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“Beyond Markets and States:

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Presentation on theme: "“Beyond Markets and States:"— Presentation transcript:

1 “Beyond Markets and States:
Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems” Elinor Ostrom American Economic Review June 2010, 100(3): “A core effort is developing a more general theory of individual choice that recognizes the central role of trust in coping with social dilemmas…One size fits all policies are not effective.” p. 642 Agenda: Polycentric? MORE types of goods The nature of man revisited yet again… MORE types of property rights Best practices for fostering cooperation The goal of business…. Link to Nobel lecture: Play to 4:00.

2 Polycentric? The boss is not the only one with authority – you need to allocate decision rights to others. You also need to work with other independent businesses. Remember: contracts do NOT solve problems! Hopefully they identify what problems are likely and give you a recourse of LAST resort! Managing via contract is very costly and not very timely.

3 Beyond (Between) Markets and States
Businesses – Franchises, Public, Private, Strategic alliances (auto, technology, food, fashion) Cooperatives (farming, broadcasting) Public/private partnerships (development, insurance) Associations (business districts, natural resources) Clubs, voluntary groups, campaigns, PTA Markets – private goods with no externalities State – everything else! – Note reference to Hobbes p. 642 Ostrom – but if I look at the world I see more different forms of organization! “The dichotomous view of the world explained patterns of interaction and outcomes related to markets for the production and exchange of strictly private goods, but it has not been adequately accounted for internal dynamics within private firms. Nor does it adequately deal with the wide diversity of institutional arrangements that humans craft to govern, provide, and manage public goods and common-pool resources.” p. 642.

4 MORE types of goods Secretarial Support Insurer & Vendor Contracts
Chart from p. 645 with overlay picture examples from the hospital Cath Lab Electronic Medical Record

5 Example: Who will teach what classes when? Who? What? Where? When?
Why? How? Dean, Registrar, Department Chair, Professor NOT the College President, Trustees What professor, what class, what room, What content and location on any given day Office, Electronic documents Web scheduling has increased coordination! 1-year prior, 1 semester prior, Daily Allocation of resources Time and space Negotiation among factions NOT the same at all schools!

6 Example: What resources do we need to have a class?
Room Dynamic Knowledge Cleanliness

7 Are Rational Individuals Helplessly Trapped in Social Dilemmas?
“The classic assumptions about rational individuals…hide the potentially productive efforts of individuals and groups to organize and solve social dilemmas…The classic models have been used to view those who are involved in a prisoner’s dilemma game or other social dilemmas as always trapped in the situation without capabilities to change the structure themselves” (p. 648).

8 The Nature of Man revisited again…
Neoclassical Economics “Economic Man” Transaction Cost Economics “Bounded Rationality” Institutional Economics Capacity for Learning and Collective Action “…like the US Cavalry in a good Western, the government stands ready to rush to the rescue whenever the market ‘fails’…Private individuals, in contrast, are credited with little or no ability to solve collective problems among themselves. This makes for a distorted view of some important economic and political issues.” Rober Sugden (1986) quoted in Ostrom (2010) on p. 649

9 “When boundedly rational individuals do interact over time…they learn more accurate information about the actions they can take and the likely actions of other individuals” (p. 659). “Simply assuming that humans adopt norms, however, is not sufficient to predict behavior….observed behavior may vary by context because the perception of the ‘right thing’ would change” (p. 660). “…the updated theoretical assumptions of learning and norm-adopting individuals can be used as the foundation for understanding how individuals may gain increased levels of trust in others, leading to more cooperation and higher benefits with feedback mechanisms that reinforce positive or negative learning…” (p. 660). NOTE: “the right thing” goes back to clear communication of organizational strategy! Also p. 661: “Social scientists also need to recognize that individual behavior is strongly affected by the context in which interactions take place rather than being simply a result of individual differences” – not just the nature of man but the nature of organizations, cultures, communities. “Thus, it is not only that individuals adopt norms, but also that the structure of the situation generates sufficient information about the likely behavior of others to be trustworthy…” (p. 660).

10 How do we get people to contribute their best effort to a common objective?
“In CPR dilemmas where individuals do not know one another, cannot communicate effectively, and thus cannot develop agreements, norms and sanctions, aggregate predictions derived from models of rational individuals in noncooperative games receive substantial support.” Communication is feasible with the full set of participants 2. Reputation of the participants are known 3. High marginal per capita return – stakes and incentives 4. Entry and exit capabilities 5. Longer time horizons 6. Agreed-upon sanctioning capabilities P. 650 – 651 Like the pre-requisites for perfect competition, these are the pre-requisites for perfect cooperation! Take inventory of what features your organization does and does not have. The more you have, the more you can aim for participatory self-governance. The less you have, the more ridgid (and costly) command and control you will need. p. 664 “The surprising but repeated finding that users of resources that are in relatively good condition – or even improving – do invest in various ways of monitoring one another relates to the core problem of building trust.”

11 What is “Cheap Talk”? “The opportunity for repeated face-to-face communication was extremely successful in increasing joint returns…Findings…are consistent with…the impact of face-to-face communication on the capacity of subjects to solve a variety of social dilemma problems. p. 655

12 MORE types of property rights
 Access  Withdrawal  Management  Exclusion  Alienation What do we talk about… how to manage common pool resources! Access and withdrawal can get combined when you are not talking about something like walking through a field. What we may have considered “management” now becomes “exclusion” – the right to decide who has management rights Management still typically does not have alienation rights unless owner-managed All these rights are generally subsumed under alienation in Markets. Given by regulation/administrative authority in states. You need to specify them in your allocation of decision rights in your organizational architectures!

13 Example: What are the rights associated with classrooms and who has them?
Access Withdrawal Management Exclusion Alienation The right to enter the room Students enrolled in the class, professor, administration (limited) The right to take things (desks, computer) out of the room Professor (temporarily), facilities, administration The right to change the way the room looks and is used Professor (temporarily), facilities, administration The right to decide who can enter the room Registrar, professor, administration The right to sell (rent) the room and capture the proceeds $$ Board of Trustees delegated to administration & facilities Try this: client lists, vendor networks, computer servers & software

14 Best Practices (p. 653)…Applied to Business
1A,B: User and resource boundaries Allocation of decision rights 2A,B: Congruent & Appropriate Architecture in the context of the rules of the game. 3: Collective Choice – participation in making & modifying rules Management, leadership and corporate culture 4A,B: Monitoring users and resources Observability and accountability of individuals to outcomes 5,6 Graduated Sanctions & Conflict Resolution Mechanisms Job descriptions, performance reviews & management 7: Minimal recognition of rights Management recognizes employee “rights” to make their own rules within clearly defined spheres of decision rights. 8: Nested Enterprises All decisions are not made by the CEO! Some of these we’ve talked about, and some we are going to talk about more. All should be kept in mind as you devise your organizational architectures.

15 Conclusion and business ^ “…a core goal of public policy should be to facilitate the development of institutions that bring out the best in humans.”


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