1. The modernization of war

2. War, the State and historical change
War = organized, collective violence
War = prime function of the state
State: institution representing, governing a territory/population
Inter-state/international relations
War = instrument of politics and government
Clausewitz: “Continuation of politics by other means”
Defensive: protecting territory, population, sovereignty of the state
Offensive: state’s interests pursued via expansion, colonization, etc.
= prime function of the state
- institution that represents and govern a territory and a population
- inter-state / international relations
- War = tool of politics and government - Clausewitz: war is the continuation of politics by other means. 
Defending the integrity of the territory, protecting the population against external attack, preserving sovereignty of the state. 
Aggressive pursuit of the state’s or national interests: territorial expansion, colonization, etc. 

3. War, the State and historical change
Modernization and progress
A problem, not an equivalence
Drivers of modernization
Technology – Tools
Economics – Money
Politics – Ideas
Modernization of war - Story of the transformation of the warfare, of the business of war. 
Despite positive connotations of modernity, modernisation, the transformations of warfare remind us that modernisation is not necessarily an unadulterated good, overwhelming positive process. 
The second lecture, tomorrow, will therefore consider the costs of war in relation to its modernisation. 
The modernisation of war product of changes in the following areas:
- technology
- economics
- politics
Tools, money, ideas
Changes happened simultaneously in these three realms and are in constant interaction. 
Modernisation of warfare, like social change, is a fraught, contested process. 

4. War, the State and historical change
The “military revolution” in early modern history
Michael Roberts (1956), Netherlands, Sweden,
Technological, tactical, and doctrinal evolutions  larger, permanent armies
Creation of the modern state
Fortification, naval warfare, rise of the West (G. Parker, 1970s)
Transformation of warfare part and parcel of wider historical changes

5. The long nineteenth century, 1789-1918
Revolutions of the late eighteenth-century
Enlightenment: rational and scientific approaches to warfare
Political revolutions: citizenship, taxes, and military service
Advent of mass warfare
Frederick the Great (18th c.) – <40,000 soldiers
Napoleon, Leipzig, 1813: 195,000

6. War and the transformation of politics
“Levée en masse”, France, 1793
“From this moment until the enemy is driven from the territory of the Republic, all the French people are permanently requisitioned for the armies. The young men will go to the front, married men will forge arms and carry supplies, women will make tents and clothing, children will divide old linen into bandages, old men will be carried into the squares to rouse the courage of the soldiers, to teach hatred of kings and the unity of the Republic.”
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“The musket made the infantryman and the infantryman made the democrat” J.F.C Fuller, The Conduct of War

7. “How war made states and vice versa”
With a nation in arms, a state’s extractive power rose enormously, as did the claims of citizens on their state. Although a call to defend the fatherland stimulated extraordinary support for the efforts of war, reliance on mass conscription, confiscatory taxation, and conversion of production to the ends of war made any state vulnerable to popular resistance, and answerable to popular demands as never before. From that point onward, the character of war changed, and the relationship between war making and civilian politics altered fundamentally.” Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD , 1990

8. War and citizenship
“All this bargaining created or confirmed individual and collective claims on the state, individual and collective rights vis-à-vis the state, and obligations of the state to its citizens. It also created rights – recognized enforceable claims – of states with respect to their citizens. The core of what we now call “citizenship”, indeed, consists of multiple bargains hammered out by rulers and ruled in the course of their struggles over the means of state action, especially the making of war.” Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States

9. The long nineteenth century, 1789-1918
Economic transformations
Scientific and technological progress
Agricultural efficiency
Industrialization
Organizational changes
Bureaucracy
Professionalization (General staff and military academies)

10. A second “military revolution”?
Technologies of combat
Breech-loading guns, rapid-firing rifles and artillery, machine gun – Firepower and accuracy
Transportation and communication
Railway: US Civil War, Prussia vs Austria (1866) and France (1870-1)
Communications (Telegraphy)
Steam-powered, ironclad boats
Medical advances

11. Transformations of the battlefield: Waterloo

12. Transformations of the battlefield: WWI

13. Critical innovations Air Power
Integrations of different weapon systems
The Absolute Weapon: the Atomic bomb
Hiroshima, 6 August 1945 = 14,000 tons of TNT
1953: Hydrogen bomb
1961: USSR bomb = 4,000 Hiroshima-type bomb

14. An innovation-centred narrative
First World War – The chemists’ war
Second World War – The physicists’ war
Towards to a New Revolution in Military Affairs – ICT
Civilianization and Industrialization of warfare – War = perversion of science and innovation
“Since technology and war operate on a logic which is not only different but actually opposed, the conceptual framework that is useful, even vital, for dealing with the one should not be allowed to interfere with the other” Martin Van Creveld

15. What does the killing? Technology-in-Use
The engine of warfare: Horsepower!!
British Army in WWI (1917): 591,000 horses, 213,000 mules, 47,000 camels, 11,000 oxen
German Army in WWII (1945): 1.2 million horses
Guns and artillery remained the main killers in WWI and WWII

16. What does the killing? Technology-in-Use
Greater efficiency obtained not by innovation but by better deployment, coordination, organization of existing technologies
Rifles and small arms: gradual adaptation