1. The Real Actors and the PMP
M.Victoria Murillo
Columbia University
February 2009
Thanks.
Strange role as I participated in the original terms of reference and long-term discusison with Mariano on how to integrate “real actors” into the PMP (how to provide meat for institutions).

2. Hypothesized Group Factors Affecting Policy Influence
Some general factors affecting both economic and social groups (“real actors”):
SIZE
INTERNAL STRUCTURE
MARKET INCORPORATION
POLITICAL INCORPORATION
Hypothesis (not based in the case studies) trying to generalize from real actors (both economic & social => workers, business, indigenous, piqueteros, etc.) to the PMP in terms of the aggregation of policy preferences and their influence => potential impact on productivity.
The 2 first factors => type of demands and BP
The second 2 => type of action to influence the PMP (articulation).
Definition of group is a) arbitrary and b) endogenous to the political process, but just trying to symplify the arrow between real actors and the PMP, and get some possible predictions, I am proposing here some hypotheses for discussion.

3. GROUP SIZE
Potential for influence based on share of market/population.
E.g. size of indigenous population (Bolivia versus Chile), size of industry relative to the economy (PDVSA versus La Electricidad de Caracas).
Caveat: weigh sometimes overcomes size (e.g. transport in X economies).
Collective action problems/advantages.
Here I am ignoring the nature of demands and hypothesizing about their form. Don’t pay attention to the industry structure (Jeff Frieden), ethnic cleavages, etc.

4. GROUP STRUCTURE
Homogeneity or heterogeneity based on sectoral differences, origin of capital, ethnic or regional identities, etc. affect interest aggregation and collective action.
Divisions bw Amazonian/Highland indigenous groups in Ecuador.
Division between agro-industry and agricultural producers in Argentina.

5. MARKET INCORPORATION
Formal sector actors tend to be incorporated by business/labor organizations.
More limited repertoire of collective action (strike/lock-out, social mobilization, lobby & corporatist arrangements—policy delegation is possible).
Informal sector business/labor choose regional/ethnic/other identities.
Broader repertoire of collective action given the weak BP of traditional associations (mobilization, violent threat, clientelistic linkages, etc.)

6. POLITICAL INCORPORATION
Labor or populist incorporation: most usual in the region for either organized labor or the urban/rural poor (dynamic: e.g. FA, PT).
Is the MAS an indigenous party or a party of the Bolivian poor (like the MNR was in the 1950s?)
What are the constraints imposed by these constituencies?
Are business different in that they can always threat disinvestment or capture regulators?

7. Demands to the PMP Demands: SIZE => monopoly.
Heterogeneity => BP.
SIZE * HETEROGENEITY = BP of monopolistic demands.

8. Articulation to the PMP
Market incorporation:
YES:
lobbying
corporatism (usually with labor-based party)
social mobilization
NO:
Clientelism
Social mobilization
Riot
Federal
Executive (easier to exchange)
Local executive & salience (harder to exchange)

9. Articulation to the PMP
Political Incorporation:
YES:
In opposition: legislature & social mobilization.
In government: executive.
NO:
Access: lobby executive.
No access: social mobilization.

10. Hypothetical example 1 Organized labor in Argentina:
Size: % of formal labor covered by contracts.
Structure: not unified but vanguard sector (metal replaced by transportation) => demand of collective bargaining centralized at industry level.
Market/Political incorporation: lobbying the executive (threat of strike).
Outcome: labor legislation/exchanges with business are possible given the relatively centralized arena.
These examples are limited in that they are not interactive and rivals are crucial to policy outcomes => business for labor, landowners for peasants, etc. Other actors are crucial to outcomes but I am trying to isolate group preferences & tools for influence as well as outcomes expected given these preferences (but not considering the dynamic of exchange with others).

11. Hypothetical example 2:
Piqueteros:
SIZE: small proportion of informal workforce.
STRUCTURE: fragmented => demand for decentralized social policy, not just to local level but also to specific groups.
TOOLS: lobby government by groups incorporated by PJ & social mobilization by opposition groups.
OUTCOME: decentralized social policy (beyond the local level demanded by party bosses)/exchanges are difficult due to competition with other actors and within the group itself.

12. Hypothetical example 3:
Ecuatorian indigenous groups:
SIZE <50%.
STRUCTURE: divided between lowlands and highlands (organizationally & leadership) => demand for group level control of natural resources.
Informal & no political incorporation (unsuccessful own parties) => social mobilization for policy demand.
Yet, weak BP => central control over natural resources (given fiscal demands of other groups) & difficulties for exchanges.

13. Articulation?
SQ easier to defend, given interaction with real actors as veto players.
Actors’ power & avenues for influence => policy outcomes.
Even in Argentina, stable labor regulation & decentralized social policy => swings with non-veto actors.
Real actors => Group (identity/organization):
Demands & BP (industrial organization).
Articulation with PMP (type of incorporation).
It is possible to integrate this into the general model? Is it worth trying?
PROVOCATION to conclude:
Flavor of case studies => SQ easier to defend if veto power given to “real actors”.
Back to Adam Przeworski => balance of power shaping institutional stability (institutions as reflecting power).
Policy outcome as the result of actor’s power and their avenues for influence.
Back to Moe => balance of power of actors => policy distortion.
E.g.
Slim defends the SQ in telecom regulation & veto reforms that make it more competitive.
His veto power is based on the size/structure of his group (large relative to the economy and unified under CARSO) & he resorts to direct lobbying of the executive (even if Telmex lobbies Congress to achieve particular changes based on division of power. E.g. change in luxury tax not applied to pre-paid mobiles). Others (Alestra/Avantel) opposed Telmex but are weak and either crushed or co-opted by Telmex => no policy influence. Business suffers but not sufficient mobilization on a particular expenditure to oppose the Carso groupl.