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The Information Economy

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Presentation on theme: "The Information Economy"— Presentation transcript:

1 The Information Economy
Carl Shapiro Hal R. Varian

2 Systems of Products Complementary products Product lines
Hardware/software Client/server Viewer/content Product lines High fixed cost, low incremental cost Leaders to value based pricing

3 Unique Features Complements Product lines Different manufacturers
Strategy for complementors as well as competitors Compatibility as strategic choice Standards and interconnection Product lines Lower quality may be more expensive

4 Information Anything that can be digitized Unique cost characteristics
Text, images, videos, music, etc. a.k.a. content, digital goods Unique cost characteristics Unique demand characteristics

5 Cost structure Expensive to produce, cheap to reproduce
High fixed cost, low marginal cost Not only fixed, but sunk No significant capacity constraints Particular market structures Monopoly Cost leadership Product differentiation (versioning)

6 Rights Management Low reproduction cost is two-edged sword
Cheap for owners (high profit margin) But also cheap for copiers Maximize value of IP, not protection Examples Library industry Video industry

7 Consumption Characteristics
Experience good Browsing Always new Reputation and brand identity Overload Economics of attention Hotmail example Broadcast, point-to-point, hybrid

8 Technology Infrastructure to store, retrieve, filter, manipulate, view, transmit, and receive information Adds value to information Web = 1 terabyte of text = 1 million books If 10% useful = 1 Borders Bookstore Value of Web is in ease of access Front end to databases, etc. Currency

9 Systems Competition Microsoft-Intel: Wintel Apple Intel Microsoft
Commoditize complementory chips Microsoft Commoditize PCs Apple Integrated solution Worked better, but lack of competition and scale led to current problems

10 Lock-In and Switching Costs
Example: Stereos and LPs Costly switch to CDs Systems lock-in: durable complements Hardware, software, and wetware Individual, organizational, and societal

11 Network Effects Value depends on number of users Positive feedback
Fax (patented in 1843) Internet (1980s) Indirect network effects Software Expectations management Competitive pre-announcements

12 Compatibility Examples Backwards compatibility? Beta v. VHS
Sony v. Philips for DVD Role of 3rd parties Read v. write standards Backwards compatibility? Windows 95 Windows NT

13 Basic Strategies Go it alone Partnerships (Java)
Formal standard setting Widespread use Licensing requirements Competition in a market or for a market?

14 Policy Understand environment IP policy Competition policy
Regulation Antitrust Electronic commerce Contracts Privacy

15 Information is Different… but not so different
Key concepts Versioning Lock-in Systems competition, Network effects

16 Recognizing Lock-In Cost of switching Compare Ford v. GM Mac v. PC

17 What’s the Difference? Durable investments in complementary assets
Hardware Software Wetware Supplier wants to lock-in customer Customer wants to avoid lock-in Basic principle: Look ahead and reason back

18 Examples Bell Atlantic and AT&T Computer Associates
5ESS digital switch used proprietary operating system Large switching costs to change switches Computer Associates Aircraft repair and cargo conversion

19 Small Switching Costs Matter
Phone number portability addresses Hotmail (advertising, portability) ACM, CalTech Look at lockin costs on a per customer basis

20 Valuing an Installed Base
Customer C switches from A to "same position" w/ B Total switching costs = customer costs + B's costs Example Switching ISPs costs customer $50 new ISP $25 New ISP make $100 on customer, switch New ISP makes $70 on customer, no switch Disruption costs Example: ILECs v CLECs Competitive market Profit=switching costs e.g. ILEC profits=customer + CLEC switching costs

21 Profits & Switching Costs In General:
Profits from a customer = total switching costs + quality/cost advantages In commodity market like telephony, profit per customer = total switching costs per customer Use of this rule of thumb How much to invest to get locked-in base Evaluate a target acquisition (e.g., Hotmail) Product and design decisions that affect switching costs

22 Classification of Lock-In
Durable purchases and replacement: declines with time Brand-specific training: rises with time Information and data: rises with time Specialized suppliers: may rise Search costs: learn about alternatives Loyalty programs: rebuild cumulative usage Contractual commitments: damages

23 Durable Purchases Aftermarket sales (supplies, maintenance)
Depends on (true) depreciation Usually fall with time Watch out for multiple pieces of hardware Supplier will want to stagger vintages Contract renewal Technology lock-in v. vendor lock-in

24 Brand-specific Training
How much is transferable? Software Competitors want to lower switching costs Borland and Quattro Pro help Word and WordPerfect help

25 Information & Databases
Datafiles Insist on standard formats

26 Specialized Suppliers
Advertising, legal, accounting firms Pentagon Dual sourcing Intel and AMD Adobe PostScript Java

27 Search Costs Transactions cost in finding new supplier
Also costs borne by new supplier Promotion, clsoing deal, setting up account, credit risks Example: Credit Cards $100 million in receivables sells or about $120 million Market valuation of “loyalty”

28 Loyalty Programs Constructed by firm Personalized Pricing
Frequent flyer programs Frequent coffee programs Personalized Pricing Gold status Example: Amazon and Barnes and Noble Amazon Assocates Program v. B&N's Affiliates program Add nonlinearity?

29 Contractual Commitments
“Requirements contract”: Purchase supplies from one supplier Beware of “evergreen contracts”

30 Suppliers and partners
Railroad spur lines Customized software

31 Follow the Lock-in cycle
Brand Selection Lock-In Sampling Entrenchment

32 Lessons Switching costs are ubiquitous Customers may be vulnerable
Value your installed base Watch for durable purchases Be able to identify 7-types of lock-in

33 Networks and Positive Feedback
Carl Shapiro Hal R. Varian

34 Important Ideas Positive feedback Network effects Returns to scale
Demand side Supply side

35 Positive Feedback Strong get stronger, weak get weaker
Negative feedback: stabilizing Makes a market “tippy” Examples: VHS v. Beta, Wintel v. Apple “Winner take all markets”

36 Sources of Positive Feedback
Supply side economies of scale Declining average cost Marginal cost less than average cost Example: information goods Demand side economies of scale Network effects In general: fax, , Web In particular: Sony v. Beta, Wintel v. Apple

37 Network Effects Real networks Virtual networks Number of users
Metcalfe’s Law: Value of network of size n proportional to n2 Importance of expectations

38 Lock-In and Switching Costs
Network effects lead to substantial collective switching costs Even worse than individual lock-in Due to coordination costs Example: QWERTY

39 Don’t Get Carried Away Network externalities don’t always apply
ISPs (but watch out for QoS) PC production Likelihood of tipping See next slide

40 Likelihood of Tipping

41 Chicken & Eggs Fax and fax machines VCRs and tapes
Internet browsers and Java

42 Igniting Positive Feedback
Evolution Give up some performance to ensure compatibility, thus easing consumer adoption Revolution Wipe the slate clean and come up with the best product possible

43 Evolution Offer a migration path Examples
Microsoft Intel Borland v Lotus Build new network by links to old one Problems: technical and legal

44 Technical Obstacles Use Creative design Think in terms of system
Converters and bridge technologies One-way compatibility

45 Legal Obstacles Need IP licensing Example: Sony and Philips CDs

46 Revolution Groves’s law: “10X rule” But depends on switching costs
Example: Nintendo

47 Openness v. Control Your reward = Total added to industry x your share
Value added to industry Depends on product and Size of network Your share Depends on how open

48 Openness Full openness Alliance Anybody can make the product
Problem: no champion Alliance Only members of alliance can use Problem: holding alliance together

49 Control Control standard and go it alone
If several try this strategy, may lead to standards wars

50 Generic Strategies

51 Performance Play Introduce new, incompatible technology Examples
Palm Pilot Iomega Zip Attractive if Great technology Outsider with no installed base

52 Controlled Migration Compatible, but proprietary Examples Windows 98
Pentium Upgrades

53 Open Migration Many vendors, compatible technology Examples
Fax machines Some modems

54 Discontinuity Many vendors, new technology Examples CD audio
3 1/2” disks

55 Historical Examples of Positive Feedback
RR gauges AC v. DC Telephone networks Color TV HD TV

56 Lessons Positive feedback means strong get stronger and weak get weaker Consumers value size of network Works for large networks, against small ones Consumer expectations are critical Fundamental tradeoff: performance and compatibility

57 Lessons, continued Fundamental tradeoff: openness and control
Generic strategies Performance play Controlled Migration Open Migration Discontinuity Lessons of history


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