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How do we build global cooperation? A tale of two human rights treaties
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Plan Trilemma pics How do we build global cooperation? Badass story
Wimpy story Mid-term results
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How do we build global cooperation? A tale of two human rights treaties
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How should we design institutions to best generate cooperation?
Tried to address the problems of financial flows at the global level (IMF solution) – failed So Europe turned to a regional solution But if the goal is true “global governance,” how should we proceed? How do we achieve broad, deep commitments?
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We can’t start “broad & deep” So, consider 2 alternatives:
Start with Broad membership & shallow commitments Then gradually deepen commitments Or start with: Narrow membership & deep commitments The gradually broaden membership
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Narrow & deep Deep commitments may be possible with only a handful of states Once they start cooperating, the benefits of cooperation will be evident & attractive to other states We can gradually broaden membership Rationalist/materialist approach
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Broad & shallow To get lots of members, commitments must be shallow
Once we get many states socializing together, We can gradually deepen commitments Normative approach
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United Nations Approach to international cooperation
Broad membership shallow commitments at first then deepen Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1976) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (1981) Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (CAT) (1987) the only one with UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
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On United Nations Human Rights Treaties…
They all have: Domestic legal requirements Enforced domestically… International Committees Can be invited to make reports… Only the CAT has UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
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Definition of torture The CAT defines torture as any act inflicted under public authority by which severe pain or suffering (physical or mental) is intentionally inflicted on a person for the purposes of obtaining information or a confession, punishment, intimidation, coercion, or discrimination. Note that “torture” is defined as a state-sanctioned crime The CAT is radical: governments hand over prosecuting authority to 3rd-parties for state-sanctioned crimes, perhaps committed against a state’s own citizens!
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Universal Jurisdiction:
Torture committed against citizens of country A by citizens of country B while in country C can be prosecuted by country D!!!!!
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The CAT might have teeth!
Examples: Pinochet The Bush Six Alberto Gonzales (Attorney General) David Addington (Cheney Chief of Staff) John Yoo (DOJ "torture memos") William Haynes II (Pentagon Lawyer) Jay Bybee (Asst Attorney Gen) Douglas Feith (Former Gtown Prof) Douglas Feith (Deputy Defense Secretary)
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This threat of prosecution challenges the integrity of the U.S. government… It claims that U.S. officials can be criminally punished by a foreign court for official work they do for the American people… NOTE: United States signed CAT 18 April 1988 United States ratified CAT 21 October 1994
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Human rights groups alleged: Pres. George W. Bush cancelled Swiss trip
February 2011: Human rights groups alleged: Pres. George W. Bush cancelled Swiss trip Concerned about being held accountable in Geneva for alleged torture in Guantanamo Bay Bush Cancels Visit To Switzerland Due To Threat Of Torture Prosecution, Rights Groups Say (2011)
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Why sacrifice sovereignty?
A central question in this class! The answer may depend on: Political Regime (Democracy vs. Dictatorship)
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The Puzzle The relationship between: torture and CAT participation
Completely different for democracies & dictatorships…
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Probability of democracies entering into the CAT
Level of torture practiced
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Probability of dictatorships entering into the CAT
Level of torture practiced
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The Puzzle:
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Leader-resolve story Badass story
Addresses the puzzle that dictatorships with the worst human rights records are the most likely to sign Argues that signing “commits” the leader to prison if he relinquishes power Commitment is credible because of international enforcement Signals to the domestic audience that the leader is a high- resolve type May ironically lower torture as the domestic audience realizes it is futile to resist Absent resistance, dictatorships need not practice as much torture Low-resolve types do not sign because they fear going to prison if they fall from power, which they deem likely
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The Badass Story… for dictators
Ratifying the CAT signals RESOLVE It commits the dictator to prison (somewhere) if he should ever fall from power So, it signals just how sure he is of staying in power The “wimps” don’t sign
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Badass take-away The strongest of the dictatorships – the most sure of survival – enter into the CAT
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Rosendorff’s broader view:
International institutions as signals to domestic constituents Trade agreements Used by democracies to signal low-protectionism World Bank Collects data as a credible 3rd party for democracies to be transparent The CAT Used by dictatorships to signal leader-resolve
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Central question in today’s class: Why sacrifice sovereignty?
The logic may depend on political regime
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And now… The Wimpy Story
Brought to you by: Moravcsik, Andrew The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe. International Organization 54 (2):217–52.
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And now… The Wimpy Story
Brought to you by: Moravcsik, Andrew The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe. International Organization 54 (2):217–52.
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New Puzzle: Europe post-WWII
Regarding: European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) Who supports strict enforcement? Why were these countries willing to sacrifice sovereignty? But these countries were unwilling?
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Why are democracies willing to sacrifice sovereignty?
Established-democracies & dictatorships opposed binding human rights enforcement (“sovereignty costs”) Established-democracies: nothing to gain Dictatorships: everything to lose But fragile democracies: UNSURE of their survival If they fear the return of autocracy, They want to hand over prosecutorial authority to an international body They give up some power so that their potential successors won’t have it either Perhaps this also makes democracy more likely to endure because dictatorship less worthwhile?
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We call this story: “LOCK-IN”
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Putting the stories together: What do each of the following want?
Strongly established dictators: Can use HR agreements to CREDIBLY signal resolve (Rosendorff) Vulnerable dictators: Afraid of HR agreements because they commit torture, and might fall from power some day (Rosendorff) Vulnerable democracies: Can use HR agreements to LOCK-IN policy (Moravcsik) Strongly established democracies: Don’t need HR agreements to lock-in, and thus prefer to keep their sovereignty (Moravcsik)
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Key point: Domestic institutions as determinants of international relations! REMINDER: Do readings for snowday and for today: Hollyer, James R. and B. Peter Rosendorff Why Do Authoritarian Regimes Sign the Convention Against Torture? Signaling, Domestic Politics, and Non-Compliance. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 6: Moravcsik, Andrew The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe. International Organization 54 (2):217–52.
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Exams
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Median Mean
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Thank you WE ARE GLOBAL GEORGETOWN!
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