1. METAETHICS

2. How Metaethics differs from Normative Ethics

3. ‘Norma’ = carpenter’s square
Normative Ethics = measuring, balancing, reasoning as to moral actions which are good, bad, right, wrong.
Natural Law, Kantian Ethics, Utilitarianism, Christian Ethics are all normative approaches.

4. ‘Meta’ = above or beyond
Meta-ethics = going above and beyond normative ethics to confront the basic question of definition
What do the words good, bad, right, wrong mean & how do they function?

6. Meta-ethics dominated Anglophone Analytical philosophy in the 20th Century.
The focus was upon analysing – breaking down – arguments, sentences and words.
Largely an investigation of language and concepts.

7. 4 Metaethical Theories

8. Rejected by the following 3:
F.H. BRADLEY
( )
NATURALISM
Rejected by the following 3:
G.E. MOORE
( )
INTUITIONISM
A.J. AYER
( )
EMOTIVISM
R.M. HARE
( )
PRESCRIPTIVISM

9. Starting Point! Cognitive/Non-cognitive Distinction
Cognitive = Words such as good, bad, right, wrong can be meaningful & descriptive.
They can be true or false.
Non-cognitive Words such as good, bad, right, wrong are meaningless & are not descriptive.
Thus they cannot be true or false

10. Cognitivists would argue that bad is meaningful & that this is a true statement.
Non-cognitivists would argue that bad is meaningless & that this is not a statement like other statements. It cannot be either true or false.

11. (1) Ethical Naturalism F. H. Bradley 1846-1924

13. Bradley taught at Oxford
Regarded as a radical because he rejected the British school of Locke, Hume, Bentham.
Focussed instead on continental philosophy
His Ethical Studies of 1876 became a standard work.

14. Through his lectures and books, Bradley introduced a British audience to the philosophy of Hegel ( ).
Hegelian ideas dominated much of continental European intellectual study in the 19th Century.

15. Hegelian concepts are often complex, obscure and quasi-poetical.
Bradley adopted & adapted many of these in what Warnock calls a “fantastically abstract” manner.

16. Hegel wrote –about: the Spirit of the Age, the Zeitgeist, the Divine Idea existing on earth in the State, and moral life reflecting that spirit.

17. Hegel builds up a philosophical vision based on a priori concepts and ideas which he asserts with absolute confidence.

18. Bradley in turn translated, adopted & adapted these concepts
In some ways, his approach was based on observing the world and drawing moral conclusions.
So he had no hesitation from his observation in asserting that finding one’s station and duties in life is the highest good.

19. For Bradley the Universal Good Will was unquestioned.
Each individual became one with the Good Will by accepting his station and its duties.
What was good, bad, right and wrong was clearly identifiable.

20. Bradley’s universalistic approach to philosophy encompassed everything and his moral system led to the individual achieving oneness with God.

21. Warnock described Bradley’s influence as great.
His metaphysical ethical naturalism “dominated the beginning of the 20th century”.

22. Reflect!

23. Strengths of naturalism
It provides clarity re. Good, bad, right, wrong
Supports a universalistic & absolutist approach
Through observation & analysis of the evidence people conclude what would be good, bad, right, wrong for society e.g. genetic engineering

24. MacIntyre points out that terms such as good, bad, right, wrong fit in with the general telos-based approach to morality.
They are therefore meaningful e.g.
He is a bad doctor = he does not achieve his telos of healing & helping.

25. Weakness of naturalism
Rests on unsupported foundation of a priori beliefs
Ethical statements do not have the same quality as non-ethical statements e.g It is raining AND Euthanasia is wrong.

26. HUME’S GUILLOTINE
(aka Hume’s Law)
Hume wrote about the illogical “copulations of propositions” used in ethical statements i.e. starting with an “is” (matter of fact, of nature) & leaping to an “ought” (matter of morals).

27. HUME’S GUILLOTINE
This “is/ought gap” is one metaethics avoided at all costs.
However it is often at the heart of moral statements e.g. Natural Law:
Sexual activity is the means by which humans reproduce.
People ought to engage in sexual activity only for this purpose.

28. But is Hume right?
What about a £5 note – it is a £5 note and it therefore ought to provide £5 worth of goods?
What about this statement?
In order for A to achieve B he ought do do C.

29. (2) Intuitionism G. E. Moore 1873-1958

31. Moore taught at Cambridge and was a member of the Bloomsbury Group – which included J.M. Keynes, Virginia Woolf, E.M. Forster, Lytton Strachey.
As a student Moore had come under influence of Bradley’s theories but these he rejected.

32. Moore rejected ethical naturalism because it offered “no reason at all” for its principles
Recall the same approach from Bentham to theories he dismissed as “ipsedixitism”.

33. Moore’s rejection of naturalism and his very different approach can be found in: Principa Ethica.
Warnock said there is “no comparable book on ethics in the 20th century”.
We find a significant clue to what Moore attempts to do on the first page.

34. Moore brought what Warnock calls “a sharp & clarifying wind” to the complex ethical naturalism of Bradley.
What he did was in one sense not new – it was a return to basics.

35. “GOOD IS GOOD AND THAT IS THE END OF THE MATTER.
GOOD CANNOT BE DEFINED, AND THAT IS ALL I HAVE TO SAY ABOUT IT.”
Moore declares the “most fundamental question in all Ethics” to be “how good is to be defined”
He then gives what he admits is “a very disappointing answer”

36. Quadruped
15 hands tall
Ungulate mammal
According to Moore some words present complex ideas which can be analysed (broken-down) e.g. horse
8 years old
Genus:
Equus

37. But some words present simple ideas which cannot be analysed (broken-down) at all e.g. yellow
E.g. Can you define yellow to someone who has been blind since birth?

38. Yellow = Yellow X = X Good = Good
Moore concludes that ‘good’ is “a simple and indefinable quality”
‘Good’ is a self-evident truth and like a mathematical equation can have no further proof or definition

39. Open Question Argument i.e. But is it necessarily good?
Good is pleasure.
But is it necessarily good?
No because many bad things produce pleasure.
Moore identifies the Naturalistic Fallacy in the work of other philosophers
(1) They attempt to define ‘Good’ but this is not possible. All attempts are subject to the
Open Question Argument i.e.
But is it necessarily good?

40. “Good is productive of life”
(2) In attempting to define ‘good’ they have resorted to mixing “non-natural” and “natural” terms together e.g.
“Good is productive of life”
Good = a non-natural term
Productive of life = natural terms
Moore argues that whilst it might seem coherent it is mixing 2 types of terms.
He argues that it is just like saying:
“Pleasure (non-natural terms) means the sensation of red (natural term)

41. Don’t worry if you are confused by this – after all one problem is that Moore did not explicitly define the Naturalistic Fallacy. In fact he did not even state what he meant by natural.
Remember Bradley making the naturalist assertion that the good is for the person to realize his station and its duties?
Why would Moore have rejected this?

42. Moore states that even though we cannot define ‘good’, the term ‘good’ still has meaning. We know what it means.
When we talk about things that “ought to exist” or which have “intrinsic worth” the “notion” of ‘good’ is in our mind.
We can know what makes up the good & even what are the greatest goods.

43. The conclusion Moore would have us make is that we know through…
Hopefully you are asking yourselves: “But how can we know what ‘good’ is if we cannot define it?”
The conclusion Moore would have us make is that we know through…

44. Moore’s argument is not complete
Moore’s argument is not complete. He refuses to speculate on how people intuit what is ‘good’ but insists that even though we cannot define what ‘good’ is, we know what ‘good’ is.
Two other philosophers developed Moore’s theory.

45. H.A. Prichard. He used a mathematical analogy: 7 x 4 = 28.
This is Positive Knowledge.
If you doubt it check that 7 is 7 and 4 is 4 then you know 7 x 4 = 28.
You do not need to reflect or rationalise.
It is Positive Knowledge.
Prichard argued that Moral Thinking is Positive Knowledge. To know what is good, bad, right, wrong you do not need to reflect or rationalise. He argued that “Moral thinking arises in our unreflective consciousness.” In other words we do the right thing intuitively.

46. (1) The car plunged into the canal (2) The two men jumped in to help
(3) They rescued the driver
They did not need to reflect or rationalise they did the good & right thing intuitively.
7 x 4 = 28.

47. 7 self-evident prima facie duties
W. D. Ross
He wrote about “common sense main moral convictions”.
He proposed
7 self-evident prima facie duties
by which we intuitively know what we ought to do or not to do.
Such duties are “self-evident just as a mathematical axiom”. They are “part of the fundamental nature of the universe”.
Among the 7 self-evident prima facie duties is FIDELITY (keeping promises)

48. Fidelity – keeping promises – is a main moral conviction which I know through intuition.
The “main moral conviction” of Fidelity is as self-evident as “axioms of geometry”.
My friend and I have promised each other to turn up at the restaurant at 12. Unless something exceptional happens, we will of course be there. Why?
Fidelity cannot be ‘proved’ and it has “no need of proof” – it is self-evident

49. Reflect!

50. Strengths of intutionism
Moore preserves the common sense approach in that people do “just know” without facts, and can intuit good, bad, right, wrong.
This “just knowing” fits in with Prichard’s positive knowledge provided by our intuitions.

51. Weakness of intuitionism
Where does this intuition come from? Some kind of 3rd eye? Moore avoids the question.
As Warnock points out, “It must be a very strange phenomenon”.
Prichard is wrong: 7 x 4 = 28 cannot compare with “x is good”.

52. (3) EMOTIVISM A. J. Ayer

54. Ayer taught at UCL and Oxford.
As a student he was heavily influenced by the views of the Vienna Circle.
This group of scientists, philosophers, and mathematicians met during the inter-war years.
One of the founders was Professor of Philosophy in Vienna hence the name.

55. The Key theory of the Vienna Circle was Logical Positivism.
Essentially this was concerned with epistemology – how we know the truth of what we know.
The Vienna Circle took a radical empiricist approach.
The key tool was in the Verification Principle.

56. It can only be verified if it is
The Verification Principle argues that a statement only has meaning if it can be verified.
It can only be verified if it is
ANALYTIC e.g. “All old men are men”. Here the predicate is part of the subject. Mathematical calculations are also analytic
SYNTHETIC e.g. “Peter is a pilot”. The predicate is not part of the subject by can be verified through reference to empirical data.

57. Thus farewell to a priori synthetic assumptions such as Kant’s “The moral law is within me”.
Religious and ethical statements cannot be verified and are therefore MEANINGLESS.

58. BUT there’s nothing new here…
Remember Hume’s fact-value distinction whereby you cannot see the “vice” of murder in the empirical evidence.
Hume argued that the “vice” of murder is a “perception of the mind”.

59. Hume’s scepticism was thorough.
What would he say about a Divinity Pamphlet?
“Does it contain abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matters of fact and experience? No. Commit it to the flames – it contains nothing but sophistry & illusion.”

60. Written aged 25, Ayer’s key book published in 1936 introduced a wider audience to the scepticism of the Vienna Circle combined with the insights of Hume.
Ayer wrote “I claim to have explained the nature of truth.”

61. Ayer refers to ethical terms such as good, bad, right, wrong as symbols.
x is wrong has no empirical status. The symbol wrong cannot be verified.
Intuitionism is rejected. If I say x is wrong and you say x is right there is no empirical test which can be applied for verification.

62. Ayer concludes that “Ethical statements are unverifiable” and are “mere pseudo-concepts”.
What is the function of the ethical word?
It is “purely emotive”.
Terms such as good, bad, right, wrong are like “a cry of pain or a word of command” – they are unverifiable.

63. Ayer’s example: “Stealing money is wrong” is not a sentence with factual meaning.
“Stealing money is wrong” = “Stealing money!!”
There is nothing factual here just “moral sentiments”.

64. Emotivism is also known as…
The ‘Boo-Hurrah theory’.
My saying “bad, wrong” and equivalent words is simply saying “BOO”
My saying “good, right” and equivalent words is simply saying “HURRAH”.

65. Emotivism as argued by Ayer has radical implications as Warnock recognises:
“The verification principle entailed the total dismissal of metaphysics and with metaphysics had to go the propositions of religion. Even ethical propositions were said to be literally meaningless.”
One other philosopher developed Emotivism.

66. C.L. Stevenson
He developed a point made by Ayer that ethical terms “arouse feeling and stimulate action”. They are subjective and unverifiable but have a background in the speaker’s mind which needs to be given due weight.
Stevenson proposed that ethical terms have:
An expressive content i.e. to say x is good means more than x – hoorah. It means the speaker approves of x as a basic belief.
A dynamic and magnetic content i.e. to say x is good means that the speaker approves of x and wants the hearer to respond in the same way.

67. Reflect!

68. Strengths of emotivism
Ayer was surely right in returning to basics and thus clarity & coherence.
In terms of ethical symbols, as Wittgenstein stated: Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must remain silent.
The simplicity of Ayer’s theory is convincing & reflects the truths of relativism and subjectivism

69. Strength of emotivism
Ethical symbols such as good, bad, right, wrong are very often best understood as emotive terms and no more than that.
As Stevenson wrote they can have “a magnetic & dynamic” quality but they are still non-cognitive and essentially emotive

70. Weaknesses of emotivism
Whilst ethical symbols have an emotive content, they also have reason & logic behind them. “I like coffee” does not = “Euthanasia is right”.
The reductionism behind Ayer’s emotivism means that most discourse becomes meaningless & simply a case of who can be loudest with their boo or hurrah.

71. Needless to say the Verification principle cannot be verified
Needless to say the Verification principle cannot be verified. So that means that this whole approach cannot have a truth claim!
MacIntyre said that it was a misconceived theory of ethics. This doctrine has obscured modern life which is characterised by social emotivism in which all judgements are expression of opinion.

72. (4) PRESCRIPTIVISM R. M. Hare 1919-2002

74. By now you can see how far removed metaethics has become from anything you might understand as ethics. The concern is increasingly linguistic with a narrow focus on grammar, propositions and the way in which words are used.
Hare, based in Oxford, might be considered one of the last of the 20th century philosophers engaged in metaethics.

75. In a number of books and essays
In a number of books and essays. Hare presented his theory which has been named Prescriptivism.
In one sense this theory is simply a further refinement of Emotivism.
We have already noted Ayer’s comment that ethical terms “arouse feeling and stimulate action”.

76. Hare develops this point to maintain that ethical terms can have meaning whilst at the same time he maintains a non-cognitivist stance.
An indication of what he is attempting to do is provided by his father & son analogy which he applies to morality.

77. The father’s morality is cognitive and based on “fixed principles that are handed down”.
Such principles might be found in accepted morality or in the conscience.
The father’s advice to the son is to follow these principles or to find his own principles by following his intuitions.

78. The son’s response is that all such principles and intuitions can only be “the legacy of tradition” – of culture and upbringing.
The son declares: “I have in the end to decide for myself what I ought to do. To deny this is to be a conventionalist.”

79. Hare argues that to make moral language meaningful today, a person has to reconcile these two positions –to be able to decide what we ought to do by reference to “principles which we have by our own decision accepted and made our own.”

80. If you are not confused yet you soon will be….
Hare’s argument is almost entirely linguistic and is complex. Basically it can be presented in 3 stages.
If you are not confused yet you soon will be….

81. Prescriptivism Step 1

82. Here are 2 sentences: The book is open. Close the book. Sentence 1
This is an indicative sentence & such sentences state facts & can be true or false. To accept it is to have a belief.

83. Sentence 2
Close the book
This is an imperative sentence & such sentences do not state facts & can be neither true nor false. To accept it is not to have a belief but to respond with a decision.
Hare also argues that implicit in any imperative is the word ought. Thus…
Close the book implies
(You ought to) close the book.

84. Hare develops a complex argument which leads to two conclusions.
In ethical discourse, the word ought has within in itself an internal logic of universalization. What ought to be done, should be done in all situations.
What ought to be done contains within itself the Golden Rule – do to others what one would want done to oneself.

85. Prescriptivism Step 2

86. Returning to ethical terms, Hare argues that whilst terms such as good, bad, right, wrong are non-cognitive they do have an evaluative element.
This evaluative element is in the mind of the speaker.
Hare rejects Ayer’s assertion that such terms are simply emotive.

87. Prescriptivism Step 3

88. Evaluative terms do what Ayer said i.e. “stimulate action”.
Thus in saying:
x is good
I am also saying:
Do x.
And in saying:
X is bad
Don’t do x.

89. So...
What we do is to infer the IMPERATIVE from the EVALUATIVE.
Got it?
We infer the IMPERATIVE:
Do x.
From the EVALUATIVE:
x is good.

90. So putting it together:
Telling the truth is good. (evaluative)
Tell the truth. (imperative)
You ought to tell the truth. (ought is implicit in the imperative)
I tell the truth to others as I want them to tell the truth to me. (golden rule implicit in ought)
Always and everywhere tell the truth. (universal application)

91. Back to father/son.
Hare argues that an individual has to establish their own prescriptive principles by which to live.
Such principles can be found using the handed down sound basis of all ethics – rational moral judgment.

92. Hare argues that the individual should not be a conventionalist.
The individual has to establish their own prescriptive principles by which to live NOT just adopt those of previous generations.
Using “sensitivity & imagination” ethical principles can be freely chosen whereby what is good, and right can be adopted.

93. Hare’s is the last of the distinctive approaches to metaethics.
He rejects the reductionist approach of Ayer and brings back rational moral judgment to ethical discourse.

94. Reflect!

95. Strengths of prescriptivism
Hare’s approach builds on rationality but moves further in adding the need for “sensitivity & imagination”.
He returns ethics from linguistic analysis back to ethical action.
The concepts of univerzalisation & the Golden Rule give ethical decisions meaning & coherence

96. Weaknesses of prescriptivism
Prescriptivism remains non-cognitive so a person does not know what is good, bad, right, wrong.
The argument is a complex form of Kantian ethics which relies on the concept of univerzalisation and the Golden Rule neither of which can be fully substantiated.

97. It places too much reliance on the “sensitivity & imagination” of the individual to make a rational moral judgment.
Writing in 1963, Hare raises the problem of white supremacists in South Africa being able to adopt a prescriptive approach.

98. Conclusion

99. Metaethics is increasingly discredited as an ethical theory.
The re-emergence of Virtue Ethics is largely a reaction against metaethics.
The extremes of emotivism clearly suggested that ethical language is meaningless.
More recently things appear to have come full circle with a return to naturalism.

100. “The grounding of a moral argument is ultimately in facts about human life.”
Philippa Foot
Natural Goodness
2001