and outcomes/impacts). Nt just SRA and LRA assessments.
Link to DRR and resilience community planning processes.

53. Government Lead
2011 increase in technical expertise focused on increasing individual international agency capacity. Technical assistance outside –in.
Technical assistance needs to shift to inside-out. Support to increase Government capacity to provide technical expertise to response
Focus on decision making as close to response as possible. County and sub-county.

54. Inter-Agency Strategic Planning
2011 provoked pivotal shift in the way HA works in Kenya (and Somalia) first large scale opportunity to demonstrate impact.
Linking Humanitarian and Development through Resilience. Longer term, systemic and strategic view of how present response connects to longer term Resilience and Development objectives?

55. Accountability, Coordination & Connectedness
Many none traditional and national groups were marginalized within coordination and response mechanisms.(religious, CBOs)
Represent communities and often have more nuanced and appropriate understanding of needs and response options.
Nairobi disconnect.
Coordination, planning and decision making as close to field as possible.
Inclusion of community and community based actors in analysis, planning and decision making. (e.g. Previous Resilience and DRR work already prepared detailed community level response plans.)