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Galatasaray University, GIAM
PUBLIC-PRIVATE WAGE DIFFERENTIALS IN TURKEY Ayça Akarçay Gürbüz and Sezgin Polat Galatasaray University, GIAM Istanbul – Turkey BETAM - September,
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Preliminary remarks on public employment
Overall decline in share Composition: Education upgraded
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OVERALL Public formal Private formal Private informal Total 2005
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Public formal Private formal Private informal Total 2005 24.80% 44.40% 30.80% 100% 2006 23.40% 46.90% 29.70% 2007 22.00% 50.70% 27.40% 2008 20.90% 55.10% 24.00% 2009 56.00% 23.10% 2010 20.10% 57.30% 22.50% 2011 19.70% 58.10% 22.20%
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POST-SECONDARY Public formal Private formal Private informal Total
2005 694800 102498 2006 813909 106088 2007 934939 112889 2008 109173 2009 105676 2010 107822 2011 120067
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POST-SECONDARY Public formal Private formal Private informal 2005
59.00% 35.70% 5.30% 2006 57.30% 37.80% 4.90% 2007 54.90% 40.30% 2008 52.20% 43.50% 4.30% 2009 52.40% 43.60% 4.00% 2010 53.30% 43.00% 3.80% 2011 51.90% 44.40% 3.70% Public formal Private formal Private informal Total 2005 42.70% 14.40% 3.10% 18.00% 2006 46.60% 15.40% 3.20% 19.00% 2007 49.50% 15.80% 3.50% 20.00% 2008 52.80% 16.70% 3.80% 21.00% 2009 57.00% 17.70% 3.90% 23.00% 2010 60.70% 17.20% 2011 63.10% 18.30% 4.00% 24.00%
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Questions What is the public-private wage gap?
What are the contributions of the composition and price effects at the mean and across the wage distribution? How has the public wage premium evolved from 2005 to 2011, and why? … … alongside the public-private wage gap analysis, we decompose real wage increase within the public and private sector separately in order to compare the respective price effects and see whether the evolution observed in the premia has been the result of a greater price effect in either one of the sectors. Techniques: Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (gap at the mean) Melly (2005)’s decomposition using quantile regressions. Compare the quantile decomposition (Melly, 2005) results with the John-Murphy-Pierce (1993) (JMP) decomposition. total (or raw or unadjusted) wage gap = composition effect (or observed (observable) effects (characteristics)/ control variables) + price effect (or unobserved (unobservable) effect, or adjusted pay gap, or wage premium
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Literature - Turkey Budget surveys because the question is not explicitly asked in labor surveys Tansel (2005) 1994 HICES “Household Income and Consumption Expenditure Survey” Akhmedjonov and Izgi (2012) 2009 HBS San and Polat (2012) 1994 HICES and 2008 HBS
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Literature – Turkey - shortcomings
Methodological (sector, dependent variable etc) Budget survey + small sample (esp. Public) Single year Mean not distribution Limited controls: especially sector, age and region – improvements in the last release of datasets Sector: compatible NACE rev 2 (21 to 9 sector agregation – better controlling for public activities) Age – continuous Region – NUTS 2 breakdown important to control for regional variations in private wages and public wage compensations
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Literature - world We use two recent comparative studies (notwithstanding methodological disparities): Depalo et al (2013) Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain Mizala et al (2011) - Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, El Salvador and Uruguay – early 1990s to mid 2000s
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Sample formal wage-earners (informal wage-earners, self-employed and unpaid family workers whose earnings are unreported are omitted) “public employee” = wage-earner not working in the private sector trim 1% at both ends of the distribution population aged 21 years and above to minimize selection bias at earlier ages dependent variable: log real hourly wages = declared monthly wage / (regular hours worked * 4.3)
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SELECTED SUMMARY STATISTICS
2005 2011 public private formal informal total mean Gender (woman) 22.3% 18.6% 20.1% 20.0% 27.8% 20.9% 23.7% 22.9% Urban 80.5% 88.4% 78.9% 83.7% 79.9% 85.9% 71.5% 81.9% Tenure 12.5 5.4 5.5 7.4 12.9 4.7 2.9 6.1 Tenure2 2.2 0.6 0.8 1.1 2.5 0.5 0.4 0.9 Age 38.0 32.5 34.9 34.6 38.9 33.7 36.6 35.3 Age2 15.1 11.2 13.2 12.8 15.9 12.0 14.6 13.3 Real hours 43.4 54.8 56.6 52.2 41.3 53.5 53.9 51.1 Number of household members 3.9 4.0 4.2 3.6 4.8 4.1 No education 0.7% 1.4% 9.6% 3.4% 0.3% 2.2% 12.9% 3.8% Primary and less than primary 24.5% 53.3% 71.8% 50.4% 14.7% 49.3% 66.2% 45.3% High school 18.3% 16.0% 8.7% 14.6% 11.0% 14.8% 9.1% Vocational high school 14.5% 15.2% 6.4% 12.6% 11.3% 15.4% 6.9% Post-secondary 42.0% 14.2% 3.6% 18.8% 62.7% 18.2% 4.8% 25.0% Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.9% 0.6% 9.4% 3.0% 0.8% 2.8% Mining and quarrying and other industry 4.2% 0.5% 1.9% 2.7% 2.1% Manufacturing 3.7% 44.8% 23.6% 28.0% 1.6% 35.6% 20.5% 25.7% Construction 1.3% 5.1% 17.5% 7.4% 0.4% 7.9% 16.9% 8.0% Wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage, accommodation and food service activities 5.2% 30.7% 32.1% 24.1% 29.6% 29.9% Information and communication + Financial and insurance activities + Real estate activities 4.3% 1.0% 1.7% 5.3% 2.4% 4.0% Professional, scientific, technical, administration and support service activities 5.8% 3.9% 11.5% 3.3% 7.6% Public administration, defence, education, human health and social work activities 75.9% 23.2% 86.6% 4.6% 6.6% 22.1% Other services 3.5% 9.8% 5.0% 8.8% Legislators, senior officials and managers 6.0% 4.4% 2.3% Professionals 29.3% 1.5% 10.8% 35.2% 4.9% 1.2% 10.5% Technicians and associate professionals 14.4% 9.7% 13.5% 10.0% 9.5% Clerks 14.3% 11.4% 10.2% 16.6% 12.3% 11.6% Service workers and shop and market sales workers 12.0% 13.7% 17.7% 11.7% 15.9% 22.7% 16.3% Skill agricultural and fishery workers + Craft and related workers + Plant and machine operators and assemblers 14.0% 42.5% 44.9% 35.4% 8.6% 36.9% 37.8% 31.2% Elementary occupations 12.2% 26.1% 6.5% 15.7% 28.5% 16.2% SELECTED SUMMARY STATISTICS
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Descriptive Rationalization and specialization Causes:
Overall decline in share Composition: Education + Sector and Skill – upgraded and specialized Causes: Public finance Quality Specialization Generational Increased supply of post-secondary labor force Central examination: entry barrier
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Descriptive KERNEL DENSITIES
increase in real hourly wages, in both sectors for both genders distributions are more compressed for women than men private-public gap is a little larger for women public wages are roughly the same in the public sector for both genders vs real wages in the private sector for women are lower the increase in private sector wages from 2005 to 2011 is less for women than men
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Comparison Turkey’s size of public sector ( : 24.8 to 19.7%) is closer to European countries in 2005 (Germany 19.1 and Belgium 37.6%, 26.5% on average) higher than Latin American countries (Colombia 7.7% and Panama 17.8%, 13% on average). However, the decreasing trend has been relatively fast, in comparison the public sector in Latin American was 15.8% on average in the first half of the 1990s before decreasing to 13% in the mid-2000s
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The mean raw gap and premia are positive
2005 2011 MELLY MEN MELLY WOMEN JMP MEN JMP WOMEN Total 0.648 0.864 0.686 0.878 0.649 0.685 Composition 0.349 0.492 0.5 0.571 0.320 0.472 0.402 0.523 Price 0.299 0.371 0.187 0.307 0.329 0.391 0.283 0.355 Obs. 37904 51165 9220 15024 Contribution of composition at the mean 54% 57% 73% 65% 49% 55% 59% 60% Mean The mean raw gap and premia are positive Increased from 2005 to 2011 for both genders Corresponding figures are also positive in European (except in Belgium) and Latin American countries, and higher in the latter. Comparatively Turkey is situated closer to Latin American countries having higher premia The composition effect dominates both years. Observed characteristics explain more than half of the total mean wage gap The contribution of observed characteristics obtained here lies within a plausible range: in European countries the contribution of the composition effect varies from 85% in Germany to 33% in Spain (overall 56% in average, excluding Belgium where the raw gap is very low and the contribution of the composition effect extremely high).
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PUBLIC-PRIVATE WAGE DIFFERENTIALS
Melly men 2005 Melly men 2011 Melly women 2005 Melly women 2011 Total Composition Price Price/total p10 0.588 0.182 0.405 69% 0.836 0.223 0.613 73% 0.675 0.288 0.387 57% 0.390 0.446 53% p20 0.744 0.192 0.552 74% 0.956 0.262 0.693 0.762 0.357 0.987 0.470 0.517 52% p30 0.754 0.239 0.515 68% 1.019 0.325 0.875 0.539 0.336 38% 40% p40 0.783 0.426 54% 1.009 0.500 0.509 50% 0.852 0.629 26% 1.049 0.731 0.318 30% p50 0.794 0.511 0.283 36% 0.969 0.592 0.377 39% 0.746 0.105 12% 1.050 0.799 0.251 24% p60 0.575 0.178 0.990 0.730 0.260 0.822 0.829 -0.007 -1% 1.037 0.814 22% p70 0.720 0.589 0.131 18% 0.900 0.207 23% 0.000 0% 0.924 0.049 5% p80 0.619 0.580 0.039 6% 0.833 0.140 17% 0.636 0.756 -0.120 -19% 0.811 0.724 0.087 11% p90 0.457 0.627 -0.170 -37% 0.668 -0.115 -17% 0.462 -0.118 -25% 0.560 -0.069 -12% Along the distribution line The price effect dominates the composition effect at the lower end of the distribution. For men the composition effect exceeds the price effect after the 50th percentile, for women after the 30th percentile In comparison: “for Spain, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Portugal the explained part of the wage differential exceeds the unexplained part above the 60th percentile of the wage distribution whereas for Germany, France and Belgium this turning point is well below the 40th percentile of the distribution. For Slovenia and Austria this point can be located around the 40th percentile of the wage distribution.” (Depalo et al., 2013)
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the mean values are very similar with O-B decomposition
2005 2011 MELLY MEN MELLY WOMEN JMP MEN JMP WOMEN Total 0.648 0.864 0.686 0.878 0.649 0.685 Composition 0.349 0.492 0.5 0.571 0.320 0.472 0.402 0.523 Price 0.299 0.371 0.187 0.307 0.329 0.391 0.283 0.355 10th percentile 0.588 0.836 0.675 0.847 0.182 0.223 0.288 0.390 0.222 0.416 0.405 0.613 0.387 0.446 0.345 0.415 50th percentile 0.794 0.969 0.852 1.050 0.775 0.971 0.848 1.048 0.511 0.592 0.746 0.799 0.389 0.540 0.506 0.640 0.377 0.105 0.251 0.356 0.414 0.328 0.385 90th percentile 0.457 0.668 0.46 0.560 0.487 0.468 0.573 0.627 0.783 0.580 0.629 0.260 0.381 0.303 -0.170 -0.115 -0.12 -0.069 0.258 0.243 Obs. 37904 51165 9220 15024 JMP vs MELLY the mean values are very similar with O-B decomposition however values along the distribution do not fit stylized facts: “[Q]uantile regression accounts for heteroscedasticity while others, like the JMP decomposition, assume independent error terms. However, the variance of the residuals expands as a function of education […]This is a composition effect and not an increase in the price of unmeasured skills as concluded traditionally.” (Melly, 2005, p. 579). Indeed, the JMP decomposition results suggest that the price effect is overestimated (except for the first percentile) and increasingly so along the distribution line, i.e., we observe a stable rather than an increasing gap between the composition and the price effect.
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Along the distribution
2005 2011 MELLY MEN MELLY WOMEN Differences in premia 50-10 -0.122 -0.236 -0.282 -0.195 90-50 -0.453 -0.492 -0.223 -0.320 Along the distribution The evolution of the level of the premium and the inter-percentile variation confirm a decrease along the distribution line with a penalty at the higher end of the distribution as in other countries. The differences of premia between the 90th and 10th percentiles are negative for all the countries, the decline is steeper in Latin American countries and Turkey compared to European countries. The decline of the premium is faster in the second half (90th – 50th percentile); this is verified in all cases except in two European countries, three Latin American countries and in Turkey for women in the year 2005.
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2005 2011 MELLY MEN MELLY WOMEN Contribution of composition at the mean 54% 57% 73% 65% Contribution of the price (premium) 10th percentile 69% 53% 50th percentile 36% 39% 12% 24% 90th percentile -37% -17% -25% -12% Differences in premia 50-10 -0.122 -0.236 -0.282 -0.195 90-50 -0.453 -0.492 -0.223 -0.320 Differences in contributions of premia -0.333 -0.344 -0.450 -0.294 -0.729 -0.561 -0.379 -0.363 Besides levels, contributions of price and composition effects to the total gap are important. Depalo et al. (2013) : “A striking regularity in all countries is that the overall wage gap is the result of a combination of the explained part, which increases along the wage distribution, and of decreasing returns. […] the ratio of the premia to the total wage gap decreases in all the countries” Our results confirm that the contribution of the price effect is decreasing along the distribution line with decreasing returns (faster after the median) for men (2005 and 2011) and women for the year 2011 only (bottom panel of Table 5). As a corollary, the share of composition is increasing along the distribution, with a slower pace after the median.
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EVOLUTION OF PREMIA 2005 TO 2011 - LEVELS
Levels: increase for all percentiles. More at lower percentiles for men vs second half of the distribution for women --- premia become more like men’s at the higher end. ISSUE: Increase of premia/ decrease of penalty at the higher of distribution: “Chile experienced a significant decline in the wage penalty faced by public servants in the highest percentiles of the wage distribution after This could be explained by the implementation of a human resources management reform, aiming to attract and retain highly-skilled workers in the public sector. This is also the case for Uruguay that engaged in a civil service reform in 1997” (Mizala et al, 2011, p. 123). The explanation suggested for Latin America is public policy, however this may as well be the result of private sector wage policy… within sectors?
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WITHIN SECTOR WAGE DIFFERENTIALS
WITHIN SECTOR WAGE DIFFERENTIALS Melly public men Melly private men Melly public women Melly private women Total Composition Price Price/total public Price/total private p10 0.436 0.223 0.213 49% 0.187 0.028 0.159 85% 0.300 0.087 71% 0.139 0.000 100% p20 0.387 0.095 0.293 76% 0.176 0.324 0.049 0.276 0.099 p30 0.403 0.073 0.330 82% 0.282 0.253 90% p40 0.346 0.069 0.277 80% 0.120 -0.028 0.148 123% 0.308 0.065 0.243 79% 0.110 p50 0.336 0.034 0.302 0.160 0.290 0.046 84% 0.092 -0.016 0.107 117% p60 0.335 0.057 0.278 83% 0.307 0.043 0.264 86% p70 0.289 0.051 0.237 0.109 0.261 0.030 0.232 89% p80 0.313 0.056 0.257 0.041 0.058 59% 0.270 0.224 0.101 -0.006 -6% p90 0.255 0.016 0.239 94% 0.010 74% 81% 0.172 0.085
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EVOLUTION OF PREMIA 2005 TO 2011 – LEVELS - PUBLIC OR PRIVATE?
Men: lower end - public high wage increase vs higher end – private low wage increase Women: more equal wage increase in the public sector along the distribution vs higher end – private low wage increase
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EVOLUTION OF PREMIA 2005 TO 2011 – CONTRIBUTION OF PREMIA
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Concluding remarks Positive premium Increasing composition effect
Decreasing price effect (premium) 2005 to 2011: increased premium
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Lower wages Lower wage earners’ premia higher:
Public sector protection (premium) Private sector (also increases although less than public): increased demand vs decreased supply (esp. men) + Institutional wage setting: minimum wage Note.- For formal sector only – excluded segment in private sector → informal sector (Tansel and Kan, 2012)
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Higher wages Higher wage earners increased supply
Public sector smaller + entry barrier private sector lower wage increase (demand and supply dynamics) Also: quality / signalling issue of increased post-educated labor supply Unemployment Women: more supply and/or more discrimination?
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Selection IV issue of ex-ante variable (prior to selection) ..
PSM find individuals that match in both sectors according to control variables, who then constitute the non-biased sample used for directly measuring the premium Trade-off between: having a large number of independent variables which is desirable for controlling observables at best, but.. decreases the number of individuals that fall within a common support region (nb of obs) The PSM then has two drawbacks: either the distributions obtained after PSM will contain too few individuals (especially in the public sector), or.. as a number of controls must be left out, the sample will actually continue bearing heterogeneities, or both
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