1. Cybersecurity Case Study Maroochy water breach

2. Maroochy Shire
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3. Maroochy shire sewage system
SCADA controlled system with 142 pumping stations over 1157 sq km installed in 1999
In 2000, the area sewage system had 47 unexpected faults causing extensive sewage spillage

4. SCADA setup Typical SCADA-controlled sewage system
This is not the system that was attacked

5. SCADA sewage control
Special-purpose control computer at each station to control valves and alarms
Each system communicates with and is controlled by central control centre
Communications between pumping stations and control centre by radio, rather than wired network

6. What happened
More than 1m litres of untreated sewage released into waterways and local parks

7. Technical problems
Sewage pumps not operating when they should have been
Alarms failed to report problems to control centre
Communication difficulties between the control centre and pumping stations

8. Insider attack
Vitek Boden worked for Hunter Watertech (system suppliers) with responsibility for the Maroochy system installation.
He left in 1999 after disagreements with the company.
He tried to get a job with local Council but was refused.

9. Revenge!
Boden was angry and decided to take revenge on both his previous employer and the Council by launching attacks on the SCADA control systems
He hoped that Hunter Watertech would be blamed for the failure
Insiders don’t have to work inside an organisation!

10. What happened?
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11. How it happened
Boden stole a SCADA configuration program from his employers when he left and installed it on his own laptop
He also stole radio equipment and a control computer that could be used to impersonate a genuine machine at a pumping station
Insecure radio links were used to communicate with pumping stations and change their configurations

12. Incident timeline
Initially, the incidents were thought to have been caused by bugs in a newly installed system
However, analysis of communications suggested that the problems were being caused by deliberate interventions
Problems were always caused by a specific station id

13. Actions taken
System was configured so that that id was not used so messages from there had to be malicious
Boden as a disgruntled insider fell under suspicion and put under surveillance
Boden’s car was stopped after an incident and stolen hardware and radio system discovered

14. Causes of the problems Installed SCADA system was completely insecure
No security requirements in contract with customer
Procedures at Hunter Watertech were inadequate to stop Boden stealing hardware and software
Insecure radio links were used for communications

15. Causes of the problems
Lack of monitoring and logging made detection more difficult
No staff training to recognise cyber attacks
No incident response plan in place at Maroochy Council

16. Aftermath On October 31, 2001 Vitek Boden was convicted of:
26 counts of willfully using a computer to cause damage
1 count of causing serious environment harm
Jailed for 2 years

17. Finding out more