1. U.S. Joint Forces Command Allied Command Transformation (NATO)
The Joint Perspective
U.S. Joint Forces Command
Allied Command Transformation (NATO)
Organizing, Training & Equipping Joint Forces
Institutionalizing Process & Product of Change
Delivering Coherently Integrated Capabilities
Establishing/Reinforcing Joint Culture and Learning Institutions
Focusing on Core Business Areas
Increased capability through greater degrees of integration is multiplicative, not additive. Here’s what we actually saw as we built up our joint and combined operation in Afghanistan:
fully integrate joint = ten fold capability increase
fully integrate interagency = another ten fold increase
fully integrate friends and allies = another ten fold increase

2. Requirements for JTF HQs are Increasing20 15 10 5
JTF Operational
During year
JTF Formed
During year 24
Requires more than Individual Augmentees pulled from assigned duties. 16 13
Number of JTF HQs
Also requires Service operational headquarters that are not focused on their force providing duties. 10 8
I show you this slide to illustrate the dynamics of JTFs in our recent past. The purple columns easily show that we are growing more standing JTF headquarters. However, my real focus is on the number of JTF headquarters that we activate and then deactivate shown here in red. In some cases, the JTF is formed for a single event that may last less then 30 days. In most cases they will last from 6-11 months. We are forming a lot of JTF headquarters and that does not even count the ones we plan, but do not execute. 7 8 6 1 1
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

3. Attributes of a Transforming Joint Force The Operator’s approach
Deconflict Service Forces
Coordinate
Stitch Service Seams
Integrate
Services/SOCOM Capabilities
Coherently Integrate
Interdependent,
Collaborative,
Learning & Adaptive Coherently Joint Force
Interagency
SOF
Army Forces
Air Forces
Marine Forces
Navy Forces
Army Forces
Air Forces
Marine Forces
Navy Forces
Army Forces
Air Forces
Marine Forces
Navy Forces
SOF
Increased capability through greater degrees of integration is multiplicative, not additive. Here’s what we actually saw as we built up our joint and combined operation in Afghanistan:
fully integrate joint = ten fold capability increase
fully integrate interagency = another ten fold increase
fully integrate friends and allies = another ten fold increase
Multinational
Result:
Effects-Based Outcomes
Supported/Supporting Relationships

4. Continuum of Transformation
UNCLASSIFIED
Continuum of Transformation
Multinational
Interagency
Army Forces
Air Forces
Marine Forces
Navy Forces
SOF
Joint Operating Concepts
Vector to achieve Effects-Based, Collaborative, Network Centric & Interdependent force
Left is where we started (evident progress); RIGHT is where we are headed
We seek asymmetric advantages in Knowledge, Speed, Precision, and Lethality—the elements of the Overmatching Power seen in IRAQI FREEDOM.
A Sample of JUST some initiatives on the Continuum of Transformation.
Active Service partnerships– and recently Allies – in wargames/CDE
From Service Training To Joint National Training Capability-We must train as we Fight!-(1st event last January).
2d Training Transformation; Services had 1st Training Transformation with Top Gun, the Air Warrior and Red Flag and the National Training Center.
Focus reflects lessons learned (jointness, Overmatching Power). . . Joint Fires JCAS
 Power of this approach: Army major, 3rd Infantry Division OIF veteran and FT Irwin noted: “we play with all the ‘toys’ is in war. Now we get to play with everything.”
From Attrition To Effects Integrated Operations & Intelligence=Focused effects
From counting numbers To measuring enemy coherence, behavior, will, ability
Requires greater integration—between joint forces, government agencies, allies A key start point is in integration of Operations AND Intelligence must be better customers/suppliers
Lessons Learned aids this: briefed all COCOMs, CIA, DIA, Services (to 3 star level)
with Combatant Commanders in training and exercises
Transformation in Action: MRX’s, etc.; CJTF 180 (Afghanistan since JUN 02), training USFK and War Plans modification, etc.
Transforming how we provide fires. OIF showed potential (less artillery, more CAS=less to deploy), JNTC focused on CAS, Now working doctrine, tech, organizations and training
C2 as discussed in Insights and Implications This is the first step Must sustain C4I investment to leverage full potential. (Schoomaker “good enough” BMC2)
Joint Lessons Learned: In addition to what we’ve done, continue collect in Iraq, expanded for GWOT (9 locations) and put a team into SOUTHCOM with a Senior Mentor
Service Wargames
Joint-Service Wargames
Service Training Transformation
Joint National Training Capability
Attrition Warfare
Effects-Based Operations
Fire Support
Coordination Line
Kill Box/Joint Terminal
Attack Controllers
Organic Fires
Joint Fires
C4ISR C2+C2ISR
Service Command & Control
Joint Command & Control
Joint Center for Operational Analysis
- Lessons Learned
Service Lessons Learned
Joint Lessons Learned