1. LECTURES 17 & 18: Problems of Commodity-Exporting Countries
(“Commodities” means particularly oil, minerals & agricultural commodities)
The Dutch Disease
The Natural Resource Curse

2. Commodity prices over the last decade have been even more volatile than usual.
IMF
Bruegel

3. Lecture 17: THE DUTCH DISEASE
Question: What are the consequences of a natural resource boom in exports? E.g., commodity booms of and

4. Resource boom when there are only (two) TGs
Country with comparative advantage in oil
exports oil;
is better off when world oil price rises.
So what’s the problem?
1) Manuf.s may have spillover benefits
2) Switching sectors may be costly
3) Spending may rise too much
especially if boom is believed permanent
but is in fact temporary. •
Oil • • •
Manufactures
Oil •
If oil supply is inelastic, so substitution between oil & manufactures is limited, then problems 1 & 2 might seem limited.
But we will bring NTGs back in. • •
Manufactures

5. What is the Dutch Disease?
BP due to commodity boom:
P natural resource  => TB 
or resource supply  (e.g., good harvest) => TB 
or oil discovery => capital inflow to develop oil;
KA  due to stabilization or liberalization; or inflow of foreign aid.
Undesired side effect: Real appreciation & crowding-out of non-commodity TGs.
Under fixed rate, Res inflows => MB  => inflation in PNTG .
Under floating, appreciation E  => PTG  .
Either way, => (PNTG /PTG)  .
or, by analogy,
How?
(Also via G ) or

6. The Dutch Disease in terms of the Salter diagram
A commodity boom stretches the Production Possibility Frontier rightward (H): can now afford to buy more TGs.
The new LR equilibrium point, E', (external balance & internal balance) now implies a higher relative price of NTGs, inducing land & labor to move out of non-commodity TGs, into the NTG sector.
TB>0 => real apprec. • ' • ' • ' '
Jeffrey Sachs, 2007, “How to Handle the Macroeconomics of Oil Wealth,” in Escaping the Resource Curse, edited by Humphreys, Sachs & Stiglitz.

7. Alternative strategy for dealing with inflows:
Movement to point EN′ may be rapid, especially if exchange rate floats or PNTG is flexible.
Alternative strategy for dealing with inflows:
Try to avoid/postpone real appreciation, e.g., by sterilized intervention,
if BP shift known temporary, e.g., transitory commodity boom, and
if short-term capital inflows are excessive (“over-borrowing”)
or perhaps if shifts from EN to EN′ are costly;
or if crowded-out non-commodity TGs had positive spillovers.
Typically sterilization only works temporarily, especially if capital markets are open.

8. PN ≡ PNTG /PTG NN
BB shifts out. Again: the new equilibrium is a higher PNTG /PTG . But how do we get there? And is it wise, if the boom might reverse? E'
(3)
BB'
Response to Dutch disease. One plausible sequence: (1) Sterilize reserve inflow E
(2)
(1)
(2) Allow inflow to raise money supply BB
(3) Appreciate currency if boom looks permanent. A

9. Another common aspect of the Dutch Disease: governments over-spend, in response to high revenue.
For example, the government wage bill goes up – which is difficult to reverse when export revenues go back down (Arezki & Ismail, JDE, 2013).
This is one source of the pro-cyclicality of government spending that is so common among developing countries,
esp. Latin America, Africa, and Middle East.
References for procyclical fiscal policy:
Gavin & Perotti, 1997
Kaminsky, Reinhart & Vegh, 2004
Talvi & Vegh, 2005
Alesina & Tabellini, 2005
Mendoza & Oviedo, 2006 Céspedes &Velasco, 2014

10. Iran’s government wage bill has been heavily influenced by what oil prices were 3 years before.
Lagged oil prices

11. Correlations between Gov.t Spending & GDP }
procyclical
Adapted from Kaminsky, Reinhart & Végh (2004)
“When it Rains, It Pours”
Pro-cyclical spending
countercyclical
Counter- cyclical spending
G always used to be pro-cyclical for most developing countries. 11

12. The procyclicality of fiscal policy, continued
Pro-cyclicality has been especially strong in commodity-exporting countries, historically. .
An important development after some developing countries, including commodity producers, were able to break the pattern:
taking advantage of the boom of
to run budget surpluses & build reserves,
thereby earning the ability to expand fiscally in the crisis.
Chile is the outstanding model;
also Costa Rica, China, & Korea.
Exceptions: Argentina, Ecuador, Venezuela.
Some graduated ( ); but then backslid ( ):
Brazil, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Thailand.
keep 12 12

13. Correlations between Government spending & GDP 2000-2015
Adapted from Frankel, Vegh & Vuletin (JDE, 2013)
After 2000, about 1/4 developing countries switched to countercyclical fiscal policy: Negative correlation of G & GDP.
Updated by Guillermo Vuletin, Oct. 2016

14. Correlations between G & GDP, 2000-2009
Appendix: vs
Correlations between G & GDP,
Adapted from Frankel, Vegh & Vuletin (JDE, 2013)
In the decade , about 1/4 developing countries switched to countercyclical fiscal policy: Negative correlation of G & GDP.
Updated by Guillermo Vuletin, Oct. 2016

15. Update of Correlation (G, GDP): 2010-15
Back-sliding among some countries.
Since 2010, some of those countries have reverted to pro-cyclical fiscal policy.
Updated by Guillermo Vuletin, Oct. 2016

16. 16 16

17. LECTURE 18: The Natural Resource Curse
A large primary sector brings pitfalls.
It does not necessarily lead to good economic performance.
The objective should be to avoid the pitfalls,
to harness the natural resources for the benefit of the country.

18. Commodity exports are not positively correlated with growth.
Source: Frankel (2012)

19. Long-term trends in world commodity prices
Six possible channels that some have suggested could lead to sub-standard economic performance:
Long-term trends in world commodity prices
(Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, But negative trend has not been borne out.)
Volatility (e.g., Hausmann & Rigobon, 2003)
Permanent crowding out of manufacturing (Matsuyama, 1992)
Unsustainability
Civil war (Collier, 2007…)
Poor institutions (Auty; Sachs-Warner; Engerman-Sokoloff…).

20. Natural resources need not necessarily be a “curse.”
Chile & Botswana are examples of countries that have done well
better than others in their regions,
due in part to “good institutions,”
including some specific institutions that others could emulate.
What institutions can best avoid the resource pitfalls?

21. The Dutch Disease & commodity price volatility are two components of the longer-run NRC.
Another important source of the NRC: natural resource abundance may be conducive to bad institutions, including rent-seeking & corruption.
The Engerman-Sokoloff hypothesis (e.g., North America vs. South America):
extraction by mine & plantation => monopoly/authoritarianism/inequality; => societies without private incentives, => ill-suited to develop manufacturing & services.

22. Ideas that may help manage volatility, in four areas.
How can countries that export commodities cope with the high volatility in their terms of trade?
Ideas that may help manage volatility, in four areas.
Micro
Macro
Tried & tested:
1. Hedging
3. Fiscal policy
Untried:
2. Debt denomination
4. Monetary policy

23. Idea 1: Commodity options
Use options to hedge against downside fluctuations of the $ price of the export commodity.
Mexico does it annually for oil.
thereby mitigating, e.g., the 2009 & 2015 downturns.
Why not use the futures or forward market?
Ghana has tried it successfully, for cocoa.
But: The minister who sells forward may get:
meager credit if the $ price of the commodity goes down,
and lots of blame if the price goes up.

24. For some commodities, derivatives contracts are unavailable at long horizons.
Chicago Mercantile Exchange Data source: Bloomberg
“Managing Volatility in Low-Income Countries: The Role and Potential for Contingent Financial Instruments,” IMF SPRD & World Bank PREM, approved by Reza Moghadam & Otaviano Canuto, Oct Fig.7 p.21.

25.   Idea 2: Commodity bonds
To hedge against long-term fluctuations in $ commodity price.
For those who borrow,
e.g., an African country developing oil discoveries --
link the terms of the loan, not to $ or €, nor to the local currency, but to the price of the export commodity.
Then debt service obligations will match revenues.
Debt crises
in 1998: Indonesia, Russia & Ecuador, and
in 2015: Ghana, Ecuador, Nigeria & Venezuela,
<= the $ prices of their oil exports fell,
and so their debt service ratios worsened.
Indexation of debts to oil prices might have prevented the crises.
An old idea. Why has it hardly been tried?

26. “Who would buy bonds linked to commodity prices?”
Answer -- There are natural customers:
Power utilities & airlines, for oil;
Steelmakers, for iron ore;
Millers & bakers, for wheat;
Etc.
These firms want the commodity exposure,
but not the credit risk.
=> The World Bank could intermediate:
Link client-country loans to the oil price;
then lay off the oil risk by selling precisely that amount of oil-linked World Bank bonds to the private sector.

27. Idea 3: Adopt institutions to achieve counter-cyclical fiscal policy
Developing countries, historically, have had notoriously pro-cyclical spending,
especially commodity-exporters
Cuddington (1989), Gavin & Perotti (1997), Tornell & Lane (1999), Kaminsky, Reinhart & Vegh (2004), Talvi & Végh (2005), Mendoza & Oviedo (2006), Alesina, Campante & Tabellini (2008), Ilzetski & Vegh (2008), Medas & Zakharova (2009), Medina (2010), Arezki, Hamilton & Kazimov (2011), Erbil (2011) and Avellan & Vuletin (2015).
Tax policy tends to be procyclical as well: Vegh & Vuletin (2015).
But after 2000 some achieved counter-cyclicality,
running surpluses , then easing in 2009.
Frankel, Carlos Végh & Guillermo Vuletin, 2013, “On Graduation from Fiscal Procyclicality,” J.Dev.Ec.
Luis Felipe Céspedes & Andrés Velasco, 2014, “Was this Time Different? Fiscal Policy in Commodity Republics,” J.Dev.Ec.

28. Who achieves counter-cyclical fiscal policy?
Countries with “good institutions”
”On Graduation from Fiscal Procyclicality,” 2013, Frankel with Carlos Végh & Guillermo Vuletin; J.Dev.Ec.

29. The quality of institutions varies, not just across countries, but also across time.
Worsened institutions;
More-cyclical spending.
Improved institutions;
Less-cyclical spending.
Good institutions;
Countercyclical spending
Frankel, Végh & Vuletin, 2013.

30. What specific institutional mechanisms can help reduce cyclicality of fiscal policy?
Independent central banks, to be able to resist political pressure to monetize budget deficits;
Well-managed Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) to insulate accumulated assets from pressure to spend (especially in the case of a depletable natural resource), or from temptation to allocate assets on political grounds;
Budget rules, to be able to resist pressure to increase spending overly when revenue is temporarily high. 30

31. Sovereign Wealth Funds
A commonly suggested model:
Norway’s National Petroleum Fund (now “government Pension Fund”)
When oil prices are high, save it in a fund to offset depletion of reserves.
Internationally diversified.
An even better model:
Botswana’s Pula Fund
Professionally managed; no political interference.
But most important is saving the money in the first place. 31

32. What specific institutions can help?, continued
Budget rules?
Budget deficit ceilings or debt brakes?
Have been tried by many countries:
97 IMF members, by 2013.
Usually fail.
Rigid Budget Deficit ceilings operate pro-cyclically.
Phrasing the target in cyclically adjusted terms helps solve that problem in theory. But…
Rules don’t address a major problem:
Bias in official forecasts
of GDP growth rates, tax receipts & budgets.
In practice, overly optimistic forecasts by official agencies render rules ineffective..

33. Countries with Balanced Budget Rules frequently violate them.
BBR: Balanced Budget Rules
DR: Debt Rules
ER: Expenditure Rules
Compliance
< 50%
International Monetary Fund, 2014

34. An institution that others might emulate: The Chile model
I concluded that the key feature was the delegation to independent committees of the responsibility to estimate long-run trends in the copper price & GDP,
thus avoiding the systematic over-optimism that plagues official forecasts in 32 other countries.
Frankel, 2013, “A Solution to Fiscal Procyclicality:   The Structural Budget Institutions Pioneered by Chile.”

35. Over-optimism in official forecasts
Statistically significant bias among 33 countries
Worse in booms.
Frankel (2011, 2013); Frankel & Schreger (2016).
Leads to pro-cyclical fiscal policy:
If the boom is forecast to last indefinitely, there is no apparent need to retrench.
BD rules don’t help.
Forecast are even more biased in countries that have them.
Solution?

36. The example of Chile’s fiscal institutions
1st rule – Governments must set a budget target,   
2nd rule – The target is structural: Deficits allowed only to the extent that
(1) output falls short of trend, in a recession, or
(2) the price of copper is below its trend.
3rd rule – The trends are projected by 2 panels of independent experts, outside the political process.
Result: Chile avoided the pattern of 32 other governments,
where forecasts in booms were biased toward optimism. 36

37. Chilean fiscal institutions
In 2000 Chile instituted its structural budget rule.
The institution was formalized into law in 2006.
The structural budget surplus must be…
0 as of 2008 (was higher before, lower after),
where “structural” is defined by output & copper price equal to their long-run trend values.
I.e., in a boom the government can only spend increased revenues that are deemed permanent; any temporary copper bonanzas must be saved.

38. The Pay-off Chile’s fiscal position strengthened immediately:
Public saving rose from 3 % of GDP in 2000 to 8 % in 2005
allowing national saving to rise from 21 % to 24 %.
Government debt fell sharply as a share of GDP and the sovereign spread gradually declined.
By 2006, Chile achieved a sovereign debt rating of A,
several notches ahead of Latin American peers.
By 2007 it had become a net creditor.
By 2010, Chile’s sovereign rating had climbed to A+,
ahead of some advanced countries.
=> It was able to respond to the recession.

39. Idea 4: Adopt a monetary policy regime that can accommodate terms of trade shocks
Longstanding textbook wisdom: For a country subject to big terms of trade shocks, the exchange rate should be able to accommodate them.
When the $ price of commodities is:
we want the currency to
so as to avoid
high,
appreciate
excessive money inflows, credit, debt, inflation & asset bubbles.
low,
depreciate
trade deficit, fx reserve crisis, excessively tight money & recession.
When the $ price of commodities is:
we want the currency to
high,
appreciate
so as to avoid
excessive money inflows, credit, debt, inflation & asset bubbles.

40. Should commodity exporters float?
Of course some will continue to fix the exchange rate,
especially very small countries.
But others need some degree of exchange rate flexibility.
The long-time conventional wisdom that floating works better, for countries exposed to volatility in the prices of their export commodities, has been confirmed in empirical studies, including:
Broda (2004),
Edwards & Levy-Yeyati (2005),
Rafiq (2011),
and Céspedes & Velasco (2012).

41. Across 107 major commodity boom-bust cycles,
Céspedes & Velasco, 2012, IMF Economic Review  “Macroeconomic Performance During Commodity Price Booms & Busts”
Constant term
not reported.
(t-statistics in parentheses.)
** Statistically significant at 5% level.
Across 107 major commodity boom-bust cycles,
output loss is bigger the bigger is the commodity price change & the smaller is exchange rate flexibility.

42. Is full discretion an option?
But if the exchange rate is not to be the nominal anchor for monetary policy, then what is?
Is full discretion an option?
The Fed & some other major central banks, for now, have given up on attempts to communicate intentions in terms of a single variable,
even via forward guidance, let alone an explicit target (like IT).
But the presumption is still in favor of transparency and clear communication.
Many still feel the need to announce a simple target.
Most developing countries, in particular,
need the reinforcement to credibility.

43. Monetary policy-makers in developing countries may have more need for credibility.
a) due to high-inflation histories,
b) less-credible institutions, or
c) political pressure to monetize big budget deficits.
A. Fraga, I. Goldfajn & A. Minella (2003), “Inflation Targeting in Emerging Market Economies.”
But it does not add to credibility to announce a target which the central bank is likely to miss subsequently.

44. What choice of monetary anchor or target?
Of the variables that are candidates for nominal target,
the traditional ones prevent accommodation of terms of trade shocks:
Not just exchange rate target,
but also M1 (traditional monetarism)
and the CPI (Inflation Targeting).
But some novel candidates would facilitate accommodation of trade shocks:
Target an index of product prices (PPT)
Target Nominal GDP (NGDPT)
Add the export commodity to a currency basket peg (CCB).

45. New proposal: Target a Currency + Commodity Basket (CCB)
Consider three commodity-exporters that, at times, have pegged to a basket of major foreign currencies:
Kuwaiti dinar ( , 2007-present), pegged to basket of $ + €,
Chilean peso ( ) pegged to $ + DM + ¥,
Kazakh tenge ( ) to $ + € + ₱.
The proposal is to add the commodity to the basket.
E.g., oil for Kuwait & Kazakhstan,
copper for Chile.

46. CCB: Add the export commodity to the currency basket

47. Target a Currency + Commodity Basket (CCB)
This target would give the best of both worlds:
It is precise and transparent on a daily basis,
Determined by observed mid-day or closing prices in London or the ICE.
while yet sustainable on a long-term basis:
The currency would automatically strengthen (vs. the $) when the $ price of oil rises,
and automatically fall when the price of oil falls.

48. 48 48