1. Equipment Reliability Working Group
Sub Group – Equipment Categorisation
Prague 4th to 5th April 2017

2. Members at Helsinki November 2016
Graham Norman UK
Thomas Gerin Engie (Tihange and Doel)
Ferran Tarrasa ANAV Spain
Bertil Van Boven Netherlands
Gerard Beije Netherlands
Luis Yague Spain (Ebedrola)
Yujie Liu China
Ying Cai China
Chen Yu China

3. Members at Prague 4th- 5th April 2017
Graham Norman UK
Ferran Tarrasa ANAV Spain
Bertil Van Boven Netherlands
Luis Yague Spain (Ebedrola)
Chen Yu SNPI/CGN China
Randriamampith Renaud EDF France
Zeljko Selak NEK
Cedric Stappaerts ENGIE Belgium
Dan Philips FENOC USA
Huixin Wu SNPI/CGN China
Howard Whitaker NAWAH
Juhym Bang KHNP
Lee Donghoon KHNP
Gabor Wolf PAKS NPP
Hiroaki Seki JANSI Japan
Next meeting September (last date July 14th Passport copy to CGN to obtain an invite to allow a visa request/issue to China)

5. Main addition developed at Prague workshop
Safety and Reliability FUNCTION is the output requirement of the NPP
Maintenance is applied to EQUIPMENT and COMPONENTS
The link between Critical FUNCTIONS and the EQUIPMENT that provides those functions has to be established
Review each Engineering System that makes up the NPP and determine the Functions provided by each system
Start with the asset hierarchy (facility, system, (including boundaries etc)
The end result must determine the link between function+importance+components
Nuclear Safety
Reactivity Control
Core Cooling
Containment
Support systems
Production
Electricity generation
Elec. transformation
Electricity transport
Spent fuel processing
System
Functions
Importance of Functions
(criticality)
Critical Equipment and Components providing the critical function

6. From Luis

9. Work since Helsinki
Draft 2 of EC Process Guide issued
Main comments received
not convinced about step 3 the Assessment –
• Graded approach
• “Protection” of important functions.
• rules for definition of functions of the system
• rules for system borders identification (boundary components)
Bertil
Asset hierarchy and identification
EC Scoping survey
Louis
Ferran
Thomas

10. What should we do next?
AP913 Rev 5 has altered the definition of Critical Components? Graham to review and incorporate or be explicit about the differences.
Sub-Sub group work
Worked examples, Ferran to work up and e mail
Definitions, Luis to develop , all to pass on any ambiguities to Luis
Integration with IERWG Equipment Reliability Process..Graham to share this process with Kris’s team
We will seek approval though e mails in the following 2 to 4 weeks

11. END of Prague additions

12. Helsinki Day 1 Equipment Classification working group
Discussed draft 1 document on Equipment Classification
Findings
We do not know what we want, until we see what we do not want!
The Draft 1 document has provided a good structure to start from.
In essence the document is directing peoples thoughts in the right direction.
There is some preceding activities or additional sections to add with respect to:-
Asset hierarchy /Scope
Glossary/ Definitions
End of life/ change of mission considerations
Reference to mandatory requirements

13. There are some activities the EC sub working group need to start over the next 6 months in addition to producing draft 2, 3,4…of the guide e.g.
Exemplars/ templates/ standard check lists, reactor type examples…
Rules of thumb for time, cost, manpower to implement EC to various levels of deetail/ maturity
Develop a document structure for the various sub group outputs
Further populate the table relating to station equipment classification
Consider linking classification with condition and influencing O&M

14. Helsinki Day 2
Asset hierarchy considerations
Comprehensive asset register
Safety case derived assets (active and passive)
PM register (maintained assets only)
Spares register (Purchasing/ commercial/ contracts register)
In service inspection schedule
Building register
Programmable Electronic System register (software, firm ware, hardware, networks..)
Active assets (assets that have moving components, assets that need power to move)
Passive components (Safety features such as containment boundary, utility services, cables, civil structures, mechanical load paths……)
Site/ Station security assets
Site infrastructure

15. Actions
Action
Who
Asset hierarchy
Mid December
bertil
Glossary/ Definitions
Luis
End of life/ change of mission considerations
December
Graham
Reference to mandatory requirements
Ferran

16. Action
By when
Who
Exemplars/ Templates/ standard checklists of criteria/ questions
Dec
Thomas
reactor type examples of equipment classified as C1, C2, C3, RTM
VVER
Westinghouse PWR
Candu
AGR
EDF UK
EPR
Rules of thumb for time, cost, manpower to implement EC to various levels of detail/ maturity
Dec for Q, Feb for As
Luis
Further populate the table relating to station equipment classification (add reactor type)
As above
Graham
Develop a document structure for the various sub group outputs
11th November 2016
Dajun
Consider linking classification with condition and influencing O&M

17. Actions
Action
By When
Who
Add reactor type to the table
Dec
Graham
Considerations for in scope/ out of scope options
Feb
Bertil/ Graham
Arrange a sub group mid point telecon
Mid Dec, mid February, mid March
Aim to vote on the document in April Working Group

18. Summary
NPPs are very complex facilities consisting of 100,000 to 500,000 components
A prioritisation process is needed to enable the deployment of the various tools, processes and stations resources (both people and money).
Many Utilities have performed EC and it works for them.
Every country has sovereign right to do what they want to do (within international law)
A process has been developed that hopefully can be used by all NPPs. The process is for guidance allowing newcomers to start and to allow others to review their current processes.
Final comment:- JUST DO IT, DIVE IN, HAVE A GO,

19. C1=12%
C2=5%
NC=12%
RTM=13%
Out=59%
C1=0.5%
C2=3.5%
C3=29%
C4=67%
RTF=67%

20. C1=12%
C2=5%
NC=12%
RTM=13%
Out=59%
C1=0.5%
C2=3.5%
C3=29%
C4=67%
RTF=67%

21. Utilities
Categories
Maint Rule
Assessment by
Package
Status
Used by
Tags per category
Active/ Passive SSCs
Cernavoda
SPVs
Safety
Prod’n
‘other’
Non crit
RTM n
System Eng
MS xl
15 years maturity
WM, Maint, Tech, Procurement
Stock
SPV=2%
Safety=6%
Prodn=4%
Other=1%
NC=87%
Active only
Slovenske Elektrarne
Critical
Non Crit
RTF
System Eng with support
MS xl + SAP
5 years experience
All processes
C=15%
NC=47%
RTF=37%
Mainly active with some passive
PAKS
Nuke Safety 4
Seismic 4
N but considering the US
MS xl then Access
20 years experience
WM, Tech,
C1=4%
C2=25%
C3=21%
NC=50%
A and P
Engie C1 C2 C3
Contractor, SRO, verification by ops
MS xl, SAP, P&IDs
0 years
Not started
Pilot done
C1,2,3 =17%
RTM and NC=83%
Utilities
Categories
Maint Rule
Assessment by
Package
Status
Used by
Tags per category
Active/ Passive SSCs
Cernavoda
SPVs
Safety
Prod’n
‘other’
Non crit
RTM n
System Eng
MS xl
15 years maturity
WM, Maint, Tech, Procurement
Stock
SPV=2%
Safety=6%
Prodn=4%
Other=1%
NC=87%
Active only
Slovenske Elektrarne
Critical
Non Crit
RTF
System Eng with support
MS xl + SAP
5 years experience
All processes
C=15%
NC=47%
RTF=37%
Mainly active with some passive
PAKS
Nuke Safety 4
Seismic 4
N but considering the US
MS xl then Access
20 years experience
WM, Tech,
C1=4%
C2=25%
C3=21%
NC=50%
A and P
Engie C1 C2 C3
Contractor, SRO, verification by ops
MS xl, SAP, P&IDs
0 years
Not started
Pilot done
C1,2,3 =17%
RTM and NC=83%

22. Do this quickly- round table Things to consider
Q3 Compare OPTIONS from the 7 Utilities, ENHANCE (consider opening this up to all members contributions)
Do this quickly- round table
Things to consider
Question
Answer
Can we live with USNRC Maintenance Rule?
No, not all countries can adopt it.
Can we live with INPO AP913?
Yes, as a guide, but seriously consider the integration with other processes such as AP928 (IWM)
Does your Regulator or Company force you to do something different or prevent you from implementing International Standards?
Yes, there are many different regulatory frameworks e.g. some prescriptive, some goal setting – different arrangements for life extensions
Is your Station/ Facility in need of some other process?
We can develop a process to be flexible enough to meet all needs
Can we develop a pick and mix?
Yes

23. Scope:- Where do we put C1s, C2s, C3s…..?
Consequences
Frequency
Terminal
Survivable
Trivial
Industry Acceptability
daily
10-7year
SCRAMS
Loss of Primary Containment
Run to Maintenance
Active SSCs
Passive SSCs

24. Expected Mitigation Effort
Deployment of Effort on Active and Passive SSCs
Expected Mitigation Effort
Risks and Issues
Station Age
20y
40y
80y
60y
Active SSCs
Passive SSCs

25. Comment from Tuesday 11th April discussion
Make it explicit the scope of the procedure is not to be too specific with Category definitions as there are too many countries, nuclear facility types and cultures to accommodate.
Include lessons learned form those utilities that have classified their SSCs. i.e. list the ‘what worked well, how not to do it and identify the benefits of categorisation.
Ensure it is made explicit the WANO EC process will be guidance and not mandatory. It should be a guide for those that want to perform EC for the first time or to review their current process.

26. Classification LFE + ves What has went well - ves What has not worked
Include key groups in the process e.g. Operations, Maintenance, Design, Safety assessors
Being too conservative resulting in too many items as C1 thus diluting focus on the truly critical items
Establish a review panel to ‘Approve’ the classification and to ensure consistency of approach and assessment across the unit, station or utility.
Grouping too many sub components or components incorrectly into a higher asset and allocating the same classification to them all.
Ensure the process links correctly with other processes e.g AP913 EC links to AP928 (work management) and should link to ‘Critical Spares’ process.
Do not mix equipment classification with maintenance strategies (e.g. RTM is a maintenance strategy and not a EC)
Perform prework, understand the purpose, process, clarify the classification definition etc before starting.
Benchmark with others that have both +ve and –ve results. Target others with the same reactor, vendor equipment, same problems etc.

27. Step 1 Select the unit’s stage of life :-
Step 2 Select the purpose for SSC classification:-
Step 3 Select SSC classification approach
Step 4 Modify the unit’s operating processes and procedures
Then implement and keep it live especially based on OE and your stations situation

28. PURPOSE for Classification (in order to…. For who …
Common Language
Systematic
Consequence based with focus on sustained Nuclear Safety and Efficient Mission Delivery
Based on IAEA, INPO and relevant good practice.
Must be a guide and not prescriptive. Identify issues for consideration and provide informed choices.

29. PRODEquipm’t Rel. ECONEconomics ALL 3Combined C2 C3 NSNuclear Safety
Options
Classification 1
NSNuclear Safety
(ref, IAEA SS DS 367) 2
PRODEquipm’t Rel.
Sustained production, minimisation of SCRAMS, maximum MWhr (ref, INPO AP 913) 3
ECONEconomics
Long Term Operation
Life Extension
Asset Life Optimisation
(ref INSAG 14) 4
ALL 3Combined
Balanced
Comprehensive C1
1st Gold
Top, Highest, Grand, Big,
No 1
SSCs preventing off site release of nuclear material from Reactivity Control
Cooling
Containment (3C’s)
SSCs that cause production to be stopped quickly or stopped for a long time (eg SPVs causing SCRAMs, Turbine loss of lubrication).
Life limiting
SSC’s that are impossible to repair or replace eg reactor pressure vessel, usually large passive structures.
C1s from Nuclear Safety +Equipm’t Rel+Econ, or
NS+ER,
ER+Econ C2
2nd Silver
Second, Middle
SSCs preventing on site release of nuclear material from Reactivity Control
SSCs that cause production output to be reduced – long period of revealed deterioration
Very expensive to replace SSCs such as large one offs or large quantities of smaller items (e.g. heat exchanger replacement or station rewire)
C2s from Nuclear Safety +Equipm’t Rel+Econ, C3
3rd Bronze
Third
SSCs preventing worker dose or contamination.
Minor impact to station output e.g. fuelling delays due to fuel path equipment failures
SSCs that impact Station Efficiency or SSC where their replacement costs far outweighs the cost of maintenance
C3s from Nuclear Safety +Equipm’t Rel+Econ,
C ‘n’
Bottom, Lowest
Out of scope, not covered
No nuclear or radiological impact
No production impact
Minimum, legal, good industry practice

30. Engineering Department EC Workload
1 Stage of life
2 EC Purpose
New Build NS
Prod
Econ
Mid Life
Life Extension/ End of life
3 Approach
Cons→Risk
Own
Others
4 Outputs
Age Management Strategy for Larger SSCs
Investment Plans,
Optimisation/ Efficiency
Continuous ER Improvement
In Service Inspection
OE driven SSC inspections
Initial Asset Register
( MEL) and Classification of SSCs
SSC Maint Strat.
Crit Spares List
SPV list
Equipment Training
Condition Assessments
Margin Management
Age Management
Investment Plans
Risk and Mitigation Management
Fit for Purpose solutions and Specs
Refurb vs Replace..

31. Members from Madrid Sept 2015
Graham Norman UK
Alexander Lindqvist Sweden
Mike Ballard WANO
Lassi Hostikka Finland
Zhang Chi China
Bertil Van Boven Netherlands
Ferran Tarrasa Spain

32. Members from Budapest 2016 Graham Norman UK
Alexander Lindqvist Vattenfall Sweden
Mike Ballard WANO
Thomas Gerin Engie (Tihange and Doel)
Zoltan Macsai Paks
Saulea Sorinel Cernavoda
Vesa Tanttari Fortum
Pavol Dubosky Slovenske Elektrarne
Ferran Tarrasa Blanes ANAV Spain

33. END