1. Figure 2. Broadband lines and broadband users, 1999–2006
Figure 2. Broadband lines and broadband users, 1999–2006. Source: Wireline Competition Bureau, FCC, High Speed Services For Internet Access: Statusas of Dec. 31, 2005 (2006); 2003 NetRatings Earnings Conference Call—Final, Fair Disclosure Wire, Feb. 26, 2004; U.S. Broadband Penetration Tops 40%, Editorand Publisher, Sept. 28, 2005; Carol Wilson, Nielson: Broadband Use Nears 75%, Prism Insight, Jun. 22, 2006.
From: A CONSUMER-WELFARE APPROACH TO NETWORK NEUTRALITY REGULATION OF THE INTERNET
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2. Figure 1. Verizon's monthly price for 1
Figure 1. Verizon's monthly price for 1.5 Mbps DSL access, May 2001 to May Source: Bear Stearns, March Broadband Buzz: A Monthly Updateon Critical Broadband Issues 6 (2006). Note: In April 2005, Verizon began offering 3.0 Mbps DSL access for the same price that it had been offering 1.5 Mbps DSL access, thus doubling the performance of its entry-level DSL product. The figure treats this repricing as halving the price of 1.5 Mbps DSL access. See Press Release, Verizon, Verizon Online Offers Twice the Speed of Its Basic Consumer DSL Service For the Same Price (April 4, 2005),
From: A CONSUMER-WELFARE APPROACH TO NETWORK NEUTRALITY REGULATION OF THE INTERNET
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3. Figure 3. Nationwide concentration for residential broadband access (cable, DSL, fiber, wireless, and satellite), 1999–2005. Source: FCC, High-Speed Servicesfor Internet Access: Statusas of December 31, 2005, at table 3.
From: A CONSUMER-WELFARE APPROACH TO NETWORK NEUTRALITY REGULATION OF THE INTERNET
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4. Figure 4. Lessig's theory of how network operators should charge end-users and content providers for bandwidth and priority.
From: A CONSUMER-WELFARE APPROACH TO NETWORK NEUTRALITY REGULATION OF THE INTERNET
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5. Figure 5. Cable modem and DSL residential market shares, 1999–2005
Figure 5. Cable modem and DSL residential market shares, 1999–2005. Source: FCC, High-Speed Servicesfor Internet Access: Statusas of December 31, 2005, at table 3.
From: A CONSUMER-WELFARE APPROACH TO NETWORK NEUTRALITY REGULATION OF THE INTERNET
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6. Figure 6. Absolute and relative quality of service for content providers who do not contract for priority delivery.
From: A CONSUMER-WELFARE APPROACH TO NETWORK NEUTRALITY REGULATION OF THE INTERNET
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7. Figure 8. Demand for Priority Delivery with and without Capacity Constraints.
From: A CONSUMER-WELFARE APPROACH TO NETWORK NEUTRALITY REGULATION OF THE INTERNET
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8. Figure 9. The effect of prohibiting a broadband network operator from charging content providers for priority delivery of packets in a market with two-sided demand.
From: A CONSUMER-WELFARE APPROACH TO NETWORK NEUTRALITY REGULATION OF THE INTERNET
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9. Figure 7. Marginal effect of priority delivery on end-user's experience with increasing access speeds.
From: A CONSUMER-WELFARE APPROACH TO NETWORK NEUTRALITY REGULATION OF THE INTERNET
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10. Figure 10. End-user welfare gains from a subsidy funded by prioritization fees levied on content providers. The savings for existing broadband households correspond to the rectangular area bounded by the old and new monthly price for broadband service.
From: A CONSUMER-WELFARE APPROACH TO NETWORK NEUTRALITY REGULATION OF THE INTERNET
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