1. NNSA’s Radiological Security Program
NICSTAR 2015

2. Overview Mission of NNSA’s Office Of Radiological Security
Role of the Nuclear Security Summit in Radiological Security
NNSA’s Virtual Perimeter for High Activity Gamma Sterilization facilities
Security By Design and International Standards
Alternative technologies

3. Office of Radiological Security
The mission of the Office of Radiological Security is to enhance global security by reducing and protecting radiological materials that could be used by terrorists in a radiological dispersal device.

4. Nuclear Security Summit
The first Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) took place in April 2010
There was no mention of radioactive material security
In 2012, the Germans introduced language on Radioactive Source Security
In 2014, Radioactive Source Security played a much bigger role
The U.S. is in the midst of planning for a Nuclear Security Summit in 2016

5. 2014 Nuclear Security Summit: Gift Basket Overview
Joint Statement Signatories: Algeria, Armenia, Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and the United States
Commitment to secure all IAEA Category 1 sources, within their territory, consistent with the IAEA’s Code of Conduct by the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, including:
Support an independent regulatory body
Establish a comprehensive lifecycle management plan
Develop a comprehensive plan for sources out of regulatory control
Assess domestic threat and develop national response plan
Implement site level security measures
Provide rapid response to unauthorized attempts to access radioactive material
Instituting additional best practices
Multifactor access controls
Active involvement of off-site response including law enforcement
A holistic framework that governs secure transportation, possession and disposition
Monitoring systems with defense in depth
Enhanced delay

6. Virtual Perimeter
Virtual perimeter alarms would be treated conceptually like a RFID seal providing tamper detection around the “device”

7. Recommended Security Upgrades
Automated access controls to facility
Two Person Rule
Radiation detectors outside bunker
Siren/strobe
Training
Plans and Procedures
Remote monitoring of alarms
Secure and alarm handling tools
Lock out on bridge cranes
Local law enforcement response awareness
Insider threat measures to detect unauthorized access to the sources in the pool
Intrusion detection systems focused on irradiator
Control Room
Duress
Labyrinth door
Sensors on loading plug
Conveyor openings
Motion sensors in labyrinth
Motion sensors around bunker
CCTV
Interior of warehouse focused on irradiator
Exterior if needed
Labyrinth
Barriers/covers for pools

8. Insider Threat Considerations
Active Insider attempting an abrupt theft per GMS Potential Adversary Capabilities (PAC)
Authorized access to facilities to include bunker
May be in facility alone or with small number of other staff on off shifts
Knowledgeable of security and safety systems
Has alarm system codes to bypass alarms
Knowledgeable of security procedures and plans
Knowledgeable on radiation safety and shielding requirements
Knowledgeable of facility operations and location of sources in modules and racks
On authorized list to call LLEA and offsite monitoring companies

9. Pilot Pool Cover Concept
Protection measures for the pool:
Steel pool covers
Alarms tied to Remote Monitoring System

10. Tamper Indication and Delay
TID on Grating
Alarmed Steel Grating
High Temperature Wiring
Mechanical Switch

11. Nuclear Security Summit 2014: Security By Design
House Gift: The United States plans to work with international manufacturers of high-activity sealed source devices to perform voluntary assessments of the vulnerability of their machines (to source theft).
Worked to set a standard for in-device delay and detection measures on newly fabricated high activity devices.
Safety Act certification has been approved for in-device delay systems to help promote their inclusion as the security star standard.
If device hardening is performed at manufacturing, it reduces retrofitting costs and immediately improves device security.
Continues to work with manufacturers in the domestic market to strengthen partnerships and support device hardening.
Manufacturers are now marketing their hardened devices internationally.
NNSA is interested in working with international device manufacturers to enhance delay and detection capabilities before devices come to the market.
Have worked to set a standard for in-device delay and detection measures on newly fabricated high activity devices.
In conjunction with DHS, Safety Act certification has been approved for IDD
Continuing to work with manufacturers – security by design

12. NSS on Alternative Technologies
The US plans to establish an international research effort on the feasibility of replacing high-activity radiological sources with non-isotopic replacement technologies, with the goal of producing a global alternative by 2016.
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has set up a working group to look at the issue of alternatives for all applications, including Gamma Sterilization
Meetings occur once per month
NNSA’s Office of Radiological Security will continue to work with NNSA’s Research and Development office to develop alternatives where no commercially available alternative exists (e.g., well logging). Also working to develop a strategic roadmap on the maturity of global technology development.
Domestically, NNSA is looking to aid volunteer sites and provide incentives to replace devices that use the most attractive materials (Cs-137 Irradiators) with commercially available replacements (e.g., X-Ray or UV Pathogen Reduction).
NNSA is also engaging with other countries to monitor the momentum on alternative technology.

13. National Nuclear Security Administration
Questions?
Kristina Hatcher
National Nuclear Security Administration