1. Warfighting Functions: Air Defense

2. How does the OPFOR conduct AD?
This slide shows the HOW the threat conducts AD.
Destroying enemy aircraft.
Forcing aircraft to expend their munitions before reaching the optimum or effective range.
Diverting the aircraft before reaching their targets.
Mitigating the effectiveness of the attack.
Forcing the enemy to break off and/or discontinue the air attack.
On the last slide we discussed WHY the threat uses AD, the OBJECTIVE of threat AD. This slide introduces the ways in which the threat can use AD to achieve its objective.
If you wish, you could begin discussing examples of the ways the threat uses AD to achieve its objective.
If you facilitate a discussion on this topic, highlight the fact that air defense is NOT JUST about using an AD system to shoot down a flying object.
Ex. The Camp Bastion Raid – This raid could be considered a form of AD. The objective of the raid was to DESTROY blue air assets.
Ex. INFOWAR – Using spoofing/jamming technology to divert enemy air assets. [Iran targeting US UAV]

3. Key Concepts Every unit is considered an air defense asset.
This slide displays the 3 KEY CONCEPTS of threat air defense.
Source: TC , Chapter 11, Page 11-1
Every unit is considered an air defense asset.
Air defense is an integral part of combined arms combat.
Air defense cannot be regarded as single pieces of equipment or even as units engaged in combat actions but as parts of an Integrated Air Defense System (IADS).
Prevent
Detection (counter- aerial reconnaissance)
Penetration (enemy freedom of movement)
Protect
Support Zone
Units from attack
Destroy (air defense ambushes)
Concept #1: Every unit is an air defense asset
Every unit is immediately responsible for defending itself from aerial observation and air attack by whatever means are available. All units conduct air surveillance whenever aerial threat is imminent.
Concept #2: Air Defense is an integral part of combined arms combat
A maneuver unit commander who disregards the enemy air threat of fails to properly plan for defending against it risks mission failure.
Concept #3: IADS
Air defense weapons, radars, and associated equipment cannot be regarded as single pieces of equipment or even as units engaged in combat actions but as parts of an Integrated Air Defense System (IADS).
Proper integration of these assets as both a system and integral part of mission planning and execution for mission accomplishment is the ideal way the commander can effectively deal with the enemy air threat.
 AD Employment: TC , ¶ 11-79

4. Selected AD-Related Tasks
This slide displays the 3 KEY CONCEPTS of threat air defense.
Source: TC , Chapter 11, Page 11-1
TACTICAL TASK 18.0 ALL-ARMS AIR DEFENSE
Simultaneous employment to achieve an effect that will render greater results than AD systems alone. ALL HT units possess organic air defense capabilities to differing degrees.
TACTICAL TASK 19.0 ANTILANDING ACTIONS
Methods used to prevent landings by airborne or heliborne troops or destroy enemy landing forces on the ground soon after landing.
TACTICAL TASK 3.0 AMBUSH (ANNIHILATION)
A surprise attack from a concealed position, used against moving or temporarily halted targets.
Concept #1: Every unit is an air defense asset
Every unit is immediately responsible for defending itself from aerial observation and air attack by whatever means are available. All units conduct air surveillance whenever aerial threat is imminent.
Concept #2: Air Defense is an integral part of combined arms combat
A maneuver unit commander who disregards the enemy air threat of fails to properly plan for defending against it risks mission failure.
Concept #3: IADS
Air defense weapons, radars, and associated equipment cannot be regarded as single pieces of equipment or even as units engaged in combat actions but as parts of an Integrated Air Defense System (IADS).
Proper integration of these assets as both a system and integral part of mission planning and execution for mission accomplishment is the ideal way the commander can effectively deal with the enemy air threat.
 Tactical tasks: TC 7-101, Appx B

5. Principles SURPRISE FIREPOWER MOBILITY CONTINUITY INITIATIVE
The threat follows several basic principles when conducting air defense: surprise, firepower, mobility, continuity, initiative, coordination, and security. Of these, the element of surprise is the most critical.
On this slide, we review the first THREE. The next slide addresses the remaining FOUR.
Source: TC , Chapter 11, Page 11-2
SURPRISE
FIREPOWER
MOBILITY
CONTINUITY
INITIATIVE
COORDINATION
SECURITY
ISIL militant carrying a MANPADS
ZPU-4 AA Gun Mounted in Chad 2008
SURPRISE:
Achieving surprise is fundamental to any successful air defense battle. At the tactical level, surprise can be achieved through a variety of means, including—
The positioning of air defense systems in unexpected locations.
The use of camouflage, concealment, cover and deception (C3D).
The use of non-air defense systems in conjunction with air defense systems.
FIREPOWER:
The threat force structure includes a wide variety of air defense weapons (missiles and guns). This mix of capabilities gives ground force commanders outstanding firepower for air defense. It is important that air defense planning consider and employ all assets available, across all arms, to achieve maximum firepower. Almost all tactical vehicles and many support vehicles have guns for self-defense against aerial systems. Other weapons, even improvised weapons, can be used against some aircraft.
MOBILITY:
Air defense assets must have mobility comparable to the ground forces for which they provide cover. When planning air defense, the commander must always consider the mobility of air defense weapons and the time required for their deployment. The ground forces, for which air defenses provide cover, are quite mobile and frequently change formation as they deploy. The air enemy is mobile and can attack from many directions or altitudes. Therefore, the commander must use to the maximum the mobility and firepower of his assets, creating optimum groupings and fire plans. Improvements in mobility and fire control now allow more air defense weapons and sensors to operate and engage air targets while moving on difficult terrain. Mobility contributes directly to continuity.
Surprise is a key OPFOR force-mulitplier!
Position AD in unexpected locations
Camouflage, Concealment, Cover, Deception (C3D)
Use of non-AD systems in conjunction with AD systems

6. Phases
The use of three phases are essential to the integration and successful employment of AD at the strategic and operational level.
Phase III is most important for this lesson because it is where the tactical AD mission takes place.
PHASE I: Actions against enemy aircraft and control systems on the ground before they are employed.
PHASE II: Actions against enemy aircraft while in flight.
PHASE III: Actions against enemy aircraft flying in airspace over threat ground maneuver forces.
The three phases are defined by where the enemy aircraft are and what they are doing:
Phase I: Actions against enemy aircraft and control systems on the ground before they are employed. This phase is conducted using primarily strategic- and operational-level assets of the Army and the Air Force.
Phase II: Actions against enemy aircraft while in flight but before they enter the airspace over threat ground maneuver forces. Again, this mission is performed primarily at the strategic and operational levels.
Phase III: Actions against enemy aircraft that have penetrated into the airspace over threat ground maneuver forces. Thus, the “target area” consists of the area where enemy aircraft have penetrated over the threat disruption, battle, and support zones. OSC-level tactical fighters and the short- to medium-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), antiaircraft (AA) guns, and other weapons of the ground maneuver units execute this phase. It is in this phase that ground-based tactical air defense plays its primary role.
PHASE I
PHASE II
PHASE III
Comms
Fuel
Parts
In flight
Over forces
Parking/Departure
Ammo
People

7. AD in the Force Structure
The threat ground force structure includes air defense units. These units are equipped with a variety of systems having the firepower, mobility, and range to fully support fast-moving tank and mechanized forces in dynamic offensive operations.
Divisions
Most maneuver DIVs come with at least 1 AD BDE fully capable of providing AD for the entire DIV
Divisional and Separate BDEs
Divisional maneuver brigades contain organic air defense assets, usually an air defense battalion.
Divisions:
Divisions can be assigned to create task-organized division tactical groups (DTGs). When this occurs, consideration must be given to allocating additional air defense assets to ensure protection of the augmented force. In some situations, the DTG may be allocated assets normally associated with operational-level organizations.
Divisional and Separate Brigades:
Like the division, maneuver brigades may be task-organized as brigade tactical groups (BTGs) and may require additional air defense assets to protect newly allocated units.
Separate brigades may contain a more robust air defense battalion.
However, separate brigades typically contain a more robust capability than divisional brigades, even without augmentation. Thus, air defense augmentation of a separate brigade (task-organized as a BTG) may be the equivalent of an air defense brigade.
Battalions:
The platoon leader of the MANPADS platoon (or the senior air defender) also coordinates with the appropriate staff member, or FAC if present, to deconflict any possible fratricide issues.
Companies:
Most threat tactical vehicles are equipped at least with a 7.62-mm general-purpose machinegun that can engage enemy aircraft in addition to ground targets. All threat units receive training in the employment of massed small arms weapons fire to engage low-flying enemy aircraft. This technique is routinely practiced by troop units and is usually employed under the supervision of the company commander when he has been notified that an enemy aircraft is approaching. For additional information, see All-Arms Air Defense below.
16x SAM Launcher, SA-15b / Tor-M1 / Tor-M1T
18x MANPAD Launcher, SA-18
6x SAM Launcher, Crotale
12x SP AA Gun/Missile System, 2S6M
18x MANPAD Launcher, SA-18
Tor-M1
SA-18
Crotale
2S6M

8. AD in the Force Structure
The threat ground force structure includes air defense units. These units are equipped with a variety of systems having the firepower, mobility, and range to fully support fast-moving tank and mechanized forces in dynamic offensive operations.
Battalions
Maneuver battalions typically have a MANPADS platoon for self-protection. Other AD assets may be allocated.
Companies
The MANPADS platoon at battalion may be retained at battalion level, or the battalion may allocate its squads down to maneuver company level.
Divisions:
Divisions can be assigned to create task-organized division tactical groups (DTGs). When this occurs, consideration must be given to allocating additional air defense assets to ensure protection of the augmented force. In some situations, the DTG may be allocated assets normally associated with operational-level organizations.
Divisional and Separate Brigades:
Like the division, maneuver brigades may be task-organized as brigade tactical groups (BTGs) and may require additional air defense assets to protect newly allocated units.
Separate brigades may contain a more robust air defense battalion.
However, separate brigades typically contain a more robust capability than divisional brigades, even without augmentation. Thus, air defense augmentation of a separate brigade (task-organized as a BTG) may be the equivalent of an air defense brigade.
Battalions:
The platoon leader of the MANPADS platoon (or the senior air defender) also coordinates with the appropriate staff member, or FAC if present, to deconflict any possible fratricide issues.
Companies:
Most threat tactical vehicles are equipped at least with a 7.62-mm general-purpose machinegun that can engage enemy aircraft in addition to ground targets. All threat units receive training in the employment of massed small arms weapons fire to engage low-flying enemy aircraft. This technique is routinely practiced by troop units and is usually employed under the supervision of the company commander when he has been notified that an enemy aircraft is approaching. For additional information, see All-Arms Air Defense below.
6x SP AA Gun/Missile System, 2S6M
6x SAM Launcher, Crotale
18x MANPAD Launcher, SA-18
SA-18
Crotale
2S6M

9. Selected AD Systems Surface to Air Missiles (SAM) AA Guns MANPADS
This slide displays equipment that is considered to be ‘typical’ AD equipment. These are: SAMS, AA Guns, MANPADS, and combination missile/gun systems.
Surface to Air Missiles (SAM)
AA Guns
MANPADS
Combination Missile/Gun Systems
SA-18
The screenshot on the bottom left is a roll-up of equipment available in the AD BN on the previous slide.
Highlight:
The IADS concept – While this graphic is impossible to read [there is a supplemental slide available that is visible], it is listed because it shows that the TFS demonstrates the concept of IADS. The weapon, radar system, and other associated equipment can be found in the list.
FM identifies all personnel and systems present in every unit found in the TFS.
The fact that systems such as the 2S6M are organic to threat AD BNs.
Associated radar and acquisition systems are organic to the unit.
The 2S6M is an example of an AD system typically associated with regular force units. However, it is important to note that irregular forces are more and more gaining access to AD systems typically associated with regular force units. The most example of this was the use of the BUK AD system by Ukrainian separatists in July 2014.
Figure of 2S6M (WEG Tier 1 and 2): SR Gun and Missile System): SP AA Gun Missile System Found in: threat AD BNs
Figure of BUK-M2 (WEG Tier 1 and 2): Mobile tracked SAM): SP Medium-range SAMS, Alleged irregular force use in July 2014
Figure of ZU-23 (WEG Tier 1, 2, and 3): Light Towed AD Gun
Figure of SA-18: Man-portable air defense system (MANPADS)
2S6M
BUK-M2
ZU-23

10. WEG Air Defense Systems

11. WEG Air Defense Radars

12. Types of Russian Air Defense Systems
Russian Designation
NATO Reporting Name
Type of System
Detection Ranges
Operational Range
9K37 Buk M1/M2
SA-17 “Grizzly”
SA-11 “Gadfly”
Self-Propelled, medium-range surface-to-air missile system
Acquisition: 80km
Acquisition (NOE): 10km
Tracking: 32km
Operational Range: 32-45km
Missile Altitude: 22-25km
Pantsir SM
SA-22
“Greyhound”
Self-Propelled (wheeled) Short- to medium- range-surface-to air- missile and autocannon system
Acquisition: 75km
Tracking: 45km
Operational Range: 40km
Missile Altitude: 15km
30mm Auto Cannon
Maximum Range: 4km
2K22M1 Tunguska-M1
2S6M1
SA-19
“Grison”
Self-Propelled (Tracked) Short- to medium- range-surface-to air- missile and autocannon system
Acquisition: 18km
Tracking: 13km
Operational Range: 10km
Missile Altitude: 3.5km
9K38 Igla
SA-24
“Grinch”
Short range man portable air defense system
Radio DF: 20km
Operational Range: 6km
Alt. 3.5km
(NOE) is Nap of the Earth (range is lessened due to masking)
These are a good representative set of tactical AD capabilities.
Operational range for Pantsir is based on 57E6 Missile.

13. Comparative Capabilities of Air Defense Systems25 50 75
100-KM
SA-11 / Buk M1 80 28
SA-17 / Buk M2 80 45
SA-22a / Pantsir-SM 75 45 40 4
2S6M1 18
Ranges of radars and lethal weapons on selected AD systems. 13 10 4
SA-18/24 20 6
Increasing Range of Acquisition Radars from Air Defense Systems
Protects HVT’s (SA-20/21’s & Critical Infrastructure)
Air Defense of Tactical and Operational Ground Forces
Acquire
Track
Missile
Guns
Countermeasures

14. Comparison
SA-11 / Buk M1
SA-17 / Buk M2
SA-22a / Pantsir-SM
2S6M1

15. ATGM Anti-Helo Attack Example

16. Non-traditional AD Equipment
‘Typical’ AD systems are not the only types of weapons systems threat actors use to target enemy air.
The threat, especially irregular forces, routinely use systems not traditionally meant for AD to target enemy air.
Heavy Machine Guns
RPGs
Anti-Helicopter mines
NSV
There are examples of the threat using both heavy machine guns and RPGs to target enemy air.
Ask the students if they can provide any examples of threat groups targeting enemy air with one of these nontraditional systems.
Figure of NSV (WEG Tier 1, 2, and 3): Heavy Machine Gun
Figure of RPG-7: Rocket propelled grenade launcher
RPG-7
Anti-Helicopter Mines

17. Air Defense Non Traditional Threats
Non-traditional threats such as direct energy weapons, aerial mines, and aerial ambushes will engage short range targets using localized C2 means.
Anti-materiel rifles can engage aerial targets from up to 2,000m
Anti-helicopter mines have acoustic sensors that range out to 500m and Doppler radar out to 150m and can be command detonated by RF link the lethal range is 100m to 300m.
Direct energy weapons such as lasers and dazzlers can disable targets through intense heat or by blinding sensors.
Arash
20mm Anti Material Rifle
AHM-200 2
Anti Helicopter Mine
One of the biggest determinates of AD capabilities is the C2 structure. According to a number of sources C2 nodes are designed to support multiple types of AD systems with C2 and targeting data. They can operate in a stand alone mode at the battery and battalion level however they are more effective when integrated with higher echelon C2 nodes that communicate across joint capabilities. Thanks to COTS digital technology as well as an emphasis on space based equities, AD is joint enabled across multiple domains including land, sea, air, and space.
DIY Non- State Actor
Anti Helicopter Mine
Green laser
dazzler
SA-22
SAM System

18. Irregular “Threat” Instructing on AD
IRAQ

19. Integrated Air Defense System (IADS)
IADS is an integral concept of understanding threat AD.
Threat AD is a system of systems and it is important to discuss the weapons, radars, and associated equipment as parts of one whole that creates an umbrella of AD.
System of systems
Provides interlocking umbrella of AD coverage at both range and altitude.
Composed of:
Early warning sensors
Weapon system
C3D countermeasures
Other associated equipment and personnel
Enables the threat to defeat navigation, C2, ISR, and possibly low observables.
Threat AD weapons and surveillance systems at all levels of command are part of an integrated AD system (IADS). This ability provides a continuous, unbroken (usually overlapping) umbrella of AD coverage and presents a significant threat to any potential enemy air activity.
Integrated Air Defense systems (IADS) include complex arrays of early warning sensors and combinations of long-range and close-range surface to air missiles.
Advantage is achieved when advanced systems are able to defeat friendly navigations, C2 and stealth capabilities.
Detect Acquire Engage

20. Notional Integrated Air Defense System (IADS)
IADS is an integral concept of understanding threat AD.
Threat AD is a system of systems and it is important to discuss the weapons, radars, and associated equipment as parts of one whole that creates an umbrella of AD.
System of systems
Provides interlocking umbrella of AD coverage
Composed of:
Air Surveillance Radars
CP’s & SABOC’s
Layered weapon systems
Digital integration of systems
Enables the threat to defeat navigation, C2, and stealth capabilities
SA-22
SAM System
Threat AD weapons and surveillance systems at all levels of command are part of an integrated AD system (IADS). This feature provides a continuous, unbroken (usually overlapping) umbrella of AD coverage and presents a significant threat to any potential enemy air activity.
Integrated Air Defense systems (IADS) include complex arrays of early warning sensors and combinations of long-range and close-range surface to air missiles.
Advantage is achieved when advanced systems are able to defeat friendly navigations, C2 and stealth capabilities.
SA-22
SAM System
SA-22/Mater
SAM System
SA-22
SAM System
SA-22
SAM System
SA-22
SAM System

21. * All operating under long range ADA umbrella.
Impact of IADS
IADS integrates strategic, operational, and tactical assets under unified C2.
Firing systems (without active early warning systems) may not be detected.
Integration of new communications technology provides automated control in order to extend the early warning and engagement range.
Range (km) 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
Altitude (m)
(System characteristics approximate)
ADA that can be at BTG echelon
BCT AO (approximate)
The purpose of this slide is to visually describe the distances and elevation limits of the four named IADS systems. These are the ‘kill zones’ of the systems; however there are other AD weapons that may be activated before these system are engaged. Examples are individual MANPADS on an area security mission, or longer range missiles on point security missions.
Systems included in this list are, 2S6M/Tungusta, SA-22a/Pantsir, SA-11/BUK-M1, SA-17/BUK-M2.
BCT AO
* All operating under long range ADA umbrella.
SA-22
SA-11
SA-17
2S6M
SA-15

22. Russian IADS Radars C3I and Deception
Example implementation of notional motorized brigade
Dynamic integration of kinetic and non-kinetic organic air defense assets to defeat ISR and FIRES. X II
Air Defense BN Command Post
Universal Air Defense C3I System
Early warning at max standoff
SA-22 I I
Electronic deception
SA-11 I I
RES X I I EW II
Jamming (esp. UAS/ISR nets) I EW
SA-15 I
2S6
Air Defense BDE Command Post II
Radar Range for
BUK-M2 < 100km
2S6 I I
SA-15 I
Multi-spectral camo, obscurants
High-fidelity decoys
2S6
Radar Range for 2S6 18KM EW II
This slide shows the AD support systems that enable the anti air threat in depth. Systems include EW, and INFOWAR activities designed to provide early warning and conceal and deceive. Additionally a few choice C2 platforms are illustrative of the level at which current threat IADS are networked for more effective use of AD assets.
Anti Materiel Rifle
Air Defense BTY Command Post
Anti Helicopter Mine.
“Push” warning
II(-)
Anti Helicopter Mine.
Key Points
Early warning assets distributed, dispersed, networked (AD-COP)
System-based target acquisition activated only for final targeting
Jamming, C3D dynamic, adaptive
Tactical early warning dynamic integration
Radar Range for SA-22 30km

23. Sample IADS Tactical DeploymentXX
2S6
2S6 I
2S6 I
Pantsir I
2S6
SA-18/24 II
SA-18/24
2S6
SA-18/24
2S6 I
SA-18/24 II
Buk 1 I
SA-18/24
Buk 2 I II X
SA-18/24 X
SA-18/24
2S6 I
SA-18/24
SA-18/24 II
SA-18/24
2S6 I
SA-18/24
SA-18/24
This slide shows the AD support systems that enable the anti air threat in depth. Systems include EW, and INFOWAR activities designed to provide early warning and conceal and deceive. Additionally a few choice C2 platforms are illustrative of the level at which current threat IADS are networked for more effective use of AD assets. II
SA-18/24
Key Points
Acquisition radars (BTG & higher) cover virtually all battlespace from aircraft liftoff
Launch platform radar activated only for final targeting, if at all
Jamming, electronic and visual C3D
Buk M1*
28 KM
Buk M2*
45 KM
Pantsir*
40 KM
2S6M1
10 KM
SA-18/24
6 KM II N
5KM
*Range beyond depicted area

24. Example implementation of notional motorized division’s AD assets.
Integration of kinetic and non-kinetic- strategic, operational, and IADS to defeat ISR, AIR ATK, and FIRES. XX X X X
AD assets in the TC series are well represented and have the ability to accurately reflect real world capabilities in a training environment. Exercise designers and scenario writers can leverage the OPFOR doctrine as well as the Worldwide Equipment guide to present a contested air picture that challenges joint US capabilities.
* Source Military Periscope. SA-20a specs for context.
12 x 2S6 (x3) 6 km
6 x SA-22 (x2) 20 km
Key Points
Early warning assets distributed, dispersed, networked (AD-COP)
System-based target acquisition activated only for final targeting
Jamming, C3D dynamic, adaptive
2 x SA-11 (x2) 35 km
2 x SA-17 (x2) 40 km
2 x SA-20a* (x1) 190 km

25. Air Defense in Dense Urban Terrain
Don 2N
Radar
Dense Urban Terrain will include governmental, military, economic, and cultural HVTs which the threat will seek to protect.
Over the horizon radar provide early warning data to cue AD systems by type and location.
Long range and short range AD systems are integrated across services to defend population centers against aerial attacks.
Non-traditional threats engage short range targets using asymmetric C2 structures.
SA-21
SAM System
Russia, China and Iran are exchanging and developing technology to address the challenges the US presents them with regard to air superiority. They can operate in a stand alone mode at the battery and battalion level however they are more effective when integrated with higher echelon C2 nodes that communicate across joint capabilities. Thanks to COTS digital technology as well as an emphasis on space based equities, AD is joint enabled across multiple domains including land, sea, air, and space.
Urban areas will enhance their Cover and Concealment, but may limit their ability for rapid repositioning and fields of fire.
SA-22
SAM System
Long range systems will protect from over-watch and short range can maneuver within a Dense Urban set.

26. IADS Challenges to Army Simulation
Advanced IADS presents new challenges to Army pilots.
Previous training and simulation of Target Engagement/Track Radar for short range air defense systems insufficient.
Russian, China and other countries are successfully integrating tactical TER/TTR’s into IADS in order to detect and track threat systems.
Air Surveillance (ASV) and long range acquisition radars extend RED engagement timeline.
Allows cueing down-echelon from ASV radars to long-range and short range air defense systems.
New Russian & Chinese TTP’s and Technologies
ASV radars in IADS pass target cues down to Shooter allowing Shooter to be “silent”.
Use of Passive sensors (EO/IR) and Low Probability of Intercept (MMW & CW) radars make detection of Shooter difficult.
Systems included in this list are, 2S6M/Tunguska, SA-22a/Pantsir, SA-11/BUK-M1, SA-17/BUK-M2.
TERs are Target Engagement radar and TTRs are Target Tracking Radars
Army Needs to Train & Equip to Meet Challenges Presented by IADS.

27. Tactically-Observable Impacts
Networked Systems
Non-Networked Systems
Information passing
Dynamic acquisition and system tasking
Acquisition info “pushed” to subordinate systems
Observable changes
Reduced signature
Forward Early Warning dispersed (or not present)
AD systems (and target acquisition radar) not detectable until activated
EW & deception assets intelligently focused
Acquisition time requirement reduced (“Heli will be at your location in 30 seconds from south”)
Disposition w/LOS not necessarily on likely avenues (“spider holes”)
Shows a comparison and contrast between networked systems and non-networked systems.

28. Employment by Zone
It is important to drive home the notion that threat AD cannot be templated as employment varies based on the factors listed here.
BDEs/BTGs provide point protection of sub-units, will also vertically integrate with Division coverage.
Disruption Zone
Participation in counter-reconnaissance
Provide coverage to forces (must have similar mobility!)
Air defense ambushes on likely ingress routes.
If extended into enemy territory, may rely on SPF, C3D
Battle Zone - Offense
Provide coverage for forces – allow freedom of movement.
Create windows of opportunity for offensive action.
Battle Zone – Defense
1. Protect forces, 2. Protect long-range fires and reserves
Support Zone
Keep zone free from significant air action to permit effective logistics and C2
Whatever the nature of combat being conducted by maneuver forces, the actions of supporting air defense units are, as the term implies, inherently defensive.
Assigning specific missions to air defense units requires an understanding of the types of missions, the planning considerations involved, and the engagement procedures used.
Regarding Templating: generic ranges and IPB can provide some expectation of threat capabilities, but low-tech tactical solutions can often be used to counter sophisticated counter-systems. (Ex. Serbs and how they emplaced-displaced-hid-fired AD systems and how they minimized “hot radar” signature)
 AD in Zones: TC , ¶ 11-87

29. Air Defense Considerations - Offense
This slide shows a number of factors that determine the appropriate employment of an air defense unit. Consideration must be given to each of these factors.
Integrated Attack
Balance protection of the fixing forces with allocating AD assets to provide greater protection for other enabling or action forces.
Dispersed Attack
Commanders may have to accept risk in certain areas, compensating with increased C3D and the increased use of other arms to assist in air defense.
May allocate/position air defense assets where the air threat is perceived to be the greatest OR to maneuver units most critical to the success of the attack.
May require AD augmentation from higher
Limited Objective Attacks (Spoiling Attack, Counter-Attack)
Generally conducted against a stronger enemy – AD may be the principal means of (temporarily) defeating overmatch
Fixing forces are generally covered, but assault forces may require significant AD once discovered.
 AD in Offense: TC , ¶

30. Air Defense Considerations - Defense
This slide shows a number of factors that determine the appropriate employment of an air defense unit. Consideration must be given to each of these factors.
Maneuver Defense
AD units must be positioned to cover defending forces but capable of displacing with rapidly moving ground maneuver forces.
Must cover contact and shielding forces as they maneuver between defensive arrays. Ideally, most air defense assets can be positioned with the shielding force and provide adequate coverage for the contact force. AD units (or elements) may need to frequently displace.
Highly mobile MANPADS may be more appropriate with maneuvering forces, while long-range systems are best for defending forces.
Area Defense
AD in Disruption Zone similar to Maneuver Defense
Frequent displacement is the rule!
Balance point protection, while attacking enemy aerial reconnaissance.
Complex terrain may require separation of acquisition, targeting, and attack capabilities.
AD ambushes may be particularly effective with observers linked to units for rapid response.
 AD in Defense: TC , ¶

31. Key Air Defense Take-Aways
This is the conclusion slide for the threat AD brief. It highlights several of the key take-aways from the entire brief.
Threat AD systems are positioned to defend key systems and nodes, and mobile enough to support maneuver forces.
Threat AD is a combined arms approach and not purely defensive.
Threat AD will maximize use of IADS to preserve lower echelon systems and maintain surprise.
The threat will use new generation weapons (jammers, passive detection, advanced kinetic weapons) and equipment for air defense.
Non-traditional threats such as direct energy weapons (laser, dazzler), anti-helicopter mines, and anti-materiel rifles will engage short range targets along with traditional AD systems.

32. Questions?