1. Currency crises and exchange rate policy
Chapter 9

2. Learning objectives
Defining currency crisis
First, second, and third generation models of currency crises
Role of speculation, expectations, and international contagion
Coordination, efficiency, frequency, and measurement of currency crises
Policy trilemma and its role in current exchange rate problems

3. What is a currency crisis?
International capital mobility is often viewed as the main determinant of financial fragility and financial crises
What is a currency crisis?
Speculative attack on the currency (usually when the value of the currency is expected to change significantly). Investors start selling their investments (denominated in that currency). Currency crises tend to affect fixed exchange rate regimes rather than flexible (floating) regimes.
Initially the authorities may try to resist the devaluation of the currency by raising interest rates and/or selling foreign reserves.
Eventually, the authorities have to let the value of the currency fall.
The speculative attacks on the currency can be largely self-fulfilling.
Note that
(i) even in the case where the attacks are not successful there is still a currency crisis if, for example, the authorities had to raise interest rates significantly or to deplete their foreign exchange reserves.
(ii) A currency crisis may originate from perceived weaknesses of the local economy.
Example: The currency crisis in Southeast Asia in 1997 (Fig. 9.1)

4. Figure 9.1 The Asian crisis: rapid drop in the value of some currencies, 1985–2002
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; New York monthly exchange rate.

5. Figure 9.2 Currency crashes since 180040
Asian crisis
percent 30
Napoleonic wars
Great Depression 20 10
1800
Figure 9.2
1830
1860
1890
1920
1950
1980
2010
Source: based on Reinhart and Rogoff (2009); share of countries with an annual depreciation greater than 15 per cent, five year moving average.

6. Frequency and measurement
Empirical studies (e.g., Bordo et al., 2001) find that the frequency of currency crises has increased over time (Fig. 9.2).
Bordo et al. conclude that the increased frequency is largely due to currency crises in emerging markets and the increase in international capital mobility.

7. Characteristics of currency crises
Reversal of capital flows
A current account surplus has to develop as the net capital outflow increases (Fig. 9.3)
Devaluation of domestic currency implies higher real value of debt for domestic firms and banks.
Currency crises can have a significant negative impact on real GDP growth (Table 9.1) and per capita income (Fig. 9.4).

8. Figure 9.3 The Asian crisis: current account balance, 1990–2009, per cent of GDP
Source: World Development Indicators online

10. Figure 9.4 The Asian crisis: developments of GDP per capita, 1990–2009
Source: World Development Indicators online

11. First-generation models
Two basic dimensions to classify the models:
The role of international investors
Rationale for the crisis
The first-generation model (Krugman, 1979 and Flood and Garber, 1984):
P = m(M), (with dP/dM >0) (9.1)
P = EfP* , (with P* = Ef = 1; fixed exchange rate) (9.2)
dM = dF +dR (9.3)
In this model, investors play a passive role and the currency crisis is entirely due to domestic economic conditions that are not consistent (are incompatible) with the fixed-exchange rate objective (bad fundamentals of the economy). The only possible outcome is devaluation of the local currency.

12. Is the first-generation model useful? Yes.
Most economists think that currency crises are on average the result of bad fundamentals (at least to some degree).
The model explains why a currency crisis can happen quite suddenly during a time when the authorities appear to still be able to maintain the fixed-exchange rate.

13. Box 9.1: Speculative coordination
Coordination of investors’ decision is required for a currency crisis to occur.

14. Box 9.1

15. Second-generation models
The first generation model assumes that both investors and monetary authorities behave passively; their behavior is mechanical.
We need a model that can link currency crises and the loss of confidence in the fixed exchange rate to the workings of the financial sector at large.
In second-generation models, currency crises do not depend only on a given set of fundamentals but also on the behavior of investors.
Second-generation models show multiple equilibria: the occurrence and absence of a speculative currency attack can both be an equilibrium outcome.

16. The second generation models (Krugman, 1996) are based on three assumptions.
Policymakers have a reason to abandon the fixed exchange rate.
Policymakers also have a reason to maintain the fixed exchange rate.
The cost to maintain the fixed exchange rate rises if investors expect a devaluation of the currency. Investors will demand higher interest rates (Fig. 9.5).
Assumptions (1) and (2) imply that there is a trade-off;
there are costs and benefits to maintaining or not
maintaining the fixed exchange rate. From assumption
(3) we can see that investors determine the
policymakers’ position on this trade-off.
Expectations are crucial in these models and the devaluation may or may not take place. It all depends on the interaction between investors and policymakers.

17. The empirical evidence on the causes of currency crises largely points to the incompatibility between economic fundamentals and the fixed exchange rate.
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999): countries that are hit by a currency crisis have on average excessive money and credit growth rates, a high current account deficit (high capital inflow), overvalued (in real terms) currency, and lower GDP growth rates.
However, self-fulfilling expectations can also play a role. The evidence on this may be derived from studies examining contagion in currency crises.
Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000, p. 147): “Contagion is a case where knowing that there is a crisis elsewhere increases the probability of a crisis at home.”
(Table 9.3)
Fundamentals-based contagion (when a country hit by the crisis is linked to other countries through international trade or finance) versus pure contagion (self-fulfilling crisis).

18. Figure 9.5 Interest rates for selected Euro area countries, 1993–2012
Source: ECB, monthly interest rates statistics; long term interest rates- 10 year maturity (

20. Expectations and contagion
Market efficiency
The first- and second-generation models make a strong assumption about market efficiency. They assume that currency crises never catch investors by surprise and investor expectations about the incompatibility between the fixed exchange rate and the economic fundamentals turn out to be correct. Thus, currency crises can be of entirely self-fulfilling nature (based on any information).
Empirical evidence shows that self-fulfilling crises, although they can still occur, are not the rule.

21. Exchange rate and policy trilemma
Three policy objectives:
Fixed exchange rate
Monetary policy independence
Capital mobility
Problem: Only two of these objectives can be achieved at any one point in time!
(Fig. 9.6)

22. Figure 9.6 The policy trilemma