1. Detecting Tomorrows Threats Today

2. Cyber + Global = Big Problem
Cyberspace has Globalized Risk X
Software Assurance?
Doesn’t exist. Bad guys get in. Period. X
Prosecution?
Forget it. The attack originated from thousands of miles away. X
Attribution? Difficult. X
Intellectual Property?
“Property” implies the rule of law. The only law that doesn’t
need to be enforced is the law of economics. You will know,
because it’s the one causing you to lose market share.

3. Evolving Risk Environment
All of your valuable information is stored online where it can be a cyber target
Attackers are motivated and well-funded
Financial Gain, Strategic Advantage, Intellectual Property Theft
Cyber weapons work, existing security doesn’t, end of story.

4. Anti-virus is rapidly losing credibility
Source: “Eighty percent of new malware defeats antivirus”, ZDNet Australia, July 19, 2006
Top 3 AV companies don’t detect 80% of new malware
The sheer volume and complexity of computer viruses being released on the Internet today has the anti-virus industry on the defensive, experts say, underscoring the need for consumers to avoid relying on anti-virus software alone to keep their…computers safe and secure.
Source: “Anti-Virus Firms Scrambling to Keep Up ”, The Washington Post, March 19, 2008 4

5. Signature based systems don’t scale

6. Efficacy Curve Efficacy is rising ZERO KNOWLEDGE DETECTION RATE DDNA
Detecting more than not (> 50%)
ZERO KNOWLEDGE DETECTION RATE
Detecting very little
Signatures
And scaling issue getting worse

7. HBGary’s take on all this
Focus on malicious behavior, not signatures
There are only so many ways to do something bad on a Windows machine
Bad guys don’t write 50,000 new malware every morning
Their techniques, algorithms, and protocols stay the same, day in day out
Once executing in physical memory, the software is just software
Physmem is the best information source available

8. The Big Picture of HBGary
Detect bad guys using a smallish genome of behaviors – and this means zeroday and APT – no signatures required
Followup with strong incident response technology, enterprise scalable
Back this with very low level & sophisticated deep-dive capability for attribution and forensics work

9. And The Very Near Future
Continue to develop biological models to solve enterprise security problems
Extend capabilities of Digital DNA™
Allow users to make their own Genomes
Boom, now you have E-discovery and DLP plays
Inoculation shot for Remediation
Proven with Aurora already
Research direction: Digital Antibodies, deployed persistent protection against specific threat patterns

10. Inoculation Example Using Responder + REcon, HBGary was able to trace
Aurora malware and obtain actionable intel in about 5 minutes.
This intel was then used to create an inoculation shot,
downloaded over 10,000 times over a few days time.
To automatically attempt a clean operation:
*******************************************
InoculateAurora.exe -range clean

11. Products

12. Responder Field Edition
Stand Alone
Enterprise
Memory Forensics
Responder Field Edition
Integrated with EnCase Enterprise (Guidance)
Enterprise Malware Detection
Digital DNA for ePO (HBSS)
Active Defense
Response
Responder Professional
w/ Digital DNA
Intrinsic to all Enterprise products
Policy Enforcement and Mitigation
Integrated with Verdasys Digital Guardian

13. Customers DoD 26000 Nodes Civilian Agencies 36,000 Nodes
Government Contractors &
Consulting Customers
OEMS
Fortune Customers *
Foreign Governments & 38 Customers
Universities &
Law Enforcement 87 Customers
* Multiple site license discussions in the pipeline

14. Technology Block Diagram

15. Enterprise Cyber Defense Enterprise Incident Response
Active Defense
Active Defense
McAfee
Verdasys
EnCase
Enterprise Cyber Defense
Enterprise Incident Response
Digital DNA™
Responder™
TMC’s support in Federal space.
REcon
Ruleset (‘genome’)
Threat Monitoring
Mature product in market
Automated Reverse Engineering
Automated Feed Farm
Windows Physical Memory Forensics
NTFS Drive Forensics
Could be productized…
Product, extremely flexible, SDK available

16. Digital DNA™

17. Digital DNA™ Automated malware detection
Software classification system
5000 software and malware behavioral traits
Example
Huge number of key logger variants in the wild
About 10 logical ways to build a key logger

18. Digital DNA™ Benefits = Better cyber defense
Enterprise detection of zero-day threats
Lowers the skill required for actionable response
What files, keys, and methods used for infection
What URL’s, addresses, protocols, ports
“At a glance” threat assessment
What does it steal? Keystrokes? Bank Information? Word documents and powerpoints?
= Better cyber defense

19. How an AV vendor can use DDNA
Digital DNA uses a smallish genome file (a few hundred K) to detect ALL threats
If something is detected as suspicious, that object can be extracted from the surrounding memory (Active Defense™ does this already)
The sample can then be analyzed with a larger, more complete virus database for known-threat identification
If a known threat is not identified, the sample can be sent to the AV vendor automatically

20. Digital DNA™ Performance
4 gigs per minute, thousands of patterns in parallel, NTFS raw disk, end node
2 gig memory, 5 minute scan, end node
Hi/Med/Low throttle
= 10,000 machine scan completes in < 1 hour

21. Under the hood
These images show the volume of decompiled information produced by the DDNA engine. Both malware use stealth to hide on the system. To DDNA, they read like an open book.

22. Ranking Software Modules by Threat Severity Software Behavioral Traits
Digital DNA™
Ranking Software Modules by Threat Severity
0B 8A C2 05 0F F B ED C D
8A C2
Malware shows up as a red alert. Suspicious binaries are orange. For each binary we show its underlying behavioral traits. Examples of traits might be “packed with UPX”, “uses IRC to communicate”, or “uses kernel hooking with may indicate a presence of a rootkit”. The blue bar shows the Digital DNA sequence for the binary iimo.sys.
0F 51
0F 64
Software Behavioral Traits

23. B[00 24 73 ??]k ANDS[>004] C”QueueAPC”{arg0:0A,arg}
What’s in a Trait?
04 0F 51
B[ ??]k ANDS[>004] C”QueueAPC”{arg0:0A,arg}
The rule is a specified like a regular expression, it matches against automatically reverse engineered details and contains boolean logic. These rules are considered intellectual property and not shown to the user.
Unique hash code
Weight / Control flags
The trait, description, and underlying rule are held in a database

24. Digital DNA™ (in Memory) vs
Digital DNA™ (in Memory) vs. Disk Based Hashing, Signatures, and other schematic approaches

25. White listing on disk doesn’t prevent malware from being in memory
Internet Document
PDF, Active X, Flash
Office Document, Video, etc…
DISK FILE
IN MEMORY IMAGE
Public Attack-kits have used memory-only injection for
over 5 years
OS Loader
White listing on disk doesn’t prevent malware from being in memory
MD5 Checksum
is white listed
Whitelisting typically works by have a list of good hashes with the assumption that you’re loading only good binaries for execution into memory. But bad code can get injected into good programs. White listing does not mean secure code. DDNA will find the bad injected code.
White listed code does not mean secure code
Process is trusted

26. Digital DNA defeats packers
IN MEMORY IMAGE
Packer #1
Packer #2
Decrypted
Original
OS Loader
Digital DNA defeats packers
Starting Malware
As you know most malware is packed. The bad guy does this to avoid detection. For every packer used, you need another signature. But a program must unpack itself in memory to execute. Its underlying behaviors remain the same, so its DDNA remains the same.
Packed
Malware
Digital DNA remains consistent

27. Same malware compiled in three different ways
DISK FILE
IN MEMORY IMAGE
Same malware compiled in three different ways
OS Loader
If the same malware is compiled e different ways you would need 3 different hashes or signatures to see it. DDNA still detects because the program is logically the same and has the same behaviors.
MD5 Checksums
all different
Digital DNA remains consistent

28. Compromised computers… Now what?

29. Active Defense™

30. Alert!

31. Hmm..

32. Active Defense Queries
What happened?
What is being stolen?
How did it happen?
Who is behind it?
How do I bolster network defenses?

33. Active Defense Queries

34. Active Defense Queries
QUERY: “detect use of password hash dumping”
Physmem.BinaryData CONTAINS PATTERN “B[a-fA-F0-9]{32}:B[a-fA-F0-9]{32}“
QUERY: “detect deleted rootkit”
(RawVolume.File.Name = “mssrv.sys“ OR RawVolume.File.Name = “acxts.sys“)
AND RawVolume.File.Deleted = TRUE
QUERY: “detect chinese password stealer”
LiveOS.Process.BinaryData CONTAINS PATTERN “LogonType: %s-%s“
QUERY: “detect malware infection san diego”
LiveOS.Module.BinaryData CONTAINS PATTERN “.aspack“ OFFSET < 1024 OR
RawVolume.File.BinaryData CONTAINS PATTERN “.aspack“ OFFSET < 1024
No NDA no Pattern…

35. Enterprise Systems Digital DNA for McAfee ePO
Digital DNA for HBGary Active Defense
Digital DNA for Guidance EnCase Enterprise
Digital DNA for Verdaysys Digital Guardian
Traditional methods to analyze memory and malware are difficult. It requires expertise, is time consuming and expensive, and it doesn’t scale. 35

36. Integration with McAfee ePO
Responder
Professional
ePO
Console
ePO
Server
ePO
Agents
(Endpoints)
DDNA is automatically installed across the enterprise by ePO. We give a ePO a couple of zip files. ePO installs HBGary code onto the ePO server and onto each endpoint. The ePO scheduler tells DDNA when to run on each endpoint. We run, examine memory, create DDNA alerts, hand the alerts and traits to the ePO agent which sends them to the ePO SQL server. The DDNA alerts are displayed on the ePO console. DDNA is not installed as an agent. It is a command line utility that loads runs when ePO tells it to. After executing DDNA exits memory. ePO’s AV, firewall and HIDS runs 24x7 as a service. DDNA runs at a point in time to find malware.
Schedule
SQL
Events
HBG Extension
HBGary DDNA

38. Fuzzy Search

39. Responder

40. HBGary Responder Professional
Standalone system for incident response
Memory forensics
Malware reverse engineering
Static and dynamic analysis
Digital DNA module
REcon module

41. Responder Professional

42. REcon

43. REcon
Records the entire lifecycle of a software program, from first instruction to the last.
It records data samples at every step, including arguments to functions and pointers to
objects.
Offline physical memory analysis:
Rebuilding windows without windows
All physical to virtual address translations

44. Advanced Discussion: How HBGary maintains DDNA with Threat Intelligence

45. Partnership Feed Agreements
Intelligence Feed
Partnership Feed Agreements
Feed Processor
Machine Farm
Meta Data
Sources
Digital DNA

46. From raw data to intelligence
Malware Analysis
Feed Processor
Responder
Active Defense
Data Integration
Meta Data
Link Analysis
Stalker
primary
Digital DNA
Palantir
Stats

47. Ops path Malware Attack Tracking Digital DNA™ Active Threat Tracking
Mr. A
Mr. B
Mr. C
Malware Attack Tracking
Digital DNA™
Active Threat Tracking
Detect relevant attacks in progress. Determine the scope of the attack.
Focus is placed on
Botnet / Web / Spam Distribution systems
Potentially targeted spear/whalefishing
Internal network infections at customer sites
Development idioms are fingerprinted.
Malware is classified into attribution domains. Special attention is placed on:
Specialized attacks
Targeted attacks
Newly emergent methods
Determine the person(s) operating the attack, and their intent:
Leasing Botnet / Spam
Financial Fraud
Identity Theft
Pump and Dump
Targeted Threat
& Documents Theft Intellectual Property Theft
Deeper penetration

48. Malware sequenced every 24 hours

49. Over 5,000 Traits are categorized into Factor, Group, and Subgroup.
This is our “Genome”

50. Country of Origin Country of origin
Is the bot designed for use by certain nationality?
Geolocation of IP is NOT a strong indicator
However, there are notable examples
Is the IP in a network that is very unlikely to have a third-party proxy installed?
For example, it lies within a government installation
C&C map from Shadowserver, C&C for 24 hour period

51. C&C server source code.
Written in PHP
Specific “Hello” response (note, can be queried from remote to fingerprint server)
Clearly written in Russian
In many cases, the authors make no attempt to hide…. You can purchase many kits and just read the source code…

52. A GIF file included in a C&C server package.

53. GhostNet: Screen Capture Algorithm
Loops, scanning every 50th line (cY) of the display.
Reads screenshot data, creates a special DIFF buffer
LOOP: Compare new screenshot to previous, 4 bytes at a time
If they differ, enter secondary loop here, writing a ‘data run’ for as long as there is no match.
Offset in screenshot
Len in bytes
Data….

54. ‘SoySauce’ C&C Hello Message
this queries the uptime of the machine..
checks whether it's a laptop or desktop machine...
enumerates all the drives attached to the system, including USB and network...
gets the windows username and computername...
gets the CPU info... and finally,
the version and build number of windows.

55. Aurora C&C parser
Command is stored as a number, not text. It is checked here.
Each individual command handler is clearly visible below the numerical check
After the command handler processes the command, the result is sent back to the C&C server

56. Link Analysis Link Analysis We want to find a connection here
C&C Fingerprint
Botmaster
URL artifact
Affiliate ID
Developer
Protocol Fingerprint
Endpoints
Developer
C&C products
Link Analysis

57. Example: Link Analysis with Palantir™
Implant
Forensic Toolmark specific to Implant
Searching the ‘Net reveals source code that leads to Actor
Actor is supplying a backdoor
Group of people asking for technical support on their copies of the backdoor

58. Questions?