1. Wed. Apr. 19

2. Baker v Gen Motors (US 1998)

3. Kennedy’s opinion

4. Even if there us a Michigan obligation that is relevant, isn’t the obligation modifiable in Michigan and so modifiable in MO?

5. Assume that in Michigan state court General Motors had brought a declaratory judgment action against the Bakers to determine whether Ewell could testify in any suit they might bring. What result?

6. Assume that General Motors had returned to the Mich
Assume that General Motors had returned to the Mich. ct that issued the injunction and asked that Elwell be sanctioned for testifying in the MO case. What result?

7. Scalia’s opinion…

8. What if GM sued for a declaratory judgment in MO court determining the Elwell can’t testify in the Baker case?

9. is the problem that GM is asking that the Mich injunction is given greater effect in MO than it can have in Mich?

10. substance and procedure in the recognition of judgments…

11. P sues D in Cal. , gets judgment D has no assets in Cal
P sues D in Cal., gets judgment D has no assets in Cal. D has house in Nev. P sues D on judgment in Nev., but under Nev. law houses cannot be used to satisfy judgments (in Cal. they can)

12. jurisdiction for suits on judgments

13. no PPE to refuse jurisdiction but what about forum non conveniens?

14. Anglo-Am Provision v Davis (US 1903)
NY ct allowed to refuse suit on foreign judgment between 2 foreign corps when judgment arose from cause of action arising out of state

15. Kenney v Supreme Lodge (US 1920)
Ill ct refused jurisdiction for suit on Alabama wrongful death judgment against an Illinoisan
basis was statute forbidding actions for death outside state

16. Ginsburg’s opinion

17. “Full faith and credit, however, does not mean that States must adopt the practices of other States regarding the time, manner, and mechanisms for enforcing judgments. Enforcement measures do not travel with the sister state judgment as preclusive effects do; such measures remain subject to the even-handed control of forum law.”

18. “Orders commanding action or inaction have been denied enforcement in a sister State when they purported to accomplish an official act within the exclusive province of that other State or interfered with litigation over which the ordering State had no authority.”

19. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein (US 1996)

20. 28 U.S.C. § 1738
The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or Possession of the United States, or copies thereof, shall be authenticated by affixing the seal of such State, Territory or Possession thereto. The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, Territory or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts within the United States and its Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the court that the said attestation is in proper form. Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.

21. P sues D in state ct for state law fraud concerning securities
J for P (not settlement)
P then sues D in fed ct for fed securities law violations
Assume instead that P loses in state ct (no misrepresentation by D found)
P sues D in fed ct
Issue preclusion?
Assume instead that P wins in state ct (misrepresentation by D found)

22. If, under state law, federal action would be precluded
Marrese
If, under state law, federal action would not be precluded by state judgment
then the federal court may not preclude the action
If, under state law, federal action would be precluded
then the federal court must preclude the action
unless the federal statute giving the federal courts exclusive federal subject matter jurisdiction for the federal action impliedly repealed federal courts' obligations under section to give full faith and credit to state court judgments.

23. does it matter that this was a settlement?

24. does it matter that this was a class action?

25. Exam…

26. The D Corp. [hereinafter D] is incorporated in Virginia with its principal place of business in Alabama. At a convenience store in California, P (a domiciliary of California) bought a lighter manufactured by D in a plant in Alabama. Upon buying the lighter, P took it home, where he modified it to make it possible to increase the size of the flame beyond what the lighter originally allowed. On a trip to New York, the lighter exploded, injuring P. P sued D in federal court in Virginia for negligent manufacturing. D argued that under Alabama, California and Virginia law, if P is found to have been contributorily negligent in altering the lighter, he should be denied recovery. P argues that New York law of comparative fault applies, which allows P to recover from D even if his negligence contributed to the accident (although P’s damages would be reduced by his degree of fault). Which law applies and why? 4 points [7 minutes].

27. P (a domiciliary of Ontario) and D (a domiciliary of Ontario) are students at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor. D was driving the two of them back to Ontario for spring break when she ran into a tree near Detroit, Michigan, injuring P. P sued D in Michigan state court for negligence. D argued that Ontario’s guest statute applies. Michigan no longer has a guest statute. How should the Michigan court decide and why? 6 points [11 minutes].

28. In California, the D Corp [hereinafter D] (incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in California) entered into a written contract with the P Corp [hereinafter P] (incorporated in Virginia with its principal place of business in Maryland), under which P was to build a new wing of a hospital for D in Michigan. In return, D was to pay P three installments of $1.2 million each, to be deposited in a bank account in Michigan. Although P built the wing, D found it was not able to pay the final installment. Instead it sent to P’s office in Maryland a promissory note, under which D was to pay P $1.5 million in three years time. P did not acknowledge the note. One year after receiving the note, P brought suit against D for breach of contract in Virginia state court. D made a motion to dismiss, claiming that, under the promissory note, D could pay $1.5 million in two years. Under the law of Virginia and Michigan, because P did not repudiate the promissory note in a timely fashion, P is now bound to accept payment in accordance with the promissory note as satisfying D’s obligations under the contract. Under the law of Maryland and California, P is so bound only if it explicitly agrees, which it did not. Should D’s motion succeed and why or why not? 12 points [22 minutes].

29. In her will, which was executed in New York right before her death, Mother (a domiciliary of New York) established a trust on behalf of Son (at that time a domiciliary of New York). The corpus of the trust was some valuable timberland located in California and $3 million in cash held in a bank account in New York. Under the terms of the trust, Son received a life interest in the income from the timberland and in the interest from the bank account. Son also was given the power to appoint, through his will, who would receive the remainder interest in the timberland and account upon Son’s death. In the event that Son did not exercise the power of appointment, the remainder interest would go to Daughter (a domiciliary of New York). Son subsequently moved to Virginia and died there. In Son’s will, executed in Virginia right before his death, Son did not mention the remainder interest in the timberland and the bank account. But Son’s will did contain a clause stating that “the reminder of my estate I give to Granddaughter.” Granddaughter (Son’s daughter) is a domiciliary of Virginia. Upon Son’s death the timberland was sold, and Son’s entire estate, including the bank account and the proceeds from the sale of the timberland, was probated in state court in Virginia. Daughter and Granddaughter both made claims to the bank account and the proceeds of the sale of the timberland. Under the law of California and New York, these items would be Daughter’s, since the clause in Son’s will would not constitute an exercise of the power of appointment referred to in Mother’s testamentary trust. Under the law of Virginia, they would be Granddaughter’s, since the clause would constitute an exercise of the power of appointment. How should the Virginia court decide and why? 16 points [28 minutes].

30. D (a domiciliary of New York) left New York in his car for trip to Florida. At a rest stop in Virginia he picked up a hitchhiker, P (a domiciliary of Maryland). While traveling south in Virginia a deer jumped in front of the car. D swerved to get out of the way and hit a tree. In the accident, P, who was not wearing a seatbelt, was ejected from the car and sustained serious injuries. P sued D in state court in New York. D introduced the affirmative defense that P was contributorily negligent by failing to wear a seatbelt. Under the law of New York, Maryland, and Virginia, P was obligated to wear a seatbelt. But under the law of Virginia, in a negligence suit the defendant may not argue that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent by virtue of not wearing a seatbelt. New York and Maryland allow such a defense. Arguing that Virginia law applies, P moved to strike D’s affirmative defense. Should the motion be granted and why or why not? 8 points [14 minutes].