1. Analysis of Suspect Chemicals
REGIONAL TRAINING COURSE FOR CUSTOMS AUTHORITIES OF STATES PARTIES IN ASIA ON TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE TRANSFERS REGIME OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION NEW DELHI, INDIA 10 – 13 DECEMBER 2012
Analysis of Suspect Chemicals
Declarations Branch/Verification Division
ORGANISATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

2. Objectives By the end of this session participants should:
Be aware of what steps to take if a potentially toxic chemical is discovered
Be aware of potential sources of advice and assistance that may be available in your country which should be explored on your return.
Understand the role of detection, on-site and off-site analysis
Be aware of the limitations of military detection equipment

3. WHAT TO EXPECT

4. What to Expect – Chemical Munitions?
Extremely unlikely that you will discover containers loaded with actual chemical munitions
Cannot rule it out – terrorists may try to smuggle small numbers of chemical munitions but difficulty in obtaining these makes this very unlikely.
Relatively easy to detect with X-ray scanners

5. What to expect – Toxic Chemicals
Unlikely that a country trying to obtain chemical weapons will try to transfer large quantities of toxic chemicals. However, they may try to obtain small amounts for CW research.
In addition terrorists may try to obtain small amounts of toxic chemicals for an attack – you don’t need much for terrorist purposes.

6. What to expect – Toxic Chemicals (2)
Difficult to transport toxic materials without drawing unwanted attention from authorities due to safety precautions.
If no safety precautions taken, run the risk of a release during transport causing death or injury to innocent bystanders or proliferator
not desired target

7. What to expect – CW Precursors
Much more likely that a proliferator will try to obtain precursor chemicals which they can then convert to CW.
Most precursors standard industry chemicals
Easier to get hold of these chemicals
In general not highly toxic hence easier to transport without drawing attention
Easier to justify why you are transferring these chemicals – less need to conceal chemicals

8. WHAT TO DO IF SUSPECT CW OR TOXIC CHEMICAL DISCOVERED
Secure the scene
Try to tentatively identify the substance only with the information available
Report the incident to the appropriate authority
Do you know who?
Is there a procedure in place to deal with such cases?
Who will take any samples or carry out analysis?

9. THINGS YOU SHOULD NOT DO
DO NOT take any action unless you have been trained in handling toxic chemicals
DO NOT enter confined spaces
DO NOT open trailers or trucks
DO NOT open drums or other containers
DO NOT presume what is marked on label is what is inside
DO NOT destroy evidence

10. Advice on Chemical Issues Including Sampling and Analysis
Customs laboratory
Chemical unit within customs
Can provide advice and liaise with outside agencies on chemical issues, including sampling and analysis
Other government departments/laboratories
University laboratories
If suspected chemical weapon the OPCW can provide advice and assistance
The Secretariat
Other member states

11. DETECTION AND ANALYSIS

12. Detection and Analysis
Detection of CW agents and toxic industrial chemicals
On site analysis of suspect chemicals
Off site analysis of suspect chemicals

13. Detection of CW agents and toxic industrial chemicals
Mainly based on military equipment, e.g.
Detector papers and tubes
Handheld detectors based on
Ion Mobility Spectrometry
Flame Photometry

14. Limitations of Military Detectors for Customs
Really aimed at detecting the presence of chemical weapons agents (CWAs) and some toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) not at identifying what the suspect substance is.
Precursor chemicals on CWC Schedules generally not covered
Subject to interference from many standard chemicals regularly passing through customs.
Can warn of possible dangers and inform sampling and analysis but not replace it

15. On-Site Analysis

16. On-Site Analysis
Identification of much wider range of chemicals than military type detectors
aim is to identify what the chemical is not just to indicate the presence of small number of dangerous chemicals.
Less susceptible to false positives than military type detectors such as IMS
Can quickly resolve many issues without the need to transport samples to a fixed lab.

17. On- Site Analysis - Fourier Transform Infrared (FTIR)
Portable
Easy to use
Quick
Identification based on comparison with library of compounds
Additional libraries can easily be added

18. On- Site Analysis - FTIR (2)
Can be used to identify wide variety of chemicals
CWAs, TICs, CW precursors.
Explosives
Narcotics
Common chemicals
Most common CWC chemicals included

19. Off Site Analysis

20. Off site analysis – the customs laboratory
Many customs authorities have their own laboratory (or laboratories)
Others rely on other government or university labs
Range of chemicals that can be analysed much greater than portable equipment
Confirm identification by detectors or on site analysis (where available)
Possible need for independent verification

21. Gas Chromatograph –Mass Spectrometry (GC-MS)
Primary technique used by OPCW for analysis of scheduled chemicals
But expensive and needs careful maintenance – not commonly available in customs labs.
Agilent 6850 GC/ 5973 MSD

22. Other Techniques for Analysing Scheduled Chemicals
FTIR GC
NMR

23. OPCW Central Analytical Database
Source of identification information for Customs Laboratories
Contains MS, NMR, IR, GC retention indices information on over 4000 CWC related chemicals
Can be obtained through National Authority or directly from OPCW

25. Thank you Any Questions?25 25