1. U.S. Runway Safety Briefing
ICAO NAM/CAR/SAM Runway Safety/Runway Incursion Conference
John Pallante, ARI-2
October 2002

2. Global Airspace Characteristics
Growing demand for air travel and system capacity
Millions of operations a year
Hundreds of thousands of pilots and aircraft
Thousands of air traffic
controllers
Thousands of airports
Pressure to reduce delays and to enhance safety

3. Runway Safety Realities
Systemic, Rare, Potentially Catastrophic Events
Human Factors – Inevitable and Constant
Commercial and GA Incursions – Proportionate to Operations
Airport Design, Procedures, and Local Factors are Significant
Solution includes Cultural Change, Joint and Individual Ownership

4. Types of Runway Incursions
A runway incursion is any occurrence on an airport runway involving an aircraft, vehicle, person, or object on the ground that creates a collision hazard or results in a loss of required separation with an aircraft taking off, landing, or intending to land.
The FAA investigates runway incursions and attributes the occurrence to one or more of the following error types.
Operational Errors
An operational error (OE) is an action of an Air Traffic Controller (ATC) that results in:
Less than the required minimum separation between two or more aircraft, or between an aircraft and obstacles (obstacles include, vehicles, equipment, personnel on runways)
An aircraft landing or departing on a runway closed to aircraft
Pilot Deviations
A pilot deviation (PD) is an action of a pilot that violates any Federal Aviation Regulation. For example, a pilot fails to obey air traffic control instructions to not cross an active runway when following the authorized route to an airport gate.
Vehicle/Pedestrian Deviations
A vehicle or pedestrian deviation (VPD) includes pedestrians, vehicles or other objects interfering with aircraft operations by entering or moving on the runway movement area without authorization from air traffic control.

5. Runway Incursions (All Categories)
66.21
68.67
67.68
65.47
Tower Operations (millions)
YTD 09/30/02
est
DATA ARE PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE

6. Distribution by Type of Runway Incursions
Who is causing the problem FY
FY 2002 YTD (09/30/02)
DATA ARE PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE

7. Runway Incursion Severity Categories
Operational Dimensions Affecting Runway Incursion Severity
Available
Reaction
Time
Evasive or
Corrective
Action
Environmental
Conditions
Speed of
Aircraft and/or
Vehicle
Proximity of
Increasing Severity
Increasing Severity
Category A
Category D
Category D
Category C
Category C
Category B
Category B
Category A
Little or no chance of collision but meets the definition of a runway incursion
Separation decreases but there is ample time and distance to avoid a collision
Separation decreases and there is a significant potential for collision
Separation decreases and participants take extreme action to narrowly avoid a collision, or the event results in a collision
Little or no
Separation
Separation
Separation
An incursion that
resulted in a
runway collision
Collision
chance of
decreases but
decreases and
decreases and
collision but
there is ample
there is a
participants take
meets the
time and
significant
extreme action
definition of a
distance to avoid
potential for
to narrowly
runway incursion
a collision
collision
avoid a collision

8. Tower Operations (millions)
Category A&B Runway Incursions
66.21
68.67
67.68
65.47
Tower Operations (millions)
YTD 09/30/02
53 = FY02 Perf Limit
est
DATA ARE PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE

9. Severity Distribution of Runway IncursionsFY
FY 2002 YTD (09/30/02)
Category A includes 2 collisions / 4 fatalities (FLL & SRQ- 4 fatal).
Category A includes 2 collisions / 0 fatalities (VNY & LAL).
DATA ARE PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE

10. Location of Collisions at Towered
Category A and B Runway Incursions (CY 2000 and 2001)
Traffic Flow
2001 A Events
2000 A Events
2001 B Events
2000 B Events
66% or
2/3 of runway
Location of Collisions at Towered
Airports (1990 – 2001)

11. Runway Collisions Met. Conditions (1990 - 2001)
DAY VMC
DAY IMC 2 1 5
NIGHT VMC
NIGHT IMC

12. Frequency and Rate of Runway Incursions (CY 1998 - 2001)
TOTAL OPERATIONS
4 Year Total = 268 Million
Annual Average = 67 Million
TOTAL INCURSIONS
Total Incursions = 1460
Average No. of Incursions = 5 per airport over 4 years
INCURSION RATE
Average Rate = 0.55 incursions per 100,000 operations

13. Airport complexity influences the number and rate of runway incursions (FY 1998 - 2001)
LAX
STL
IAD
34 Incursions
30 Incursions
3 Incursions

14. Severity Distribution at the 32 Benchmark Airports (CY 1998 – 2001)
The Benchmark Airports accounted for
18% of all operations (approx. 61 Million out of 332 Million) at towered airports over the 4 year period
26% (383) of all the runway incursions in the 4 year period studied
The Benchmark Airports accounted for
38% (38/87) A events,
36% (59/163) B events,
35% (178/509) C events,
16% (113/694) D events

15. Outcome: Zero fatalities from runway incursions
What the FAA is Doing
Current Situation
Runway Safety Goals
Outcome: Zero fatalities from runway incursions

16. Primary Performance Factors of Runway Incursions (1997-2001)
Pilot Deviations
Enters or crosses a runway after acknowledging hold short instructions
Takes off without a clearance after acknowledging position and hold instructions
Operational Errors
Loss of arrival/departure separation on same or intersecting runways
Runway crossing separation errors
Vehicle/Pedestrian Deviations
Crosses a runway without communication or authorization
Enters a runway after acknowledging hold short instructions

17. Runway Safety Blueprint
8 Goals
– 39 Objectives
Education and Training
– Safety Seminars
Surface Safety Awareness
– Mass Mailings
Procedures
– Modeling and Simulation
– Advisory Circulars
Data Collection
– Surface Incidents
– ASRS
7. Technology – PAPI testing September 10-12, 2002 in Long Beach (LGB)

18. Runway Safety Blueprint (cont’d)
8 Goals
– 39 Objectives
Communications
– Phraseology Workgroup
Situational Awareness
– Paint Study
Local Solutions
– Special Emphasis Program
Technology
– Flashing PAPI
– Runway Status Lights (AMASS, ASDE-X)
– Moving Map
– LED Lights

19. Technologies ARI sponsoring technologies with industry-wide potential
AMASS
18 Commissioned
6 Operational Suitability Demo
13 Remaining
LED lighting
Enhances hold position markings at runway/taxiway intersection
Omaha system activation July 2002

20. Summary
Runway Safety is a multi-dimensional issue that requires a multi-dimensional approach.
People make mistakes – even the most intelligent, well-trained, conscientious, well-intentioned people make mistakes.
Education, training and procedures are important solutions, but they are always susceptible to human error. To be successful, a balanced approach also requires improvements in airport design and technology, and a determination to take ownership of the issue of runway incursions.

21. Backup Slides

22. Approach
Analyze the incident data to determine areas of greatest risks
What are the types and relative frequencies of different types of error?
Identify mitigation strategies for managing human error
Procedures
Technologies

23. Where do we go wrong? Controllers
Forget (about a closed runway, a clearance that they issued, an aircraft waiting to takeoff or cleared to land)
Get distracted
Fail to coordinate (teamwork)
Don’t catch all readback errors
Act human

24. Where do we go wrong? Pilots
Fail to “hold short” as instructed (and cross or line up on the runway)
Takeoff without a clearance
Get lost (with and without poor visibility)
Misunderstand the clearance
Act human
Taxi into position and hold R23
Taxi to holding position R23

25. Resulting in:
Aircraft/vehicles crossing in front of an aircraft taking off or landing
Aircraft/vehicles crossing in front of an aircraft landing
Controllers forgetting about aircraft holding in position and clearing an aircraft to land on the same runway
Other scenarios
Sometimes cleared, sometimes not

26. How do we fix it? Better tools for pilots and controllers
Better airport signs and markings
Surface radar at more airports
Improved means of controller-pilot communication (to reduce frequency congestion and eliminate blocked transmissions)
Runway status lights
“Loops”
Cockpit moving map displays

27. What Controllers Can Do
Optimize teamwork
Recognize limitations of human memory and attention
Don’t clear an aircraft into “position and hold” if you plan on it being there for more than a minute
Never “assume” – keep up your scan and check that the runway is clear
Good communication techniques
Always inform pilots of similar call signs on same frequency
Don’t try to talk to pilots during landing and rollout
issue taxi instructions at taxi speed

28. What Pilots Can Do
DON’T “mind your own business” – do whatever you can to increase your awareness of the airport operation
LISTEN UP
LOOK OUT
Airport diagram “out and in use”
Is there a runway between you and the gate?
Is there an aircraft on final?

29. What Pilots Can Do (cont’d)
Both pilots should listen for clearances to land, taxi, and take-off
When in doubt, about your position or your clearance - ASK
SOPs and Recommended Practices
Landing lights go on when take-off clearance is received (signal that aircraft is rolling)
Call ATC if you expected an imminent take-off and have been lined up and waiting for more than 90 seconds

30. Technologies

31. BAA Activities Background Status System demo - November 2002
Issued Surface Technology Broad Agency Announcement (BAA): Exploring new and emerging, lower cost technology solutions
Demonstrate technical feasibility of proposed technology
Proceed to technology/solution development phase based on operational transition potential
Status
Six demonstration contracts awarded in 2001 (summary on next slide)
Laser light technology contract awarded in July 2002
System demo - November 2002

32. BAA Activities (cont’d)

33. Other Projects (cont’d)
Hold Line Enhancement with LED lights
Three phases testing at Omaha
LED stand alone
LED with motion sensors
Special scenarios - TBD
Operational Assessment complete
Jan 2003

34. Other Projects (cont’d)
VHF audio alert with motion sensors for non-controlled airports
Two months data collection at Millard Airport completed in May 2002
Detection rate and false alert rate need enhancement

35. Other Projects (cont’d)
Flashing Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI)
Notifies pilots on approach that it is unsafe to land due to an aircraft or vehicle occupying the Take-off Hold position or other critical position on the runway
System control logic driven by loops detection in Long Beach
Article 7 Brief
August 12, 2002
Field Demo
September 10-12, 2002

36. Technologies Deployment
Short Term
Utilize existing Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (SMGCS) and install FAA approved light fixtures such as Runway Guard Lights and Stop Bar Lights at those hot spots and high traffic intersections to increase the awareness of pilots and vehicle operators
North Vegas
Long Beach
Phase in automatic control such as loops and motion sensor, and evaluate their effectiveness

37. Technologies Deployment (cont’d)
Mid Term
Evaluate, certify and install R&D equipment and system to improve runway safety
Addressable Sign – TYS
LED/Hold Line Enhancement – OMA
75 MHz Ground Marker – Tech Center
Long Term
Provide low cost surveillance system for smaller airports
Implement and promote the utilization of Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) and ground vehicle tracking
Integrate existing and future certified warning equipment/devices with safety logic to provide visual and aural alerts to users including air traffic controllers, pilots and vehicle operators