1. Contemporary Moral Problems
M-F12:00-1:00SAV 264
Instructor: Benjamin Hole
Office Hours: everyday after class

2. Agenda Any administrative questions? Clicker Quiz
Last thoughts on the Infanticide Objection to Warren?
Marquis, “Why Abortion is Immoral”

3. What does Marquis claim is the main reason why it is presumptively wrong to kill a fetus?
The fetus can feel pain
The fetus is an innocent person from conception with an inviolable right to life
Abortion will harm the woman
Killing the fetus would deprive it of a valuable future
The fetus actually meets Warren’s five criteria for personhood
All of the above

4. Which of the following claims is/are not defended by Marquis:
a future like ours is a sufficient condition for presumptive moral standing
a future like ours is a necessary condition for presumptive moral standing
the ability to make one’s own maxims is a necessary and sufficient condition for personhood and dignity
A & C
B & C

5. Marquis claims that: abortion is presumptively morally wrong
contraception is presumptively morally wrong
contraception is not presumptively morally wrong
A & B
A & C

6. The Infanticide Objection
Mary Anne Warren, “On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion”

7. The Infanticide Objection
The Objection
If Warren’s “5 criteria” theory of personhood is correct, then infanticide is morally permissible.
But it is not!
Therefore, Warren’s “5 criteria” theory of personhood is incorrect.
Warren’s response
Infanticide is not always morally impermissible
“neonates are so very close to being persons that to kill them requires a very strong moral justification”
Neonates have indirect moral standing, but are not themselves persons

8. “Why Abortion Is Immoral”
Marquis

9. Exegesis
Marquis, Core Argument
Contraception Objection
Marquis, Response
P1. If abortion is (presumptively) morally permissible, then the fetus is not a person with full moral standing.
P2. Abortion is morally permissible.
Therefore, a fetus is not a person with full moral standing.
P1. If X has a future like ours of great value and killing X deprives X of that future, then killing X is (presumptively) morally wrong.
P2. A fetus has a future like ours and killing that fetus would deprive it of a valuable future.
Therefore, abortion is (presumptively) morally impermissible.
P1. If the “future like ours” premise is true, then contraception would be morally impermissible.
P2. But contraception is not morally impermissible!
Therefore, the “future like ours” premise is false.
P1. If there is “no non-arbitrarily identifiable subject of the loss in the case of contraception,” then contraception is morally permissible (according to the “future like ours” premise).
P2. There is “no non-arbitrarily identifiable subject of the loss in the case of contraception”
Therefore, contraception is morally permissible (according to the “future like ours” premise).

10. What is moral standing?
To determine whether abortion is wrong, Marquis claims we must first determine what makes killing generally wrong.
His answer: When someone is wrongly killed, he or she is deprived of a valuable future: “experiences, projects, activities”
“When I am killed, I am deprived... of what I now value [and] also what I would come to value... Therefore, when I die, I am deprived of all of the value of my future.”

11. What is moral standing?
To determine whether abortion is wrong, Marquis claims we must first determine what makes killing generally wrong.
“The category that is morally central to this analysis is the category of having a valuable future like ours; it is not the category of personhood.”

12. A future like ours
If X has a future like ours of great value and killing X deprives X of that future, then killing X is morally wrong.
Implications:
A future like ours is a sufficient, but not necessary condition for presumptive moral standing.
It is seriously presumptively wrong to kill children and infants.
It is not the case that only biologically human life can have great moral worth, e.g., intelligent animals/aliens.
It might be seriously wrong to kill some currently existing non-human mammals.
Does not entail that euthanasia, physician assisted suicide, and infanticide are morally wrong (in all cases).

13. Strongly Agree Agree Somewhat Agree Neutral Somewhat Disagree Disagree
Do you agree with Marquis? “If X has a future like ours of great value and killing X deprives X of that future, then killing X is morally wrong.”
Strongly Agree
Agree
Somewhat Agree
Neutral
Somewhat Disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree

14. A future like ours
Conclusion: “Since the loss of the future to standard fetus...at least as great a loss as the loss of the future to a standard human being who is killed, abortion, like ordinary killing, could be justified only by the most compelling reasons.”
In other words, he concludes that abortion is “seriously presumptively wrong.”
Marquis intentionally avoids the question of whether the fetus is a person.

15. The Contraception Objection
Marquis:
“the immorality of contraception is not entailed by the loss of a future like ours simply because there is no non-arbitrarily identifiable subject of the loss in the case of contraception …”
Objection
If Marquis' view were true, then contraception would be wrong. But that's absurd. 

16. Do you agree with the Contraception Objection?
Strongly Agree
Agree
Somewhat Agree
Neutral
Somewhat Disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree

17. Exegesis
Marquis, Core Argument
Contraception Objection
Marquis, Response
P1. If abortion is (presumptively) morally permissible, then the fetus is not a person with full moral standing.
P2. Abortion is morally permissible.
Therefore, a fetus is not a person with full moral standing.
P1. If X has a future like ours of great value and killing X deprives X of that future, then killing X is (presumptively) morally wrong.
P2. A fetus has a future like ours and killing that fetus would deprive it of a valuable future.
Therefore, abortion is (presumptively) morally impermissible.
P1. If the “future like ours” premise is true, then contraception would be morally impermissible.
P2. But contraception is not morally impermissible!
Therefore, the “future like ours” premise is false.
P1. If there is “no non-arbitrarily identifiable subject of the loss in the case of contraception,” then contraception is morally permissible (according to the “future like ours” premise).
P2. There is “no non-arbitrarily identifiable subject of the loss in the case of contraception”
Therefore, contraception is morally permissible (according to the “future like ours” premise).