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SAMPOL 204: Varieties of Political Regimes in Latin America
Section 1: Theoretical and Conceptual Perspectives on Political Regime Types. An Introduction. Wednesday 18 January 2017, Sydneshaugen skole, Auditorium D. Einar Berntzen
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Welcome to SAMPOL 204: Schedule of lectures
Wednesday 18 January Introduction Wednesday 25 January Sultanistic regimes (defined) Wednesday 1 February Democracy with adjectives Wednesday 8 February Competitive oligarchies Wednesday 15 February BA-regimes Wednesday 22 February Sultanistic regimes (cases) Wednesday 8 March Populism/one-party rule Wednesday 15 March Democracy and presidentialism Wedesday 22 March Neopopulism and CA-regimes Wednesday 29 March The left turn in Latin America Monday 15 May Desk exam
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Historical regime trends in Latin America
: caudillo dictatorships : competitive oligarchies : military dictatorships : 2nd global wave of democratization : military dictatorships 1978-present: 3rd wave of democratization
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Trends in US policy towards Latin America
: Intervention (exporting «democracy») in Central America and the Caribbean (Cuba, Panama, Nicaragua ; Haïti ; Dominican Republic ) : Good Neighbour: non-intervention : The Cold War: intervention
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US Policy towards democracy in Latin America, 1900-2008
: US policy towards Latin America was unfavourable to democracy To varying degrees US policy was favourable to democracy in Latin America: , and 1985-
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Caudillo rule From unstable caudillism (e.g. Bolivia’s Mariano Malgarejo ( ); Mexico’s Santa Anna ( ) to stable caudillism: «order and progress»-dictatorships (e.g. Mexico’s Porfirio Díaz ( ) and Venezuela’s Antonio Guzmán Blanco ( ), Cipriano Castro ( ) and Vicente Gómez ( ).
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Oligarchic «democracies» or competitive oligarchies
Institutionalized elite contestation: Argentina ( ) Brazil ( ) Colombia ( ) Peru ( ) Ecuador ( ) Bolivia ( ) Chile (1830s-1920)
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Sultanistic regimes in the Caribbean and Central America
US intervention: The Spanish-American War (1898): Cuba; the Inter-Oceanic canal: Panama (1903); US marines in Nicaragua ( ), Haïti ( ), Dominican Republic ( ) to end caudillism US non-intervention (Good Neighbor policy): sultanistic regimes established in Dominican Republic and Nicaragua
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The 3 Types of Legitimate Rule (Max Weber)
1.Traditional authority: is legitimate because it “has always existed”. People in power enjoy it because they have inherited it (dynasties). Officials are either personal retainers (patrimonial regimes) or personal loyal allies, such as vassals or tributary lords (feudal regime). E.g. monarchies
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Legitimate Rule (cont.)
2. Rational-legal authority: is based on a system of rules that is applied in accordance with known principles. The persons who administer those rules are appointed or elected by legal procedures. Superiors are also subject to the rules that limit their powers. E.g. democracies
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Legitimate Rule (cont.)
3. Charismatic authority: is based on the charisma of the leader, who shows that he possesses the right to lead by virtue of magical powers, prophecies, heroism, etc. His followers respect his right to rule because of his unique qualities (charisma), not because of any tradition or legal rules. Officials consist of those who have shown personal devotion to the ruler. E.g. some of the caudillos; Fidel Castro
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Patrimonialism Patrimonialism: a subtype of traditional authority, in which authority rests on the personal, absolute and arbitrary power of the ruler. A type of rule in which the ruler does not distinguish between private and public patrimony and treats matters and resources of state as his personal affair. All officials are personal favourites of the ruler, with no rights, but privileges granted and withdrawn by the ruler.
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Sultanism=extreme form of patrimonialism
Sultanism: where an extreme development of the ruler’s discretion has occurred, then patrimonial authority shades into what Weber calls “sultanism”.Weber suggests that these systems are relatively unstable, because they encourage palace revolts as the only means of voicing dissent.
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Sultanism defined “Sultanism” is an extreme form of patrimonialism. In sultanism: 1. the private and the public are fused 2. there is a strong tendency toward familial power (nepotism) and dynastic succession, 3. there is no distinction between state career and personal service to the ruler,
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Sultanism defined (cont.)
4. there is a lack of rationalized impersonal ideology 5. economic success depends on a personal relationship to the ruler; and most of all, 6. the ruler acts only according to his own unchecked discretion, with no larger, impersonal goals.
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Nondemocratic regimes
Sultanistic regimes Authoritarian regimes Totalitarian regimes Pluralism Social and economic, but never political pluralism Limited, not responsible political pluralism Pluralism absent Ideology No elaborate guiding ideology No elaborate guiding ideology All pervasive elaborate ideology Mobilization Extensive and intensive mobilization is seldom found Without extensive and intensive mobilization Frequent extensive and intensive mobilization Leadership Unrestrained personal rulership Leader exercises power within ill-defined but quite predictable norms Impersonal rulership in the name of the ideology
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Sultanistic regimes in Latin America
The prototype: Trujillo ( ) in the Dominican Republic The Somozas ( ) in Nicaragua Batista ( ) in Cuba Baby Doc Duvalier ( ) in Haïti Noriega ( ) in Panama Border cases: Stroessner ( ) in Paraguay and Papa Doc Duvalier ( ) in Haïti
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«Classical» populism (1930-50)
Populist mobilization of marginalized social sectors (landless peasants, workers and the urban poor) (the «people») against the elite (the «oligarchy») Brazil: Getúlio Vargas ( ; ) Argentina: Juan Domingo Perón ( ; ) Mexico: Lazaro Cárdenas ( )
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Bureaucratic-Authoritarian regimes
Institutional military regimes established to contain popular mobilization. Electoral competition is eliminated and political participation of the popular sectors is controlled Brazil ( ) Argentina ( )
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I. The Military and Democracy
Democracy (def.): 1. The government is elected in free and fair elections 2. The electorate includes most of the adult population 3. There are good protections of civil liberties 4. There is no encroachment of the military or other nonelected actors in the domain of elected powers Semidemocracy (def.): 1 or more of the 4 attributes partially compromised Authoritarian regime (def.): If any of the 4 attributes is missing
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The military and democracy in Latin America
How and why did Latin American militaries become so involved in politics? 1. Weak civilian institutions, the military insulated from civilian authority by the traditional fuero 2. The need to impose order and stability: constant rebellion, conflict and disorder led to the militarization of politics, but the consolidation of state power and the establishment of regular armies did not solve the problem of military involvement in politics. 3. Constitutional right to protect the constitution and la patria: politicization of the military 4. Civilian calls for military intervention
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Cycles of military intervention in politics
Key periods of military intervention: : ”crisis of oligarchic rule”, ”the social question” s: the Great Depression s-1970s: the Cuban Revolution in 1959, anticommunism, saving la patria from subversion, extended periods of military rule
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Types of military intervention in politics
Military involvement in the establishment of democratic rule: Brazil , Argentina , Venezuela , Guatemala Military involvement in the breakdown of democracy: Brazil , Venezuela , Guatemala , Chile , Uruguay , Argentina
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Types of democracy, military involvement and breakdown
Semidemocracies with high military involvement: all broke down (Peru 1948, 1962, 1968; Ecuador 1961, Brazil 1964; Argentina 1962, 1966) Electoral democracies before 1980: all broke down (e.g. Argentina 1930; Uruguay 1933, 1973, Chile 1973) except Venezuela and Costa Rica (abolished the army in 1948) Semidemocracies with low military involvement: of 6 cases, 2 broke down (Colombia 1949, Chile 1924), 1 remained a semidemocracy (Colombia 1958), 3 were transformed into electoral democracies (Chile 1970; Uruguay 1919; Venezuela 1958)
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Types of military regimes
1. Personalistic military regimes: Rojas Pinilla ( ) in Colombia, Hugo Banzer ( ) in Bolivia, Marcos Pérez Jiménez ( ) in Venezuela; more ”sultanistic” than military: Rafael Trujillo ( ) in the Dominican Republic, the Somozas ( ) in Nicaragua, the Duvaliers ( ) in Haïti, Noriega ( ) in Panama, Stroessner ( ) in Paraguay 2. Institutional military regimes: Brazil ( ), Argentina ( , ), Chile ( ), Uruguay ( ), Peru ( ), Ecuador ( ), El Salvador ( ), Guatemala ( ), Honduras ( )
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Types of military regimes (cont.)
Inclusionary military regimes: Perón ( ) in Argentina; Velasco ( ) in Peru; Omar Torrijos ( ) in Panama; military junta ( ) in Ecuador; military junta ( ) in Honduras. Did not engage in large-scale repression or ”dirty wars” against their citizens Instead attempted to mobilize lower-class groups, impose redistributionist policies, and strengthen the economic role of the state
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Types of military regimes (cont.)
Exclusionary regimes: ”bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes”: Brazil ( ), Argentina ( ; ), Chile ( ), Uruguay ( ); ”military-authoritarian regimes”: Guatemala ( ), El Salvador ( ) Engaged in large-scale repression and ”dirty wars” against their citizens, wars against ”subversion”
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Civilian control of the military
The ”torturer problem”: prosecute and punish vs. forgive and forget, amnesty or not? The ”praetorian problem”: how to reduce military involvement in politics and establish a professional pattern of civil-military relations
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II. Democracy defined 1. The head of government and the legislature must be chosen through open and fair competitive elections 2. Universal adult suffrage for citizens 3. Protection of political and civil rights 4. The elected authorities must exercise real governing power
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Trichotomous classification of political regimes
Democratic: no significant violations of any of the 4 criteria Semi-democratic: partial but not flagrant violations to any of the 4 criteria Competitive regimes: Democratic + Semi-democratic Authoritarian: one or more flagrant violations of the 4 criteria
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Waves of democratization and authoritarianism
Huntington’s 3 global «waves» of democratization: 1 rst wave ( ) 1rst reverse wave ( ) 2nd wave ( ) 2nd reverse wave ( ) 3rd wave ( )
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Region-wide waves of regime change in Latin America
1rst wave 2nd wave ( ): 2 moments: 1rst moment ( ) Reverse wave ( ) and 2nd moment ( ) 2nd reverse wave ( ) 3rd wave ( )
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Transitions and breakdowns
: the ratio of transitions to breakdowns was 5 to 1. : the ratio was 4.5 to 1 : the ratio was 0.5 (i.e. 1 transition for every 4 breakdowns) : 7 transitions and no breakdowns : the ratio was 0.36 : the ratio was 9 to 1
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South America vs. Central America
1. South America: democratization in the 1980s despite continuation of the Cold War vs. Central America: democratization made possible by the ending of the Cold War 2. The USA more influential in Central America than in South America. Democracy first came in countries farthest from the USA: Argentina, Uruguay, Chile (except Mexico ) 3. South America: redemocratization vs. Central America: democracy for the first time in the Third Wave
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Mainwaring & Liñán’s argument: a actor-based approach
Political factors explain the emergence, survival and fall of political regimes in 20th century Latin America: Actors’ policy radicalism Actors’ normative attitudes about democracy and dictatorship, and A favourable regional political environment
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International actors affect domestic regime outcomes
1. Transnational diffusion of beliefs 2. Demonstration effects 3. Incentives or sanctions 4. Empower particular domestic actors 5. International actors=domestic actors 6. Direct military intervention and occupation
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