1. Dr. Mawaki Chango Kara University DigiLexis Consulting
FROM STATE ADMINISTRATION TO BLOCKCHAIN? A Policy Perspective on the Fundamentals of Identity
Dr. Mawaki Chango Kara University DigiLexis Consulting

2. Contents
Socio-historical research on identity: research purpose and findings
The making of digital identity
Blockchain and self-sovereign identity
The case of Sovrin Identity Network

3. SOCIO-HISTORICAL RESEARCH AND FINDINGS Lessons from THE MODERN STATE

4. Authoritative Identity
Identity subjects have adopted it and use it
Other parties which were not part of issuing it, rely on it.
Becomes a standard referred to by more and more parties.
Becomes an anchor around which an extensive record (of relevance) about the same individual is accumulated.
Follow by off-slide elaboration.

5. The making of digital identity Tracing the process

6. 1. Centralized Identity
Administrative control by a single authority or hierarchy
1988: IANA began to determine the validity of IP addresses
1998: ICANN began to manage and make policies for domain names
1995: Certificate Authorities started helping Internet commerce sites

7. Limitations
Users are locked in to a single authority who can deny their identity
Balkanization or silos: juggling between an incontrollable number of identities on different websites
Digital identities are owned by CAs, domain registrars, and individual sites
They rent them to users and can revoke them at any time

8. 2. Federated Identity
Administrative control by multiple, federated authorities
1999: Microsoft .NET Passport
Federated: allowed users to utilize the same ID on multiple sites
But put Microsoft at the center of it all
2001: Liberty Alliance organized by Sun Microsystems
Reduce balkanization but the power of centralized authority just got divided among several entities

9. 3. User-centric Identity
Administrative control in the hands of the individual or across multiple authorities without requiring federation
Ambition to give every user the capability to
build a persistent online identity, and
control it.
Making up for the lack of identity layer in the core Internet architecture

10. User-centric… 2001: Identity Commons
Consolidation of work digital identity and decentralization
Launch of Internet Identity Workshop in 2005
User-centric identity vs. Server-centric model of centralized authorities
Better user experience
Users to have more control over their ID
Trust to be decentralized

11. Instances of User-centric ID
OpenID (2005)
OpenID 2.0 (2006)
OpenID Connect (2014)
OAuth (2010)
FIDO (2013)
Main characteristics
User consent
Interoperability

12. Research Findings on Digital ID
Ref. Notes on Research Implications

13. 4. Self-sovereign Identity
Bringing in user autonomy
User not only to be at the center but to become the ruler of their digital identity
It’s being increasingly recognized that individuals “have an established right to an ‘identity’.”
Leading to the emergence of ‘personal cloud’ initiatives (e.g., Open Mustard Seed begun in 2012 by Patrick Deegan)

14. Self-sovereign… Mathematical policy (e.g., Marlinspike)
Cryptography is used to protect user’s autonomy and control
Legal policy (e.g., Sovrin Identity Network)
Defining principles and contractual rules that network members agree to follow
In 2015, self-sovereign identity made an entrance in international policy (refugee crisis in Europe)

15. Main Characteristics
User must be central to the administration of identity
Interoperability across multiple locations and sites
User consent
Portability is required for true user’s control
Allow ordinary users to make claims

16. A Few Basic Principles Prevent human rights abuses by the powerful
Defend against financial and other losses
Support the rights of the individual to be oneself and to freely associate
And there are more…

17. Blockchain & self-sovereign identity will distributed ledger technology save digital identity?

18. Blockchain Distributed ledger technology (DLT)
Peer to peer exchange of value
Ledgers: form of database that is provided cooperatively by a pool of participants
Distributed
Public
Encrypted
Every 10 mn. all transactions verified, cleared and stored in a block linking to the preceding block
Examples of Bitcoin and Ethereum
Permissionless ledgers

19. Case: Sovrin Identity Network
Sovrin is a software ecosystem for private, secure and powerful identity
“Public permissioned,” open source, distributed ledger technology
Nodes of the Sovrin Identity Network
Analogy with ATM
SIN (or SIDNet) is publicly accessible, but the data is visible only with the consent of its owner

20. Sovrin Stakeholders Sovrin Foundation: Oversight
Board of Trustees: Governance of the Foundation
Initiated by trusted institutions and individuals to bootstrap the process
Universities, financial organizations, hospitals, issuers of driving licences, passports, birth certificates, etc.
Technical Governance Board
Legal, technical and operational policies for Sovrin nodes
Nodes exercising stewardship of the ecosystem
Identity Owner

21. Foundations Contractual model of governance
Full suite of 3 founding documents
The Provisional Trust Framework (PTF)
The Identity Owner Agreement
The Founding Steward Agreement
The two Agreements are appendices to the PTF
Others: Agency and Developer Agreements

22. Main PTF Sections Purpose and Principles Definitions Policies
Business
Legal
Technical
Amendments

23. Purpose
The purpose of the Sovrin Network is to provide a global public utility for decentralized identity that adheres to a number of principles

25. Principles Independence and Self-Sovereignty Guardianship
Diffuse Trust
Web of Trust
System Diversity
Interoperability
Security
Privacy
Portability
Accountability
Transparency
Accessibility, Inclusion, and Non-Discrimination
Collective Best Interest

26. Business Policies Identity Owners Stewards Guardians Trust Anchors
Obligations
Stewards
Qualifications
Invitations
Disqualification and Remediation
Guardians
Obligations
Trust Anchors
Qualifications
Invitations
Disqualification and Remediation

27. Legal Policies Identity Owners Stewards Agencies Developers
Sovrin Trust Mark
Dispute Resolution

28. Technical Policies Steward Node Requirements
Steward Security Monitoring & Reporting
Sovrin Ledger Write Permissions
Sovrin Ledger Transaction Limitations
Agencies
Developers

29. Concluding Remarks
Why would stakeholders rely on Self-sovereign identity to identify their counterparts, or rather to conduct identity-based transactions with users?

30. THANK YOU! Dr. Mawaki Chango Kara University, Togo
DigiLexis Consulting
@ki_chango