1. Outline QUIZ at start of this Thursday’s class
Newspaper examples for next class discussion
Key questions about institutions
Variables, IVs, and DVs
Why do institutions form?
Two approaches: logic of consequences and logic of appropriateness
Eight key questions of course

2. Prepare for Discussion for NEXT CLASS
Real-life examples from the news that differ in problem structure terms used from this class session
Look at Newspaper of your choice before next class and find two INTERNATIONAL problems that illustrate one of the differences we will discuss today

3. Key questions about institutions
Formation: Why (and when) do states form international institutions in the first place?
Design: Why, given that they do form them, do they design them in the ways they do?
Influence: How, given that states cannot be coerced to do what they do not want to do, do international institutions ever influence the behavior of states?
Non-state action: Why isn’t all this “international organization” limited to just states?

4. Variables, IVs, and DVs
Variable: something that can vary (it varies between different values)
Values: what a variable varies between
E.g.,
Variable: color
Values: ROYGBIV
DV: Dependent variable – what you want to explain
IVs: Independent variables – what you use to explain the DV

5. Variable Terms and Concepts Examples
Unit of analysis
Variable
Indicator
Values of variable
Values of indicator
Problem
Level of Difficulty
Time til Start of Negotiations
Malign
Long
Benign
Short
Time til Complete Negotiations
Treaty
Ambitious-ness
Type of Obligations
Ambitious
Differentiated
Not-ambitious
Common
Strength
Monitoring Provision
Strong
Provision present
Weak
Provision absent

6. Some DVs for the Course
Always start with the DV – need to know what you are going to explain before you can figure out how you will explain it
DVs for the course
Whether institution forms or not
What are the features of the institution
Behavior of states

7. Institutional formation
Basic DV and question: do states (or other actors) form an institution?
Variable: institutional formation
Values: yes or no
IVs: features of problem structure
Capacities
Incentives
Information and knowledge
Norms

8. Logic of Consequences vs. Logic of Appropriateness
States calculate what is best
Independent self-interest (narrow)
Independent self-interest ( broad)
Interdependent self-interest
Logic of appropriateness
States behave to establish/maintain particular identity and/or to follow social rules
Institutions alter of what is right/appropriate

9. What is problem structure?
Features of the problem that influence:
Formation: How hard/easy to solve the problem?
Design: What kind of solution states arrive at?
Institutional influence: How effective is the solution?
No need for single dimension of hard to easy
Think about different problem features and implications for negotiation and effectiveness

10. Problem structure: Eight (8) key questions
Q1: Is it conflict, cooperation, or harmony?
Q2: Who are the actors?
Q3: Absolute capacities and relative power
Q4: Incentives/preferences
Q5: Information/knowledge
Q6: Norms
Q7: Inherent transparency
Q8: Response incentives

11. Problem structure: Eight (8) key questions
Mainly for comparing ACROSS problems
Answers to all effect
Whether states will form institution
What features they will incorporate
How states will respond to institutional rules

12. Q1: Is it conflict, cooperation or harmony?
Is it conflict or would it be if no institution?
Is it harmony?
If conflict, is it Deadlock, i.e., unresolvable?
Potential for resolution REQUIRES absolute gains frame

13. Q2: Who are the Actors? How many actors are there?
What roles do actors have?
What types of actors are involved?

14. Q3: Capacities and power
Do “perpetrators” of problem have capacity to engage in “good” behavior?
If not, it’s a “Positive Externality Plagued by Incapacity”. E.g.,
Protecting accidental detonation of nuclear weapons
Reducing AIDS in developing countries
Helping small countries defend selves from attack
Behavior not a result of logic of consequences or logic of appropriateness

15. Q4: Incentives/preferences
How do material consequences for perpetrators depend on other countries?
Types of incentive problems
Upstream / downstream
Coordination
Collaboration
All involve logic of consequences issues

16. Q5: Information/knowledge
Any unknown effects that perpetrators would care about if they knew about them?
Two types of info/knowledge problems
Epistemic/knowledge problems (unsure about how the world works): e.g., acid rain in Europe, trade wars, health quarantine regulations
Assurance problems (unsure about how other actors will behave): e.g., war games
Largely still logic of consequences

17. Q6: Norms
Problem is not material consequences but violations of values and notions of legitimacy
Normative problems involve “conflicts over values”, e.g.,
Human rights abuses
Apartheid or treatment of women
Choice of government
Involves logic of appropriateness

18. Q7: Inherent transparency
Question: Is it easy to “see” violations and/or hard to conceal them?
Hypothesis: If little inherent transparency, then strong monitoring provisions are likely.

19. Q8: Response incentives
Question: Will states respond to violations? Do violations matter a lot? Are states very concerned about them?
Hypothesis: If strong violation INtolerance, leads to either preclusive strategies OR careful monitoring WITH enforcement. For example: Strong incentives to respond to trade violations ==> carefully devised dispute resolution systems

20. Types of problem Review
Deadlock
Positive externality plagued by incapacity
Upstream / downstream problems
Coordination
Collaboration
Epistemic / knowledge problems
Assurance problems
Normative problems
Plus inherent transparency and response incentives

21. Conclusion Is there a conflict? Who are the actors
Capacities and power
Incentives
Information / knowledge
Norms
Inherent transparency
Response incentives