1. Recapitulation I: Lord’s paradox
Lord’s Paradox is a regression artefact due to the regression to the mean.
It constitutes a pro- blem for ANCOVA.
Exhibits the limits of statistical control.

2. Recapitulation II: Memory judgments
Experimental paradigms for testing memory errors:
Elisabeth Loftus: Misinformation paradigm.
DRM paradigma (Deese, Roediger, & McDermott) for eliciting false memories.
Role of suggestions and imagination.

3. Recapitulation III: Memory judgments
Reality monitoring: Ability to separate real events from imagined, dreamed etc. events.
Source monitoring: Correct attribution of the source where the information comes from.
Imagination technics as well as repeated suggestions exert an influence on both monitoring systems (e.g. psychotherapy).

4. Memory Judgments: Stability and Change
Effect of plausible inference on memory.
Study of Marcus, 1982
Objective of the study: Examining political attitudes and their changes between the years
Political attitudes concerning 5 issues were registered at three points of time: 1965, 1973, and 1982.

5. Memory Judgments: Stability and Change
Study of Marcus, 1982: Investigated attitudes (1965, 1973, 1982):
Job guarantee,
Rights of accused persons,
Support of minority groups,
Legalization of marihuana,
Gender equality.
Classification of political attitudes as be­ing either conservative or liberal.

6. Memory Judgments: Stability and Change
Study of Marcus, 1982
Basic result: Retrospectively jugded attitudes of 1973 in 1982 reflects closely actual attitudes of 1982.
Regression analysis on retrospectively assessed attidudes (RA) with attitudes in the years 1982 and 1973 as predictors:
revealed:

7. Memory Judgments: Stability and Change
Study of Marcus, 1982
Explanation: Anchoring and adjustment: Anchor = actual attitude. Adjustment of initial assessment by means of plausible inference (subjective theories).
Typical plausible inference: Older people are more conservative. Thus, they judged they had more liberal opinions in 1965 (which is wrong since it ignores the effect of the citizen movement in the Sixties).

8. Memory Judgments: Stability and Change
Anchoring and adjustment: Shortcomings of the strategy:
The strategy of achoring and adjustment usually fails for two reasons:
The initial estimate may be strongly influenced by irrelevant information.
The adjustment of the initial estimate is not strong enough.

9. Memory Judgments: Stability and Change
Anchoring and adjustment (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974):
The following question was posed:
How high is the percentage of African nations in the United Nations? (actually 28%: 54 out of 192).
A roulette wheel was spun showing either the number 10 or 65.
Result: The median responses were 25% and 45% for the outcomes 10 and 65.

10. Memory Judgments: Stability and Change
Experiment: Conway & Ross, 1982:
Participants of the study were assigned to one of two groups:
Experimental group: Program to improve students’ learning skills.
Control group: Students were set on a waiting list.
Results:
The program had no effect.
Biased assessment of of prior capabilities in order to explain »effects« of training: Students in the experimental group assessed their prior performance as worse.

11. Memory Judgments: Stability and Change
Conclusion:
Both experiments (Marcus as well as Conway and Ross) demonstrate the influence of subjective theories on the adjustments of memories.
An erroneous judgment of prior states in order to »explain« the effect of a program was also found in other contexts (e.g. therapy of pain).

12. Memory Judgments: Hindsight Bias
Concept Hindsight bias:
Erroneous assessment of their prior knowledge concerning specific events.
In hindsight, people suppose a higher agreement between their prior and their actual knowledge than is actually the case [»I knew it all along«].

13. Memory Judgments: Hindsight Bias
Experiment (Fischoff & Beyth, 1975):
Phase 1: Groups of students should pro­vide their subjective probabilities for 15 events concerning Richard Nixon’s trip to the USSR and China in 1972.
Will the United States install a diplomatic department in China?
Will Nixon initialize a common outer space program with the USSR?

14. Memory Judgments: Hindsight Bias
Experiment (Fischoff & Beyth, 1975):
Phase 2 (2-6 weeks after Nixon’s visit): Participants should remember their esti-mates of Phase 1. In addition, they should indicate whether they believed that an event had actually occurred or not.

15. Memory Judgments: Hindsight Bias
Experiment (Fischoff & Beyth, 1975):
Results:
3/4 of the students »remembered« higher estimates than given in the first phase for events they believed to have actually taken place.
Most students »remembered« lower estimates than given in the first phase for those events they believed not to have occurred.
Hindsight bias increases with the distance to the actual events: After 3-6 month 84% of the participants exhibited hindsight bias.

16. Memory Judgments: Hindsight Bias
Explanation (anchoring and adjustment):
The actual outcome functions as an anchor and people are unable to adjust their judgment readily in order to correctly assess their predictions given previously.
Reduction of hindsight bias: People searching for possible reasons why an occasion might have resulted in a dif-ferent outcome.

17. Memory Judgments: Retrospective Evaluation of negative episodes
Experiment (Kahneman et al. 1993):
Participants underwent two (slightly painful) experiences with cold water under pressure, one for each hand.
Short episode: the hand was dipped into cold water of 14C, for 60 seconds.
Long episode: the hand was first dipped into cold water of 14C, for 60 seconds, followed by a period of 30 seconds during which the temperature of water was gradually increased from 14C to 15C. The hand remained in the cold water during the whole episode.

18. Memory Judgments: Retrospective evaluation of negative episodes
Experiment (Kahneman et al. 1993):
After a short time interval participants were asked to indicate which of the two conditions they would prefer to repeat once again.
Result:
Paradoxically significantly more participants preferred to repeat the long episode despite the fact that this episode includes the short one.

19. Memory Judgments: Retrospective evaluation of negative episodes
Application Colonoscopy: (Redelmaier et al. 2003):
Clients (N=682) were subjected to a colon-oscopy.
For half of the participants the intestinal tube was not removed immediately following to the medical examination. Rather it remained for about 1 further minute in the bowel with-out being moved (=prolonged examination).

20. Memory Judgments: Retrospective evaluation of negative episodes
Application Colonoscopy: (Redelmaier et al. 2003): Results:
Clients of the group with a prolonged examination provided, in general, a more positive retrospective evaluation of the examination than those of other group.
In an interview, 5 years later, participants of the group with prolonged examination showed a higher willingness to repeat the procedure compared to participants of the other group.

21. Memory Judgments: Retrospective evaluation of negative episodes
Explanation (The »snap shot model« of retrospective evaluations of affective episodes):
The episode to be evaluated retrospectively is represented in memory by prototypical moments. The representation consists of moments of increased affective value.
In addition, the final phase of the episode is registered thus making up a part of the representation of the episode too.

22. Memory Judgments: Retrospective evaluation of negative episodes
Explanation (The »snap shot model« of retrospective evaluations of affective episodes):
Retrospective evaluation consists in a combination (weighted mean) of the evaluation of the moments of the affective summits and the evaluation of the affect at the end of the episode.
The prolonged episodes are more positively evaluated because of the less negative segments at the end of the whole episodes.

23. Memory Judgments: Retrospective evaluation of negative episodes
Explanation (The »snap shot model« of retrospective evaluations of affective episodes):
It is important that the less negative or more enjoyable phase at the end of the episode must be perceived as a part of the episode. A positive or rewarding event following to the episode need not result in a higher evaluation of the episode itself since it may not be regarded as part of the episode.

24. Memory Judgments: Retrospective evaluation of negative episodes
Final Comment:
The snap-shot model reflects an important aspect of how we represent episodes in memory:
Prototypical moments of the episodes (e.g. moments with high affective value) are registered only.