1. Ontologia
Lezioni 19-20

2. Lezione 19
22 marzo 16

3. Lezioni future Non ci sarà lezione il 6 aprile (esami di laurea)
Assumendo che non salteremo altre lezioni, finiremo martedì 26 aprile.
Domanda: contate di venire il 30 Marzo? (subito dopo vacanze di Pasqua)

4. Distinzione tra insiemi e somme mereologiche
Per es., per le somme mereologiche valgono questi 2 principi (v. Varzi sulla SEP)
(1) Everything is part of itself.
(2) Any part of any part of a thing is itself part of that thing.
Che invece non valgono per gli insiemi, assumendo ‘parte di’ = membro di’
Se invece assumiamo ‘parte di’ = ‘incluso in’ (1) e (2) valgono per gli insiemi
Domanda, ho detto che la relazione tra x e y in x+y è la coesistenza. E’ corretto?

5. What unifies facts?
Perhaps there is no answer that can be offered, no explanation that can be given. This is the BRUTE FACT APPROACH (Blanshard?, Grossmann?, Van Inwagen).
Alternatively, there is, we may say (following Vallicella), a "unifier" U of a state of affairs Fx.
But what could this could possibly be?

6. Against BFA
The difference principle creates a problem once we admit complexes with the same constituents as facts (Vallicella).
For ex., {x, F}, x+F, [Fx], *Fx*
To explain why they differ, we cannot appeal to a difference in constituents
Thus, to explain, we land on the unity problem, which is what BFA prohibits.

7. An objection
Could not we deny that there ever are TWO complexes with the same constituents? (see my States of Affairs and Bradley’s Regress: Armstrong versus Fact Infinitism, unpublished ms. (2004)).
Perhaps it is possible to go along this road for a while.

8. An objection (cont.)
For ex., Following Russell's no class theory of classes , one could argue there are no sets and thus there isn't a set {F, x}
And following restricted forms of mereology, one could argue there is no mereleological sum F+a. Thus the problem of explaining the difference between *Fx*, {F, x} e F+x disappears.
But ...

9. Propositions, facts and relational order
[Romeo loves Juliet] vs. * Romeo loves Juliet*.
[Romeo loves Juliet] vs. [Juliet loves Romeo]
*Romeo loves Juliet * vs * Juliet loves Romeo*
Difference but same constituents?
Either we sacrifice the difference principle or we must make sure that in all these cases (and any others) we find a way to argue that there is a difference in constituents

10. In search of the unifier U
If BFA fails, what unifies a state of a affairs?
What makes its components a unity?
Following Vallicella, we can have a tripartite subdivisions of the options
(a) U is internal to the fact
(b) U is the fact itself
(c) U is external to the fact

11. Lez. 20
22/3/16

12. Ipotesi
Invece della lezione del mercoledì facciamo 2 ore di seguito il mercoledì?
Niente lezione quindi il mercoledì dopo Pasqua?

13. In search of the unifier U
If BFA fails, what unifies a state of a affairs?
What makes its components a unity?
Following Vallicella, we can have a tripartite subdivisions of the options
(a) U is internal to the fact
(b) U is the fact itself
(c) U is external to the fact

14. U is internal to the fact
(a) U is a constituent of Fx:
(a1) U is a "tying " constituent, E1, in addition to the "canonical" constituents F and x.
But if this constituent is needed, don't we need a further tie E2 that ties E1, F ed x ?
INTERNAL Bradley regress
Fx = E1 Fx = E2E1 Fx = …

15. Problems with the internalist regress
Fx = E1 Fx = E2E1 Fx = …
No number can be the number of constituents of Fx
No constituent is the attributive constituent of Fx

16. U is internal to the fact (cont.)
(a2) F itself as unsaturated: F really is F_ (Frege)
But how is it that F, though unsaturated, could exist without “attracting” x in its “hole” (in a world in which F and x are «separated»)?
And what is the difference between F_+x and Fx (Vallicella)?
(a3) The tie E1 is a “non-relational tie” (Strawson, Bergmann).
This seems a contradiction in terms.

17. U is the fact itself
(c) U is Fx itself, which keeps its constituents together in a "non- mereological composition" (Armstrong in WSA).
It seems to me an opaque metaphor, which presupposes that the whole precedes the parts (can the bicycle keep its parts together?)
Or it coincides with the Brute fact Approach: We acknowledge Fx without thinking there is anything to be explained.

18. U is external to the fact
(b) U is external to Fx:
(b1) U is a transcendental mind or God who thinks of F and x as unified (Vallicella). But isn't this thinking itself a state of affairs?
(b2) U is another fact, E1Fx: EXTERNAL Bradley regress:
Fx by virtue of E1 Fx => E2 E1 Fx => ...