1. Lecture 5 Particulars: substratum and substance theories
Dr. Donnchadh O’Conaill
7/2/2017
Metaphysics University of Helsinki

2. 1. Substratum theory
Concrete particulars are complexes of more fundamental constituents, which include its attributes but also another constituent
Bare substratum: “something that is not an attribute, but functions as the literal bearer, possessor, or subject of the attributes” (Loux 2006, 86-87)
Why posit such an entity? Start with the distinction between an attribute and its bearer: we can distinguish them because the bearer “can be apprehended independently of that attribute […] its being what it is in no way presupposes or requires the attribute” Loux 87

3. E.g., “what literally possesses the colour red must be something that in itself is not red” (Loux, 87)
If it was red in itself, how could we distinguish it from the attribute of redness?
This means the bearer is not the concrete particular, which is itself red
Same for other attributes: “for each such attribute, what literally has that attribute is something whose being what it is does not involve that attribute” Loux 87-88

4. But different attributes must have a common subject to hold them together – a constituent which is not a further attribute: the substratum
Which is bare in that, in itself, it is not red or round or large…
“it is because the bare substratum exemplifies each of the properties in question that we have one thing” (Loux, 89)

5. 2. Why substrata?
We must posit something which holds the different attributes together
This role cannot be played by attributes
Vs the bundle theorist: “you mistakenly treat properties as if they were objects in their own right to be bundled as so many sticks in a pile. Shape and size […] do not appear to me to be entities for […] bundling (Martin 1980, 6-7)
If attributes cannot be hold together by themselves, something else must bring them together: i.e., the substratum

6. Substrata and the problem of indiscernibles
Bundle theorist who is realist about universals faces the problem of numerically distinct but indiscernible particulars
Substratum theorist: such particulars differ because each has a different substratum
These are “the constituents of objects that explain their numerical diversity, their being numerically different from other things” (Loux, 103)
Identity and distinctness of substrata is primitive

7. 3. Problems with substrata
Empiricism: “postulate no entities that cannot be the objects of direct or immediate experience” (Loux, 104)
Can we directly experience substrata?
Substratum theorist: yes – we can perceive distinct entities, even if qualitatively similar:
“When presented together, they are presented as numerically different” (Allaire 1963, 6) – therefore, we perceive something other than attributes, i.e., substrata
Bundle theorist: no – how can we perceive entities which have no attributes?

8. Are substrata contradictory?
Substrata are bare, “but to be bare is to possess no attribute” (Loux, 105)
So how can they be the bearers of attributes?
Substratum theorist: substratum bare in sense of having no attributes in itself, i.e., no attributes help determine its identity
But is this idea coherent? Surely substrata have some essential features, e.g., being bearers of attributes, not being attributes, etc.

9. 4. Substance theory
Bundle theory and substratum theory each assume concrete particulars are complexes of more fundamental entities
Substance theory: “concrete particulars themselves, or at least some among them” are “basic or irreducibly fundamental entities” (Loux, 108)
Not composed from other entities: indeed, attributes not intelligible independently of concrete particulars
Particular is itself the subject of its attributes – no need to posit a substratum

10. Properties and kinds
Property: how an entity is (its colour, shape, etc.)
Kind: what an entity is (a dog, tree, etc.)
“Kinds […] are prior to their members; they determine, so to speak, the identity of their members” (Loux, 109)
Individuative universals: provide principles to identify and distinguish particulars (Loux, 113)
Vs properties, which generally do not: Socrates could fail to be courageous, but could not fail to be a human being

11. The kind to which a particular belongs cannot be reduced to its properties: “it is because it belongs to the kind that it possesses these properties and not vice versa” (Loux 110)
Vs substratum theory: the bearer of properties is not itself bare – has a nature in virtue of belonging to its kind
i.e., what Socartes is, is a human – we can grasp his nature independently of grasping his other attributes

12. 5. Why substance theory?
Vs bundle theory: idea of attributes as parts making up a concrete particular is a category error (see Martin, slide 5)
Some particulars have parts – but properties not further parts, and not more fundamental than the particular
Vs substratum theory: the particular is the subject of its attributes, as is commonly thought – no need for further entity
No problem of bare entities – on substance theory, no entity is bare

13. 6. Problems with substance theory
Do non-substantial concrete particulars exist? E.g., Helsinki, this university, this lecture theatre?
Substance theorist: yes, but dependent on and reducible to substances, i.e., nothing but substances arranged in certain ways
So substances are the only fundamental particulars – the only entities which exist in the most important sense

14. Are there complex substances, e. g. , organisms
Are there complex substances, e.g., organisms? Are their parts more fundamental than the substances themselves?
Aristotle: they can have parts, but not reducible to them, and not more fundamental than the organism
Biological parts (e.g., kidneys) not independent of or prior to their organisms
Physical parts (e.g., molecules) are independent, but organisms cannot be explained by or reduced to these alone

15. Next lecture: possible worlds…

16. Works cited
Allaire, E. B. (1963) ‘Bare Particulars’ Philosophical Studies 14 (1-2): 1-8.
Martin, C. B. (1980) ‘Substance Substantiated’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (1): 3-10.