1. Regina Birner and Philip Osano
Community conservancies and payments for wildlife conservation (PWC) as a coping strategy under different conservancy institutional arrangements
Regina Birner and Philip Osano
Enabling Livestock Based Economies in Kenya to Adapt to Climate Change: A Review of PES from Wildlife Tourism as a Climate Change Adaptation Option, ILRI, Nairobi, 15 February 2012

2. Presentation Outline Climate Change and Conservancies
Criteria for case studies
Institutional Arrangements
Climate Change Adaptation: Pastoral Coping and Management Strategies
Conservancy Effects: Synergies and Trade-offs
Concluding Reflections

3. Temperature Change (1970-2025)
Climate Change and Conservancies

4. Precipitation change (1970-2025)
Climate Change and Conservancies

5. Criteria for case studies
Kitengela (WLP)
Mara (OOC and Naboisho)
Ol Kiramatian Group Ranch
Land Tenure
Private
Communal
Payment arrangements
Public funding
Market funding (private investors)
Market funding
Environmental conditions
Governance
Intermediary: NGO (The Wildlife Foundation)
Intermediaries (OOC):
Private company (Ol Purkel Ltd) and Land Committee
Group Ranch Committee
Landuse regulations
Restrictions on sale, subdivision, fencing
Restriction on settlements, grazing
Land zonation (irrigated crops, wildlife and grazing)
Criteria for case studies

6. 2. Criteria for case studies
Olare Orok &
Naboisho
Ol Kiramatian
Kitengela

7. Introduction Payment for Environmental Services (PES)
Paying farmers or livestock for services such as conserving biological diversity or reducing soil erosion
Increasingly important strategy to reach environmental and development goals
Market-based instrument that offers “win-win” solutions
Challenges of PES schemes
Transaction costs involved in reaching large number of smallholder farmers or livestock keepers
Need for smallholders to organize
Collective action problems and “elite capture”
Bargaining power of smallholders
Organization (collective bargaining)
What is a “fair price” for environmental services?
3. Institutional arrangements

8. Research Tool: “Net-Map” (Influence-Network-Mapping)
Participatory mapping method
Invented by E. Schiffer, further developed by IFPRI Governance Team
Goal is to visualize
Actors
Relations / networks between actors
Influence of different actors on specified outcomes – power relations between actors
Governance challenges
Qualitative and quantitative analyses possible
Social network analysis
Tool can also be used to facilitate participatory processes

9. Using Net-Map in different contexts

10. Step 1: Identifying actors and their linkages
Actors, as identified by respondents, are marked with “sticky” notes on a large sheet of paper
Linkages are drawn on the paper
Types of linkages
Membership
Contracts
Licenses
Flow of funds

11. Step 2: Identifying the influence level of different actors
Checkers‘ game pieces are used to visualize influence level of actors (three-dimensional map)
Influence perceived by respondent
Influence on specified outcome:
Well-managed conservances that meet both environmental andcommunity goals

12. Step 3: Using the map to discuss governance issues
What is the source of influence of different actors?
How can disadvantaged actors be empowered?
What governance challenges, such as elite capture
and leakages may
occur?
How can they be
addressed?

13. Funds Contracts Licenses
Insurance companies
Tourists
Funds Contracts Licenses
Membership
Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife
Tour operators (5)
NEMA
Naibosho Tourism Partners Company
Other offices issuing licenses (~10)
Base Camp Foundation
Local administration incl. police
Narok County Council
Manco Naboisho
Conservation Ltd.
Seyia Ltd.
Maasai Mara Reservie
Donors
Auditor
Naboisho Landholding Company
Private banks
Kenya
Wildlife
Service
Enkutotos (customary)
Executive Board (5)
Community projects
Board of members (23)
Project benefits
Fines
Lands Office
Land owners (518)
Outside
Landowners

14. Insurance companies
Tourists
Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife
“Balance of power”
Tour operators (5)
NEMA 4
Naibosho Tourism Partners Company 4
Other offices issuing licenses (~10)
Base Camp Foundation
Local administration incl. police 6
Narok County Council
Manco Naibosho
Conservation Ltd.
Seyia Ltd.
Maasai Mara Reservie 2 1
Donors
Auditor
Naibosho Landholding Company
Private banks
Kenya
Wildlife
Service
Enkutotos (customary)
Executive Board (5)
Community projects 5
Board of members (23) x
Perceived influence on outcome (Scale 0-6)
Lands Office
Land owners (518)
Outside
Landowners

15. Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife Northern Rangelands Trust
Insurance companies
Tourists
Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife
Northern Rangelands Trust
Tour operators (5)
NEMA
Tusk
Trust
Other offices issuing licenses (~10)
Narok County Council
Orpunkel Ltd. (5 directors)
O.C.C. Trust
Donors
Board of Trustees
Maasai Mara Reservie
Kenya
Wildlife
Service
Private banks
Guiding School
Motorogi Conservancy Ltd.
O.C.C. Ltd.
Research
Community projects
Motorogi land owners (119)
O.C.C. Land owners (157)
Lands Office
Outside
Landowners

16. 6 4 6 2 1 Perceived influence on outcome (Scale 0-6) x
Insurance companies
Tourists
Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife
Northern Rangelands Trust
Tour operators (5) 2
NEMA
Other offices issuing licenses (~10)
Tusk
Trust 6 1 4
Narok County Council
Orpunkel Ltd. (5 directors)
O.C.C. Trust
Donors
Board of Trustees
Maasai Mara Reservie
Kenya
Wildlife
Service
Private banks 6
Guiding School
Motorogi Conservancy Ltd.
O.C.C. Ltd.
Research
Community projects x
Perceived influence on outcome (Scale 0-6)
Motorogi land owners (119)
O.C.C. Land owners (157)
Lands Office
Outside
Landowners

17. Why is a “balance of power” possible?
... in spite of unequal basic conditions of tourism operators and pastoralists
In terms of capital, formal education, etc.
Secure land rights of the pastoralists
They are the formal owners of the land.
Tourism operations not possible without their consent
Collective bargaining
Organization of the land owners in a landholding company
Makes it possible for them to speak with one voice (in spite of considerable heterogeneity)
In case of Naibosho: Joint company by land owners and tourism operators
Outsourcing of management tasks to private operator (who is in charge of “unpopular measures”, e.g., demanding fines)

18. Questions for discussion
How important is the role of private foundations / indvidiuals to make these arrangements work?
How sustainable are the arrangements in the absence of committed indvidiuals?
How dependent is the system on funds from donations vis-a-vis the income generated from tourism?
What is the relation between profits and donations?
What share do the land owners get?
What share do the community members without land in the community conservancy get?
How is the risk distributed – ultimately?
Is there a need to improve transparency?

19. Questions for discussion
Is the institutional design too complex?
What are the transaction costs involved?
Is there a trade-off between complexity and balance of power?
Are there gains from moving to larger units? For examples, having one Trust Fund for an entire region?
Does the state play an adequate facilitating role?
Analysis suggests that role of the state is mainly regulatory – issuing licenses.
Could the licenses system be streamlined (one-stop-shop)?
Will the government start to tax the new income streams generated? (e.g., payments to farmers)?
What is the danger of “state capture”?

20. Questions for discussion
Are there missing links?
Is there a need to have strongter links with the management of the Maasai Mara Reserve?
Should community conservancies play a role in addressing the management challenges of the Reserve?
How strong are the links to the institutions providing support services to livestock keepers (e.g., veterinary services, livestock extension services?)
What is the role of customary authorities? What role can they play in addressing current and future challenges, e.g., of organizing inclusive collective action?

21. Questions for discussion
How inclusive are the institutional arrangements?
Strong voice for land owners,
but low share of female land owners (approx. 5 %).
Idea to make both spouses members of the respective institutions?
Question of how funds are distributed within the households, if women lose income, say from milk.
How about non-land owners?
They benefit from community projects.
But how strong is their voice in the selection and management of the projects
Idea to have them represented in the Trust Funds?
To what extent are the community projects in any case tasks that the government needs to support? (e.g., schools, drinking water).

22. Key features of the institutional design
How do the institutional arrangements influence opportunities to use PES for climate adaptation?
Key features of the institutional design
Livestock owners have individual property rights to plots of land.
Community conservancies are the outcome of voluntary collective bargaining.
Key question: How does climate change affect
...the economic opportunities of pastoralists and tourism operators (in absolute terms, and relative to each other)?
... the bargaining power of the parties concerned?
What role do other factors play (such as globally increasing land values)?
Does climate change affect the parties differently?
Might create incentives to withdraw if alternative uses of land become more profitable under climate change

23. Strategies to make PES in conservancies “climate-smart”
Including adaptation to climate change in community projects (Task of the Trust Funds)
Would require stronger link to agricultural/livestock research and extension (current focus is on social projects).
Some examples, however, already exist: Fodder bank
Explore the possibilities to raise additional funds from climate mitigation financing opportunities.
Adjusting income streams to buffer variation in other income sources
Should this be left to the land owners - using the existing banking and insurance system?
Should it be part of the contracts – considering that the tourism operators already have access to the banking and insurance system?

24. Climate Change Adaptation
1) Mobility (negotiations)
2) Species composition
3) Stocking levels
4) Livestock market participation
5) Breeding/feeding
Herd related
6) Investments in water infrastructure
7) Social networks
8) Insurance
9) Buying/selling/leasing land
10) Diversification
Salaries
Remittances
PES
Crops
11) Savings and other assets
Human capital
Collateral for loans
Political capital
13) Exiting pastoralism
4. Coping and risk management strategy

25. 5. Conservancy Effects: Synergies and Trade-offs
Social
Cultural heritage
social cohesion and conflicts
Empowerment
Community projects
Gender
Inter-generational
Income
Amount
Stability
Security
Predictability
Distribution
Access to financial institutions
Market creation/access
Land management
Land sales
Restrictions
Grazing
Settlements
Firewood collection
Water
Fencing
Crops
Mining
Access
Burning
5. Conservancy Effects: Synergies and Trade-offs
Ecosystem Services
Wildlife
Tourism
Biomass supply
Carbon storage

26. Synergy: Fencing and mobility
5. Conservancy Effects: Synergies and Trade-offs

27. Synergy: storage and market creation
5. Conservancy Effects: Synergies and Trade-offs

28. Trade-off: cropping and diversification
5. Conservancy Effects: Synergies and Trade-offs

29. 6. Concluding reflections
Public (State)
Private (Market)
Civic (civil society)
Types of institutions
Government agencies (local, national and global levels)
Service organisations
Private business
Membership organisations
Co-operatives
NGO’s
PES “Users” /Buyers
The Global Environmental Facility/World Bank
Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS)
The Nature Conservancy (TNC)
Public
PES Intermediary
The Wildlife Foundation (TWF)
Civil society
6. Concluding reflections
Households (participants, non-participants and ex-participants)
Individual land owners