1. TOO MANY TO FAIL? Evidence of Regulatory Reluctance in Bank Failures when the Banking Sector is Weak
Craig O. Brown
Serdar Dinç
October 2006

2. Regulation in Banking Banking is one of the most regulated sectors
(Berger et al. (1995), Barth et al. (2006))
Entry, e.g., restrictions on branching, scope, licensing
Operations, e.g., capital requirements
Exit, e.g., license revocations, government takeovers
Banks can defer failure by issuing new deposits until regulators take action
Brown & Dinç

3. Regulatory Reluctance & Intervention in Failing Banking
Regulators seem reluctant to intervene in failing banks if the whole sector is also weak.
Theory: Mitchell (2001), Acharya & Yorulmazer (JFI, forth.)
S&L Crisis in U.S.: Kane (1989), Kroszner & Strahan (JF, 1996)
Banking Crisis in Japan: Hoshi & Kashyap (2001)
Are these two cases exceptions??
Brown & Dinç

4. Bank Failures in Emerging Markets
Crisis Literature (country-level): Economic, institutional, and regulatory framework that makes crises more likely
e.g., Barth et al. (2006), Beck et al. (JBF 2006), Caprio and Klingebiel (2002), Claessens et al. (2005), Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998, JME 2002)
Bank Failures in Asian Crisis (bank-level, 4 East Asian Countries): Political connections, market’s ability to predict failures
Bongini et al. (JFSR 2001), Bongini et al. (JBF 2002)
Politics of Bank Failures (bank-level, 21 major emerging markets): Politicians wait until after the elections before closing/taking over a failing bank.
Brown & Dinç (QJE 2005)
Brown & Dinç

5. Focus of the Paper
Are the regulations about failing banks implemented regardless of the health of other banks?
Or,
Are the regulators reluctant to close/take over failing banking if the whole sector is weak?
Null Hypothesis:
Government takeover or closing of a failing bank does not depend on the health of other banks (once the macroeconomic factors are controlled for)
Brown & Dinç

6. Main Result: Preview
Government is less likely to take over or close failing banks if other banks are also weak!!
This is robust to…
Bank-specific Factors;
Macroeconomic Factors;
IMF Programs;
Election Concerns
Brown & Dinç

7. Sample Construction (Same sample as in Brown & Dinç (QJE 2005))
Beginning sample: Largest 10 banks in 1993 in each of 21 major countries
All the emerging countries for which The Economist provides statistics, except China, and Egypt:
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Czech, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Poland, Russia, Singapore, S. Africa, S. Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela
Main Data Sources
Bank Failures: Factiva
Ownership, Mergers: Bankscope, Factiva, Bankers’ Almanac
Balance Sheet: Bankscope
Brown & Dinç

8. Banks Failures by Country (Table 1-first half)
Brown & Dinç

9. Banks Failures by Country (Table 1 - cont.)
Brown & Dinç

10. Bank Failures Around the World
Bank Failures are very common. 24% of all private banks failed.
Bank Failures are evenly distributed across the continents.
Take-over of failing banks by the Government is very common. 85% of all failures.
Brown & Dinç

11. Sample Statistics (Table 2)
Brown & Dinç

12. Econometric Methodology
Cox Proportional Hazard analysis for the time until bank failure
xi: Bank specific (and macroeconomic) variables
z-i: A measure of health for other banks in the same country. (Typically, the weighted average across all other banks for a bank specific variable included in xi)
Null hypothesis  g=0 (a failing bank is closed regardless of other banks)
Regulatory reluctance  g>0 (the healthier other banks are, the more likely a bank is closed by the regulators)
(Errors are clustered at the country level)
Brown & Dinç

13. Regulatory Reluctance to Fail Banks if Other Banks are also Weak (Table 3)
Brown & Dinç

14. Regulatory Reluctance: Robustness?
Government is less likely to take over or close failing banks if other banks are also weak!!
Is this effect robust to…
Macroeconomic Factors?
IMF Programs?
Election Concerns?
Additional Bank-specific Factors?
Brown & Dinç

15. Regulatory Reluctance: Robustness to Macroeconomics (Table 4A)
Brown & Dinç

16. Regulatory Reluctance: Robustness to Macroeconomics (Table 4B)
Brown & Dinç

17. Regulatory Reluctance: Elections & IMF Lending (Table 5)
Brown & Dinç

18. Regulatory Reluctance: Additional Bank-Level Controls (Table 6)
Brown & Dinç

19. Main Result: Summary
Government is less likely to take over or close failing banks if other banks are also weak!!
This is robust to…
Bank-specific Factors;
Macroeconomic Factors;
IMF Programs;
Election Concerns
Brown & Dinç