Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Presentation is loading. Please wait.

The Evolution of Cooperation

Similar presentations


Presentation on theme: "The Evolution of Cooperation"— Presentation transcript:

1 The Evolution of Cooperation

2 The Evolution of Cooperation
I. Issue - How can cooperation evolve, especially if by cooperating, an entity reduces its own immediate fitness in sacrifice to that of another?

3 The Evolution of Cooperation
I. Issue - How can cooperation evolve, especially if by cooperating, an entity reduces its own immediate fitness in sacrifice to that of another? - However, cooperation is OBSERVED and necessary:

4 The Evolution of Cooperation
I. Issue - How can cooperation evolve, especially if by cooperating, an entity reduces its own immediate fitness in sacrifice to that of another? - However, cooperation is OBSERVED and necessary: among genes in a genome

5 The Evolution of Cooperation
I. Issue - How can cooperation evolve, especially if by cooperating, an entity reduces its own immediate fitness in sacrifice to that of another? - However, cooperation is OBSERVED and necessary: among genes in a genome among organelles in a cell

6 The Evolution of Cooperation
I. Issue - How can cooperation evolve, especially if by cooperating, an entity reduces its own immediate fitness in sacrifice to that of another? - However, cooperation is OBSERVED and necessary: among genes in a genome among organelles in a cell among cells in a multicellular organism

7 The Evolution of Cooperation
I. Issue - How can cooperation evolve, especially if by cooperating, an entity reduces its own immediate fitness in sacrifice to that of another? - However, cooperation is OBSERVED and necessary: among genes in a genome among organelles in a cell among cells in a multicellular organism among organisms in a social group

8 The Evolution of Cooperation
I. Issue - How can cooperation evolve, especially if by cooperating, an entity reduces its own immediate fitness in sacrifice to that of another? - However, cooperation is OBSERVED and necessary: among genes in a genome among organelles in a cell among cells in a multicellular organism among organisms in a social group between species in symbiotic relationships

9 The Evolution of Cooperation
I. Issue II. Mechanisms (Nowak, 2006, Science).

10 The Evolution of Cooperation
I. Issue II. Mechanisms (Nowak, 2006, Science). A. Kin Selection (W. D. Hamilton)

11 The Evolution of Cooperation
I. Issue II. Mechanisms (Nowak, 2006, Science). A. Kin Selection (W. D. Hamilton) - r > c/b

12 The Evolution of Cooperation
I. Issue II. Mechanisms (Nowak, 2006, Science). A. Kin Selection (W. D. Hamilton) - r > c/b - Coefficient of relatedness must exceed the cost/benefit ratio of the act.

13 The Evolution of Cooperation
I. Issue II. Mechanisms (Nowak, 2006, Science). A. Kin Selection (W. D. Hamilton) - r > c/b - Coefficient of relatedness must exceed the cost/benefit ratio of the act. - So, dieing while saving three sibs (c/b = 1/3) is adaptive because the coefficient between sibs is 1/2 (> 1/3).

14 The Evolution of Cooperation
I. Issue II. Mechanisms (Nowak, 2006, Science). A. Kin Selection (W. D. Hamilton) B. Direct Reciprocity (Trivers 1971)

15 The Evolution of Cooperation
I. Issue II. Mechanisms (Nowak, 2006, Science). A. Kin Selection (W. D. Hamilton) B. Direct Reciprocity (Trivers 1971) - prisoners dilemma B Stays Silent B Betrays A Stays Silent both get 6 months A gets 10 years; B goes free A Betrays B gets 10 years; A goes free both get 2 years

16 The Evolution of Cooperation
I. Issue II. Mechanisms (Nowak, 2006, Science). A. Kin Selection (W. D. Hamilton) B. Direct Reciprocity (Trivers 1971) - prisoners dilemma So, cooperation pays...but blind sacrifice does not! B Stays Silent B Betrays A Stays Silent both get 6 months A gets 10 years; B goes free A Betrays B gets 10 years; A goes free both get 2 years

17 The Evolution of Cooperation
I. Issue II. Mechanisms (Nowak, 2006, Science). A. Kin Selection (W. D. Hamilton) B. Direct Reciprocity (Trivers 1971) - in the "repeated prisoner's dilemma": B Stays Silent B Betrays A Stays Silent both get 6 months A gets 10 years; B goes free A Betrays B gets 10 years; A goes free both get 2 years

18 The Evolution of Cooperation
I. Issue II. Mechanisms (Nowak, 2006, Science). A. Kin Selection (W. D. Hamilton) B. Direct Reciprocity (Trivers 1971) - in the "repeated prisoner's dilemma": - it's adaptive to cooperate if there are repeated interactions with the same partner B Stays Silent B Betrays A Stays Silent both get 6 months A gets 10 years; B goes free A Betrays B gets 10 years; A goes free both get 2 years

19 The Evolution of Cooperation
I. Issue II. Mechanisms (Nowak, 2006, Science). A. Kin Selection (W. D. Hamilton) B. Direct Reciprocity (Trivers 1971) - in the "repeated prisoner's dilemma": - it's adaptive to cooperate if there are repeated interactions with the same partner - it works by 'tit for tat' or 'hold if it pays' (if you start on cooperate) B Stays Silent B Betrays A Stays Silent both get 6 months A gets 10 years; B goes free A Betrays B gets 10 years; A goes free both get 2 years

20 The Evolution of Cooperation
I. Issue II. Mechanisms (Nowak, 2006, Science). A. Kin Selection (W. D. Hamilton) B. Direct Reciprocity (Trivers 1971) - in the "repeated prisoner's dilemma": - it's adaptive to cooperate if there are repeated interactions with the same partner - it works by 'tit for tat' or 'hold if it pays' (if you start on cooperate) B Stays Silent B Betrays A Stays Silent both get 6 months A gets 10 years; B goes free A Betrays B gets 10 years; A goes free both get 2 years - cooperation can evolve only if w > c/b .... if the frequency of encounter exceeds the cost/benefit ratio of the altruistic act. If this is the case, you may profit in the future if the act is reciprocated (and if w is high, then there is good chance it will be)

21 The Evolution of Cooperation
I. Issue II. Mechanisms (Nowak, 2006, Science). A. Kin Selection (W. D. Hamilton) B. Direct Reciprocity (Trivers 1971) - Mutualisms: both partners have increased fitness, relative to other members of their species, by interacting with another species.

22 The Evolution of Cooperation
I. Issue II. Mechanisms (Nowak, 2006, Science). A. Kin Selection (W. D. Hamilton) B. Direct Reciprocity (Trivers 1971) - Mutualisms: both partners have increased fitness, relative to other members of their species, by interacting with another species. - Positive feedback can enhance the dependancy between partners

23 The Evolution of Cooperation
I. Issue II. Mechanisms (Nowak, 2006, Science). A. Kin Selection (W. D. Hamilton) B. Direct Reciprocity (Trivers 1971) - Mutualisms: both partners have increased fitness, relative to other members of their species, by interacting with another species. - Positive feedback can enhance the dependancy between partners Atta cephalotes, the "leaf cutter" ants, farm and eat a species of fungus that lives nowhere else now.

24 Acacia and Acacia ants

25 Corals and zooxanthellae
Aphid farming by ants Frugivory Gleaners Pollination Protozoans in Termites

26 The Evolution of Cooperation
I. Issue II. Mechanisms (Nowak, 2006, Science). A. Kin Selection (W. D. Hamilton) B. Direct Reciprocity (Trivers 1971) C. Indirect Reciprocity (Nowak 1998)

27 The Evolution of Cooperation
I. Issue II. Mechanisms (Nowak, 2006, Science). A. Kin Selection (W. D. Hamilton) B. Direct Reciprocity (Trivers 1971) C. Indirect Reciprocity (Nowak 1998) - In large populations (humans), the frequency of encounter may be low, and the relationship is asymmetric (one person CAN help, the other may never be able to).

28 The Evolution of Cooperation
I. Issue II. Mechanisms (Nowak, 2006, Science). A. Kin Selection (W. D. Hamilton) B. Direct Reciprocity (Trivers 1971) C. Indirect Reciprocity (Nowak 1998) - In large populations (humans), the frequency of encounter may be low, and the relationship is asymmetric (one person CAN help, the other may never be able to). - Helping establishes a good reputation; and increases the chance that others (not the direct beneficiaries) will help us if we need it.

29 The Evolution of Cooperation
I. Issue II. Mechanisms (Nowak, 2006, Science). A. Kin Selection (W. D. Hamilton) B. Direct Reciprocity (Trivers 1971) C. Indirect Reciprocity (Nowak 1998) - In large populations (humans), the frequency of encounter may be low, and the relationship is asymmetric (one person CAN help, the other may never be able to). - Helping establishes a good reputation; and increases the chance that others (not the direct beneficiaries) will help us if we need it. - People who are observed to be more helpful are more likely to be helped.

30 The Evolution of Cooperation
I. Issue II. Mechanisms (Nowak, 2006, Science). A. Kin Selection (W. D. Hamilton) B. Direct Reciprocity (Trivers 1971) C. Indirect Reciprocity (Nowak 1998) - But in large populations (humans), the frequency of encounter may be low, and the relationship is asymmetric (one person CAN help, the other may never be able to). - Helping establishes a good reputation; and increases the chance that others (not the direct beneficiaries) will help us if we need it. - People who are observed to be more helpful are more likely to be helped. - Even in other species... Bshry Cleaner Wrasse

31 - Even in other species... Bshry 2006 - Cleaner Wrasse
- wrasse eat parasites off "client" fish... but they can cheat and eat mucous, which is bad for the client fish.

32 - Even in other species... Bshry 2006 - Cleaner Wrasse
- wrasse eat parasites off "client" fish... but they can cheat and eat mucous, which is bad for the client fish. - Client fish observe wrasses, and prefer the wrasses that don't cheat

33 - Even in other species... Bshry 2006 - Cleaner Wrasse
- wrasse eat parasites off "client" fish... but they can cheat and eat mucous, which is bad for the client fish. - Client fish observe wrasses, and prefer the wrasses that don't cheat - AND, when WATCHED, wrasses cheat less and cooperate more...

34 - Even in other species... Bshry 2006 - Cleaner Wrasse
- wrasse eat parasites off "client" fish... but they can cheat and eat mucous, which is bad for the client fish. - Client fish observe wrasses, and prefer the wrasses that don't cheat - AND, when WATCHED, wrasses cheat less and cooperate more... - so wrasses cooperate with current clients to gain favor (reputation) with others that are observing.

35 - Even in other species... Bshry 2006 - Cleaner Wrasse
- wrasse eat parasites off "client" fish... but they can cheat and eat mucous, which is bad for the client fish. - Client fish observe wrasses, and prefer the wrasses that don't cheat - AND, when WATCHED, wrasses cheat less and cooperate more... - so wrasses cooperate with current clients to gain favor (reputation) with others that are observing. - cooperation can only evolve IF q > c/b, where: q = prob. of knowing someone's reputation

36 The Evolution of Cooperation
I. Issue II. Mechanisms (Nowak, 2006, Science). III. Conclusions

37 The Evolution of Cooperation
I. Issue II. Mechanisms (Nowak, 2006, Science). III. Conclusions - cooperation can evolve as a result of selection; even among unrelated entities (symbioses)

38 The Evolution of Cooperation
I. Issue II. Mechanisms (Nowak, 2006, Science). III. Conclusions - cooperation can evolve as a result of selection; even among unrelated entities (symbioses) - when cooperation occurs at one level, it creates a new level of organization... cells cooperate and ORGANISMS are produced... organisms cooperate and SOCIAL UNITS are produced.

39 The Evolution of Cooperation
I. Issue II. Mechanisms (Nowak, 2006, Science). III. Conclusions - cooperation can evolve as a result of selection; even among unrelated entities (symbioses) - when cooperation occurs at one level, it creates a new level of organization... cells cooperate and ORGANISMS are produced... organisms cooperate and SOCIAL UNITS are produced. - Cooperation allows specialization, and creates diversity at several levels

40 Conflicts.... I. Among Relatives

41 Conflicts.... I. Among Relatives A. Parent Conflicts

42 Conflicts.... I. Among Relatives A. Parent Conflicts - male parent (especially in multiply inseminated species) wants OWN offspring to receive resources and grow large

43 Conflicts.... I. Among Relatives A. Parent Conflicts - male parent (especially in multiply inseminated species) wants OWN offspring to receive resources and grow large - female parent, nourishing many embryos, wants ALL her offspring to survive and so does NOT want one to grow disproportionately.

44 Conflicts.... I. Among Relatives A. Parent Conflicts - male parent (especially in multiply inseminated species) wants OWN offspring to receive resources and grow large - female parent, nourishing many embryos, wants all offspring to survive and so does NOT want one to grow disproportionately. - Insulin-like Growth Factor II:

45 Conflicts.... I. Among Relatives A. Parent Conflicts - male parent (especially in multiply inseminated species) wants OWN offspring to receive resources and grow large - female parent, nourishing many embryos, wants all offspring to survive and so does NOT want one to grow disproportionately. - Insulin-like Growth Factor II: - stimulates growth of embryo.

46 Conflicts.... I. Among Relatives A. Parent Conflicts - male parent (especially in multiply inseminated species) wants OWN offspring to receive resources and grow large - female parent, nourishing many embryos, wants all offspring to survive and so does NOT want one to grow disproportionately. - Insulin-like Growth Factor II and gene imprinting: - stimulates growth of embryo. - gene from male is ON; gene from female is OFF

47 Conflicts.... I. Among Relatives A. Parent Conflicts - male parent (especially in multiply inseminated species) wants OWN offspring to receive resources and grow large - female parent, nourishing many embryos, wants all offspring to survive and so does NOT want one to grow disproportionately. - Insulin-like Growth Factor II: - stimulates growth of embryo. - gene from male is ON; gene from female is OFF - Also, there is an inhibitor to IGF-II

48 Conflicts.... I. Among Relatives A. Parent Conflicts - male parent (especially in multiply inseminated species) wants OWN offspring to receive resources and grow large - female parent, nourishing many embryos, wants all offspring to survive and so does NOT want one to grow disproportionately. - Insulin-like Growth Factor II: - stimulates growth of embryo. - gene from male is ON; gene from female is OFF - Also, there is an inhibitor to IGF-II - gene from male is OFF, gene from female is ON.

49 Conflicts.... I. Among Relatives A. Parent Conflicts - male parent (especially in multiply inseminated species) wants OWN offspring to receive resources and grow large - female parent, nourishing many embryos, wants all offspring to survive and so does NOT want one to grow disproportionately. - Insulin-like Growth Factor II: - stimulates growth of embryo. - gene from male is ON; gene from female is OFF - Also, there is an inhibitor to IGF-II - gene from male is OFF, gene from female is ON. - Infanticide by adoptive parents ... male lions kill cubs and bring female into estrus

50 Conflicts.... I. Among Relatives A. Parent Conflicts - Red Deer - In poor years, small doe's selectively abort male embryos at a higher frequency than female embryos. (In a harem forming species, males are unlikely to mate; especially if they are small).

51 Conflicts.... I. Among Relatives A. Parent Conflicts - Red Deer - In poor years, small doe's selectively abort male embryos at a higher frequency than female embryos. (In a harem forming species, males are unlikely to mate; especially if they are small). - But males with high breeding success (probability of mating, fertility, and proportion of normal sperm) can influence sex ratios also; they produce more sons. (Gomendio et al., Science )

52 Conflicts.... I. Among Relatives A. Parent Conflicts - Red Deer - In poor years, small doe's selectively abort male embryos at a higher frequency than female embryos. (In a harem forming species, males are unlikely to mate; especially if they are small). - But males with high breeding success (probability of mating, fertility, and proportion of normal sperm) can influence sex ratios also; they produce more sons. (Gomendio et al., Science ) - So, in this system, females often maximize production of daughters, while males maximize production of sons.

53 Conflicts.... I. Among Relatives A. Parent Conflicts B. Parent-Offspring Conflicts

54 Conflicts.... I. Among Relatives A. Parent Conflicts B. Parent-Offspring Conflicts - Parents are concerned with their cumulative fitness; including potential future fitness... not the survival of each and every offspring.

55 Conflicts.... I. Among Relatives A. Parent Conflicts B. Parent-Offspring Conflicts - Parents are concerned with their cumulative fitness; including potential future fitness... not the survival of each and every offspring. - Obviously, each offspring is concerned with THEIR OWN survival

56 Conflicts.... I. Among Relatives A. Parent Conflicts B. Parent-Offspring Conflicts - Parents are concerned with their cumulative fitness; including potential future fitness... not the survival of each and every offspring. - Obviously, each offspring is concerned with THEIR OWN survival - Birds often lay more eggs than they can care for, on average. If it is a good year, they can take advantage and raise more chicks. If it is a poor or average year, the last chick to hatch will die.

57 Conflicts.... I. Among Relatives A. Parent Conflicts B. Parent-Offspring Conflicts - Parents are concerned with their cumulative fitness; including potential future fitness... not the survival of each and every offspring. - Obviously, each offspring is concerned with THEIR OWN survival - Birds often lay more eggs than they can care for, on average. If it is a good year, they can take advantage. If it is a poor or average year, the last chick to hatch ends up dieing. - Red Deer: in poor years, small doe's selectively abort male embryos at a higher frequency than female embryos. (In a harem forming species, males are unlikely to mate; especially if they are small).

58 Conflicts.... I. Among Relatives A. Parent Conflicts B. Parent-Offspring Conflicts C. Sibling Conflicts

59 Conflicts.... I. Among Relatives A. Parent Conflicts B. Parent-Offspring Conflicts C. Sibling Conflicts - siblicide occurs where resources are limiting, or social dominance is a priority.

60 Conflicts.... I. Among Relatives A. Parent Conflicts B. Parent-Offspring Conflicts C. Sibling Conflicts - siblicide occurs where resources are limiting, or social dominance is a priority. - Cattle Egrets ...lay three eggs; first two have high androgens. If food is limiting, they will kill the third chick

61 Conflicts.... I. Among Relatives A. Parent Conflicts B. Parent-Offspring Conflicts C. Sibling Conflicts - siblicide occurs where resources are limiting, or social dominance is a priority. - Cattle Egrets ...lay three eggs; first two have high androgens. If food is limiting, they will kill the third chick - Hyenas... same sex siblicide more common than female-male; matriarchal society

62 Conflicts.... I. Among Relatives II. Among Non-Relatives A. Interspecific Competition

63 Conflicts.... I. Among Relatives II. Among Non-Relatives A. Interspecific Competition - within both populations, those that are competing within AND between species are at an energetic and reproductive disadvantage.

64 Conflicts.... I. Among Relatives II. Among Non-Relatives A. Interspecific Competition - within both populations, those that are competing within AND between species are at an energetic and reproductive disadvantage competititive exclusion

65 Conflicts.... I. Among Relatives II. Among Non-Relatives A. Interspecific Competition - within both populations, those that are competing within AND between species are at an energetic and reproductive disadvantage competititive exclusion - niche partitioning

66 Conflicts.... I. Among Relatives II. Among Non-Relatives A. Interspecific Competition - within both populations, those that are competing within AND between species are at an energetic and reproductive disadvantage competititive exclusion - niche partitioning

67 Conflicts.... I. Among Relatives II. Among Non-Relatives A. Interspecific Competition - within both populations, those that are competing within AND between species are at an energetic and reproductive disadvantage. - competititive exclusion - niche partitioning; character displacement Both species benefit by reducing the interaction; once it is reduced, there is no benefit to reestablish the interaction.

68 Life History Evolution
I. Components of Fitness and Trade-Offs A. Components

69 Life History Evolution
I. Components of Fitness and Trade-Offs A. Components 1. probability of survival

70 Life History Evolution
I. Components of Fitness and Trade-Offs A. Components 1. probability of survival 2. number of offspring

71 Life History Evolution
I. Components of Fitness and Trade-Offs A. Components 1. probability of survival 2. number of offspring 3. quality of offspring (probability of their survival)

72 BASAL METABOLISM GROWTH REPRODUCTION B. Trade-Offs
1. survival and growth vs. reproduction: 'r' vs. 'K' strategists BASAL METABOLISM "K"OMPETITIVE ABILITY GROWTH REPRODUCTION "r"

73 B. Trade-Offs 1. survival and growth vs. reproduction: 'r' vs. 'K' strategists 2. # vs. quality of offspring lots of little or a few big

74 B. Trade-Offs 1. survival and growth vs. reproduction: 'r' vs. 'K' strategists 2. # vs. quality of offspring lots of little or a few big 3. Timing: annual vs. perennial life history

75 B. Trade-Offs 1. survival and growth vs. reproduction: 'r' vs. 'K' strategists 2. # vs. quality of offspring lots of little or a few big 3. Timing: annual vs. perennial life history - When all else is equal, reproducing early and often is adaptive; even if it kills you. The faster you create copies that can copy themselves, the more the "compounding interest" effect of exponential reproduction can get working for you. Aphid "stem mother" produces live offspring asexually...

76 - But if that's true, why are there perennials?
Because environment matters. Lots of small offspring means that they only survive in a benign environment. But some environments are not benign... so the only way to reproduce successfully is to produce larger offspring... which may require longer survival to accumulate resources to make large offspring.

77 - But if that's true, why are there perennials?
Because environment matters. Lots of small offspring means that they only survive in a benign environment. But some environments are not benign... so the only way to reproduce successfully is to produce larger offspring... which may require longer survival to accumulate resources to make large offspring. - Or, as a consequence of storing energy, you may be able to reproduce disproportionately more later and 'recoup' the losses of delaying reproduction. 1 2 3 4 Annual 100 10,000 1,000,000 Perennial (Redwood) 1,000,001 each year

78 B. Trade-Offs 1. survival and growth vs. reproduction: 'r' vs. 'K' strategists 2. # vs. quality of offspring lots of little or a few big 3. Timing: annual vs. perennial life history C Evidence of Trade-Offs 1. Fruit flies - delay reproduction and extend their lifespan

79 B. Trade-Offs 1. survival and growth vs. reproduction: 'r' vs. 'K' strategists 2. # vs. quality of offspring lots of little or a few big 3. Timing: annual vs. perennial life history C Evidence of Trade-Offs 1. Fruit flies - delay reproduction and extend their lifespan 2. Blue tits - more chicks, shorter lifespans

80 B. Trade-Offs 1. survival and growth vs. reproduction: 'r' vs. 'K' strategists 2. # vs. quality of offspring lots of little or a few big 3. Timing: annual vs. perennial life history C Evidence of Trade-Offs 1. Fruit flies - delay reproduction and extend their lifespan 2. Blue tits (birds) - more chicks, shorter lifespans 3. Crickets - short-winged morphs (decreased survival and less growth energy) have larger eggs; long-winged forms have smaller eggs

81 B. Trade-Offs 1. survival and growth vs. reproduction: 'r' vs. 'K' strategists 2. # vs. quality of offspring lots of little or a few big 3. Timing: annual vs. perennial life history C Evidence of Trade-Offs 1. Fruit flies - delay reproduction and extend their lifespan 2. Blue tits (birds) - more chicks, shorter lifespans 3. Crickets - short-winged morphs (decreased survival) have larger eggs; long-winged forms have smaller eggs 4. Trade-offs between offspring size and number within species size number

82 B. Trade-Offs 1. survival and growth vs. reproduction: 'r' vs. 'K' strategists 2. # vs. quality of offspring lots of little or a few big 3. Timing: annual vs. perennial life history C Evidence of Trade-Offs 1. Fruit flies - delay reproduction and extend their lifespan 2. Blue tits (birds) - more chicks, shorter lifespans 3. Crickets - short-winged morphs (decreased survival) have larger eggs; long-winged forms have smaller eggs 4. Trade-offs between offspring size and number within species 5. Is there an optimal offspring size? - Probably a balance between selection on offspring survival (large size) and parental fitness (increased number). - Benign env... maximize number - Harsh env... maximize size


Download ppt "The Evolution of Cooperation"

Similar presentations


Ads by Google