1. Chapter 16 The Conduct of Monetary Policy: Strategy and Tactics

2. Preview
This chapter examines the goals of monetary policy and then considers one of the most important strategies for the conduct of monetary policy, inflation targeting

3. Learning Objectives
Define and recognize the importance of a nominal anchor.
Identify the six potential goals that monetary policymakers may pursue.
Summarize the distinctions between hierarchical and dual mandates.
Compare and contrast the advantages and disadvantages of inflation targeting.
Identify the key changes made over time to the Federal Reserve monetary policy strategy.

4. Learning Objectives
List the four lessons learned from the global financial crisis and discuss what they mean to inflation targeting.
Summarize the arguments for and against central bank policy response to asset-price bubbles.
Describe and assess the four criteria for choosing a policy instrument.
Interpret and assess the performance of the Taylor rule as a hypothetical policy instrument for setting the federal funds rate.

5. The Price Stability Goal and the Nominal Anchor
Over the past few decades, policy makers throughout the world have become increasingly aware of the social and economic costs of inflation and more concerned with maintaining a stable price level as a goal of economic policy.
The role of a nominal anchor: a nominal variable, such as the inflation rate or the money supply, which ties down the price level to achieve price stability
The time-inconsistency problem

6. Other Goals of Monetary Policy
Five other goals are continually mentioned by central bank officials when they discuss the objectives of monetary policy:
High employment and output stability
Economic growth
Stability of financial markets
Interest-rate stability
Stability in foreign exchange markets

7. Should Price Stability Be the Primary Goal of Monetary Policy?
Hierarchical Versus Dual Mandates:
Hierarchical mandates put the goal of price stability first, and then say that as long as it is achieved other goals can be pursued
Dual mandates are aimed to achieve two coequal objectives: price stability and maximum employment (output stability)
Price Stability as the Primary, Long-Run Goal of Monetary Policy
Either type of mandate is acceptable as long as it operates to make price stability the primary goal in the long run but not the short run.

8. Inflation Targeting
Public announcement of medium-term numerical target for inflation
Institutional commitment to price stability as the primary, long-run goal of monetary policy and a commitment to achieve the inflation goal
Information-inclusive approach in which many variables are used in making decisions
Increased transparency of the strategy
Increased accountability of the central bank

9. Inflation Targeting New Zealand (effective in 1990) Canada (1991)
Inflation was brought down and remained within the target most of the time.
Growth has generally been high and unemployment has come down significantly.
Canada (1991)
Inflation decreased since 1991; some costs in term of unemployment
United Kingdom (1992)
Inflation has been close to its target.
Growth has been strong and unemployment has been decreasing.

10. Figure 1 Inflation Rates and Inflation Targets for New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom, 1980–2014

11. Inflation Targeting Advantages: Disadvantages:
Does not rely on one variable to achieve target
Easily understood
Reduces potential of falling in time- inconsistency trap
Stresses transparency and accountability
Disadvantages:
Delayed signaling
Too much rigidity
Potential for increased output fluctuations
Low economic growth during disinflation

12. The Evolution of the Federal Reserve’s Monetary Policy Strategy
The United States has achieved excellent macroeconomic performance (including low and stable inflation) until the onset of the global financial crisis without using an explicit nominal anchor such as an inflation target.
History:
Fed began to announce publicly targets for money supply growth in 1975
Paul Volker (1979) focused more in nonborrowed reserves
Greenspan announced in July 1993 that the Fed would not use any monetary aggregates as a guide for conducting monetary policy

13. The Evolution of the Federal Reserve’s Monetary Policy Strategy
There is no explicit nominal anchor in the form of an overriding concern for the Fed.
Forward looking behavior and periodic “preemptive strikes”
The goal is to prevent inflation from getting started.

14. The Evolution of the Federal Reserve’s Monetary Policy Strategy
Advantages
Uses many sources of information
Demonstrated success
Disadvantages
Lack of accountability
Inconsistent with democratic principles

15. The Fed’s “Just Do It” Monetary Policy Strategy
Advantages of the Fed’s “Just Do It” Approach:
forward-looking behavior and stress on price stability also help to discourage overly expansionary monetary policy, thereby ameliorating the time-inconsistency problem
Disadvantages of the Fed’s “Just Do It” Approach:
lack of transparency; strong dependence on the preferences, skills, and trustworthiness of the individuals in charge of the central bank

16. Lessons for Monetary Policy Strategy from the Global Financial Crisis
Developments in the financial sector have a far greater impact on economic activity than was earlier realized.
The zero-lower-bound on interest rates can be a serious problem.
The cost of cleaning up after a financial crisis is very high.
Price and output stability do not ensure financial stability.

17. Lessons for Monetary Policy Strategy from the Global Financial Crisis
How should Central banks respond to asset price bubbles?
Asset-price bubble: pronounced increase in asset prices that depart from fundamental values, which eventually burst.
Types of asset-price bubbles
Credit-driven bubbles
Subprime financial crisis
Bubbles driven solely by irrational exuberance

18. Should central banks respond to bubbles?
Strong argument for not responding to bubbles driven by irrational exuberance
Bubbles are easier to identify when asset prices and credit are increasing rapidly at the same time.
Monetary policy should not be used to prick bubbles.

19. Should central banks respond to bubbles?
Macropudential policy: regulatory policy to affect what is happening in credit markets in the aggregate.
Monetary policy: Central banks and other regulators should not have a laissez-faire attitude and let credit-driven bubbles proceed without any reaction.

20. Tactics: Choosing the Policy Instrument
Tools
Open market operation
Reserve requirements
Discount rate
Policy instrument (operating instrument)
Reserve aggregates
Interest rates
May be linked to an intermediate target
Interest-rate and aggregate targets are incompatible (must chose one or the other).

21. Figure 2 Linkages Between Central Bank Tools, Policy Instruments, Intermediate Targets, and Goals of Monetary Policy
Open Market Operations
Discount Policy
Reserve Requirements
Interest on Reserves
Large-scale Asset
Purchases
Forward Guidance
Tools of the
Central Bank
Policy
Instruments
Intermediate
Targets
Goals
Monetary Aggregates
(M1, M2)
Interest rates
(short-term and
long-term)
Price Stability
High Employment
Economic Growth
Financial Market Stability
Interest-Rate Stability
Foreign Exchange Market
Stability
Reserve Aggregates
(reserves, nonborrowed
reserves, monetary base,
nonborrowed base)
(short-term such as
federal funds rates)

22. Figure 3 Result of Targeting on Nonborrowed Reserves
Federal
Funds Rate
Rd′′
Rd′ Rs
NBR*
Step 1. A rightward or leftward shift in the demand curve for reserves …
Step 2. leads to fluctuations in the
federal funds rate between
Rd*
Quantity of
Reserves, R

23. Figure 4 Result of Targeting on the Federal Funds Rateid
ier
Federal Funds Rate
Step 1. A rightward or leftward shift in the demand curve for reserves…
Step 2. lead the central bank to shift the supply curve of reserves so that the federal rate does not change…
Federal Funds Rates Target,
Step 3. with the result that non-borrowed reserves fluctuate between NBR′ff and NBR′′ff.
Quantity of Reserves, R

24. Criteria for Choosing the Policy Instrument
Observability and Measurability
Controllability
Predictable effect on Goals

25. Tactics: The Taylor Rule
An inflation gap and an output gap
Stabilizing real output is an important concern
Output gap is an indicator of future inflation as shown by Phillips curve
NAIRU
Rate of unemployment at which there is no tendency for inflation to change

26. Figure 5 The Taylor Rule for the Federal Funds Rate, 1970–2014
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, FRED database: