1. Basic Flying Skills and Aircraft certification
Airbus
Captain Xavier Lesceu
Basic Flying Skills and Aircraft certification
DGAC
Paris 8 December 2016

2. The PAST

4. NOW

5. Fly by Wire and protections
Panel logic
Dark cockpit
Fly by Wire and protections
Vertical display
Ghost bird
Auto Pilot robustness
FMS
RNAV, FLS
RNP
Side-stick
ECAM

6. Back to the Basics

7. What to AVOID

8. Undesired Aircraft State
What must BE AVOIDED
Undesired Aircraft State
An undesired aircraft state is characterized by unintentional divergences from parameters normally experienced during operations.  An aircraft upset may involve pitch and/or bank angle divergences as well as inappropriate airspeeds for the conditions.

9. Prevent LOC - I Flight envelope protections Improved alerting
Aircraft design
Flight envelope protections
Improved alerting
Automation improvements
Flight Crew training
Stall training
Upset prevention and recovery
Crew resource management
Flight crew proficiency
Simulator fidelity

10. Maintain a high level of proficiency
Back to Basics
Maintain a high level of proficiency
Knowledge
Practice
Apply
Key Legend

11. Is Flying SAFE ?

12. Is flying safe
Flying is safe as it is based on the combination of 4 pre-requisites
Safe design according to certification requirements
Aircraft maintained according to approved procedures
Aircraft operated by skilled pilots
Aircraft flown within a safe ATM en route and airfield environment
è These 4 pre-requisites are intrinsically linked together.

13. A key question: What is safe ?
Is it “safe” to fly with failures, with degraded flight controls, without AP, FD, ATHR?

14. About safety Everyday life risks Without any risks ? Birth: 2.9 x 10-3
Delivery: to 10-4
Anesthesia + surgery: around 10-4
Fighter pilot: 10-5 per hour
Traveling by car: around 10-6 per hour
Heart attack ?
Collapse of the building ?
Without any risks ?

15. Relation between severity and probability of acceptable risks.

16. Dealing with risks in aircraft design
“Catastrophic”
events are acceptable if their probability is lower than one for one billion flight hours (10-9). (This is equivalent to one event each centuries of flight.)
Example: combination of 2 failures probable at 10-5
“Hazardous”
events must be less probable than 10-7
“Major”
events must be less probable than 10-5
“Minor”
events may be more probable than 10-5

17. Dealing with risks in aircraft design
Aircraft are designed against § of the certification regulations.
This regulation requires that the severity of any event must be in accordance with its probability of occurrence.

18. Required relations between probability and severity: ACJ 25-1309

19. Required relations between probability and severity: ACJ 25-1309

20. Required relations between probability and severity: ACJ 25-1309

21. EXAMPLES

22. Examples
CATASTROPHIC
Multiple deaths, usually with loss of aircraft
Rationale
The AP orders are erroneous, the AP cannot be disengaged, the crew has no mean to fly the aircraft which is out of control.

23. Examples
HAZARDOUS
Large reduction in safety margins; crew extended because of workload or environmental conditions; serious injury or death of small number of occupants
Rationale
The crew must immediately detect the failure and take over manually within a short delay.

24. Examples
MAJOR
Significant reduction in safety margins; difficult for the crew to cope with adverse conditions; passengers injuries
Rationale
The detection by the crew of the untimely AP engagement may not be immediate, and lead to an awkward landing.

25. DGAC
Examples
MINOR
Normal
Nuisance
Operating limitations: emergency procedures
Rationale
Any pilot is assumed to be able to ensure easily basic manual flying without automation. Possible operational effects can be expected, e.g. RVSM limitations.

26. Expected flying skills when dealing with risks in aircraft design
The severity of an event is assessed taking into account
Effects on aircraft & occupants,
Assumption of crew capability to face this event
This assumption of crew capability to face the event considers expected flying skills

27. The challenges
Remember: Flying is safe because it is based on the combination of 4 pre-requisites which are intrinsically linked together
Safe design according to certification requirements
Aircraft maintained according to approved procedures
Aircraft operated by skilled pilots
Aircraft flown within a safe ATM en route and airfield environment
Not fulfilling these 4 pre-requisites may lead to change an acceptable risk into an unacceptable risk

28. Example of assumptions about the pilot’s skills
Example of a failure with a probability of classified as MAJOR

29. Reminder: Pilot take-over time - certification requirements
Certification Rules take as an assumption the following pilot reaction time to take over
3 seconds in Cruise
1 second in Approach

30. Example of assumptions about the pilot’s skills
Example of a failure with a probability of classified as MAJOR
THIS CLASSIFICATION IS BASED ON TWO ASSUMED PILOT’S SKILLS:
1) THE PILOTS MONITOR THE RAW DATA AND DETECT A WRONG FLIGHT GUIDANCE
2) THE PILOTS CAN FLY A MANUAL CAT 1 ILS ON THE RAW DATA WITHOUT AP & FD

31. What if the pilot’s skills would not be as they should be?
Example of a failure with probability of classified as MAJOR
MAJOR
HAZARDOUS
Should the skills
Not be as expected
CATASTROPHIC
MAJOR

32. Required relations between probability and severity: ACJ 25-1309
The probability of the failure (of ) would become INCONSISTENT WITH ITS SEVERITY !

33. What if the pilot’s skills would not be as they should be ?
SAFETY WOULD BE AT STAKE !

34. EVALUATE

35. Evaluation Aerodynamics Performance Undesired aircraft state
Theoretical knowledge
Aerodynamics
Performance
Undesired aircraft state
Skills
Manual flying skills
Treat and error management
Decision making
Crew communication

36. TRAIN

37. Theoretical knowledge
Ground
Theoretical knowledge
High altitude aerodynamics
Definitions of aircraft upset
Undesired aircraft state
Causes of aircraft upset
Environmental effects
Flight instruments failures
Pilot induced airplane upset
………

38. USE of VIDEO

39. SKILLS

40. Training area
Stall
Stall warning
VFE
MMO VMO
MD VD

41. Skills in simulator Simulator Fly in the whole flight envelope
Start in the middle and work towards the edges
Raw data flight
AP/ FD / ATHR / FPV OFF flights
Day / Night
Adverse weather conditions

42. Skills in simulator Simulator Stall and Upset training refer to OTT
Incorporate OEM into scenario if needed
Don’t change simulator models without OEM cooperation
Do not experiment

43. FLY

44. Manual flight in daily operations
Aircraft
Manual flight in daily operations
Establish policy
Weather conditions
Level of automation
AP – ATHR - FD
FDA
Review manual flight operations Feedback to training

46. Think
and
RETHINK
Training

47. Prevention is a key
Recovery skill need to be maintained
Do not set artificial requirements
Simulators at the highest fidelity
Share experience and scenarios
It is an industry problem that we must solve together
Contact your OEM and do not experiment

48. An “engaged” pilot uses his superior judgment to avoid situations which require the use of his superior skill.
Frank Borman

49. © Airbus S. A. S. All rights reserved
© Airbus S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. This document and all information contained herein is the sole property of AIRBUS. No intellectual property rights are granted by the delivery of this document or the disclosure of its content. This document shall not be reproduced or disclosed to a third party without the express written consent of AIRBUS S.A.S. This document and its content shall not be used for any purpose other than that for which it is supplied. The statements made herein do not constitute an offer. They are based on the mentioned assumptions and are expressed in good faith. Where the supporting grounds for these statements are not shown, AIRBUS S.A.S. will be pleased to explain the basis thereof. AIRBUS, its logo, A300, A310, A318, A319, A320, A321, A330, A340, A350, A380, A400M are registered trademarks.