1. European foreign, security and defence policy Dr
European foreign, security and defence policy Dr. Maria Strömvik, Lund University

2. Unwieldy decision-making procedures Minimal resources
Against all odds
The heart of the principle of sovereignty - vital task to safeguard national interests
Different European states with different and strong historical ties to other parts of the world
Foreign policy is largely demand-driven – requires immediate decisions on unexpected events
Unwieldy decision-making procedures
Minimal resources
International prestige
Maria Strömvik

3. European Political Cooperation
Luxembourg report 1970
Attempt to identify foreign policy issues of common interest
Ambition to possibly act in common (by diplomacy) if ”feasible and desirable”
Foreign Ministers’ meetings every six months
Political Committee (PoCo) to meet every 3 months
Presidency to coordinate the work
Maria Strömvik

4. European Political Cooperation
No meetings in Brussels
Not ”security and defence”
Not EC but ”the Six”
No secretariat
No common budget
No involvement of EC Commission
No mentioning in the treaties
No expectations to agree
Maria Strömvik

5. Almost all meetings in Brussels
CFSP today
Almost all meetings in Brussels
All issues of foreign and security policy
In the name of the EU
Strong Council Secretariat (and new EAS!)
Full involvement of the Commission
Several pages in the Lisbon Treaty
Quite high expectations to agree
Maria Strömvik

6. Common statements, positions and joint actions
CFSP instruments
Common statements, positions and joint actions
Common positions in international organisations
Special representatives
Political dialogues between EU and other countries and organisations
Maria Strömvik

7. Démarches in third states Participation in peace negotiations
CFSP instruments
Démarches in third states
Participation in peace negotiations
Political, diplomatic, economic, and financial carrots and sticks
Civilian and military peace support operations (ESDP)
Maria Strömvik

8. EPC 1980
Maria Strömvik

9. CFSP 2003
Maria Strömvik

10. EUPM Bosnia- Herzegovina Operation Proxima Macedonia EUPAT Macedonia
EUBAM
Moldova/Ukraine
EULEX
Kosovo
EUJUST Themis
Georgia
EUFOR Althea
Bosnia-
Herzegovina
EUMM
Georgia
Operation
Concordia
Macedonia
EU border
support team
Georgia
EU-support for
AU’s mission in
Darfur, Sudan
EUPOL
Afghanistan
EUFOR
Tchad/RCA
AMM
Aceh,
Indonesia
EU SSR
Guinea-Bissau
EUJUST Lex
(for) Iraq
EUPOL RDC
D. R. Congo
EUBAM Rafah
Gaza strip
EUFOR RDC
D. R. Congo
EUPOL COPPS
Palestinian
Territories
Operation
Artémis
D. R. Congo
EUSEC RDC
D. R. Congo
Atalanta
Somalia
Maria Strömvik

11. Consequences (international)
Demand for EU has increased dramatically
EU / CSDP has inspired others (notably AU)
EU has given the UN a new ”partner”
EU / CSDP has not generated any ”balancing behaviour”
Maria Strömvik

12. Consequences (EU level)
Council Secretariat’s role has increased dramatically
ESDP operations have in some cases brought MS closer together also politically
EU members and Commission discuss broader and more comprehensive foreign policy issues today than ever before
Treaty revisions
Maria Strömvik

13. Consequences (national)
Small countries ”forced” to broaden their ”foreign policy outlook”
Increased pressure on small foreign ministries
Increased pressure on inter-ministerial coordination
Increased demand for information and intelligence gathering
Revision and increased pressure on government agencies’ possibilities to provide civilian and military personnel
Markedly increased influence on international issues when EU agrees
Maria Strömvik

14. Challenges Different strategic visions among member states
Capability shortfalls (incl. availability of forces)
Institutional ”overstretch” (esp. civilian ops)
Still too little knowledge/understanding in the political systems (national and EU)
Financing (incl. trade off between national and Athena financing)
Flexibility (”war by committee”, e.g. EUFOR RDC and EUFOR Tchad/RCA)
Maria Strömvik

15. Challenges Lessons learned become very political Visibility
Institutional turf wars (esp. for civilan ops)
Relation to NATO
NATO’s raison d’être
Competition for troop contributions
Permanent HQ
Maria Strömvik

16. Opportunities
EU often perceived as more efficient and less ”corrupt” than UN
EU perceived as more ”neutral” and less self-interested than big nation states
In some cases, EU has been the only accepted third party (AMM, Rafah)
In some areas, EU can go where NATO cannot (Georgia, Moldova)
EU seen as welcome addition to the US in the international arena
Maria Strömvik

17. Opportunities EU can provide capacities that the UN cannot
In some cases UN even gets increased credibility from EU-UN cooperation
Gives European states a greater say (compared to NATO and compared to bilateral activities)
Unique actor when capable to combine and taylor different foreign policy instruments
Maria Strömvik