1. Independent Oversight Function
2017/07/26-27
2017 Nuclear Oversight Conference
TEPCO’s Practice
for Improving
Independent Oversight Function
Takashi Satoh
Deputy Head,
NSOO, TEPCO

2. 1. Three NPSs of TEPCO Under Decommissioning
Fukushima Daiichi NPS 4696MWe
Kashiwazaki Kariwa NPS MWe 1F KK
Under Decommissioning
Contaminated Water, SF, Fuel Debris
Enhancement of Safety System, and Emergency Response
(Mobile equipment,
Training / Drill)
Fukushima Daini NPS MWe 2F
Tokyo
Corporate Office
SF cooling in SFP 1

3. 2. TEPCO NSOO - Nuclear Safety Reform
RCA for deficiencies in nuclear safety before the accident :
safety awareness
technical capability
communication ability
Objective: Strengthening Safety Culture in TEPCO
Action plan:
Enhance safety awareness of top management
Establish Nuclear Safety Oversight Office (NSOO)
Reorganize emergency response team based on ICS, Incident Command System
Improve technical capability to propose Defense in Depth safety measures
Establish risk communicator positions and Social Communication Office to build trust with the public
Enhance on-site staff technical capability

4. Nuclear Safety Oversight Office
2. TEPCO NSOO - Current Situation
After 4 years operation:
Pursuing two ways to improve our oversight performance?
Learning from world standards for independent oversight
Consideration of uniqueness for TEPCO nuclear business
Board of Directors
President
Nuclear Power & Plant Siting Div. (CNO)
Fukushima Daiichi D&D Co (CDO)
H.Q. 1F KK 2F
Nuclear Safety Oversight Office
Head: Dr. Crofts (Former UKAEA Executive)
Deputy Head, Chief Assessor
12 Assessors + 2 Admin. at HQ
14 Senior Reactor Engineers on sites
External mentors
NSAB
Oversee
Support
Report & Aid
Advise HD
Internal Audit Office

5. 3. Learning from World Standards - Gap Identification
Independent view from UK nuclear safety consultant
Reinforcement of NSOO management model
Development of capable NSOO organization
Development of suitable oversight program / plan
Implementation of effective oversight activities
International Guideline
New initiative for IAEA-TECDOC / WANO guideline
Independent from line organization / Supported by Executives
Proactive, not event driven
Competent to key / wide areas
Being Role model for line organization
　　 (risk awareness, continuous improvement, etc.,)

6. 3. Learning from World Standards - Actions for Improvement
(1) NSOO Management Model
Nuclear Oversight Management Model
vision, mission, objectives and strategies.
Nuclear Baseline
standard competency as strong independent oversight
(2) NSOO Structure
Team work between headquarters (HQ) and on-site senior reactor engineers (SREs).
Risk conscious approach + coverage of key functional areas.   
(3) NSOO Key Processes
Deep insight
Follow-up with standing close to the line (still independent)
(1) NSOO Management Model
We are developing Nuclear Oversight Management Model which includes vision, mission, objectives and strategies. Also, Nuclear Baseline which defines the standard for necessary competency as strong independent oversight function is under discussion.
(2) NSOO Structure
We are strengthening our team work between headquarters (HQ) assessors and on site senior reactor engineers (SREs). The HQ assessors are performing their oversight based on risk conscious approach. The SREs are doing their oversight with covering key functional areas. We are pursuing the best combination of those two approaches.
(2) NSOO Management Model
(3) NSOO Key Processes
We are improving our key processes, such as planning, categorization and analysis, reporting and follow-up, by learning from the American and European good practices and guidelines.

7. 4. Unique Challenge to TEPCO – Governance Tools
TEPCO’s unique challenge
 Cross-functional activities under severe business condition
Policy / Goal : New Strategy and Programs/Projects
1F-site Decommissioning Strategy (Damaged decommissioning site)
KK-site Large-scale Safety Enhancement Project (Generation site)
Structure : New Organizations
Human Resource Development Center
Engineering Center
Process : Enhanced Fundamental Processes
Lines of Defense
Risk Management
Management of Change
NSOO will assess the clarity and effectiveness of those new Governance Tools for cross-functional activities

8. 4. Unique Challenge to TEPCO – Safety Culture (1)
Assessment by ex-IAEA safety culture expert
Following concerns were felt as a result of ongoing multiple improvement initiatives and very challenging schedule:
Risk of losing a priority
Lack of active engagement and passiveness; personnel just do what is told and work only on what is in front of them
As a result, development of a reactive, passive culture
　　　　　　　　　　 Development of compliance culture
Few opportunities for personnel to reflect and discuss on the effectiveness of the SC activities
NSOO will assess TEPCO’s safety culture from the viewpoint of Organizational Development (OD)

9. 4. Unique Challenge to TEPCO – Safety Culture (2)
Uncooperative Relation
①Honest and free to discuss
　　→Easy to identify problem
Quality of Relationship
Quality of Thought
Quality of Behavior
Quality of Achievement
Start
Achievement Gap
Hidden Inappropriate Value
④Achievement improves as a result
　Enhancing safety
　Newly added value！
②Ask original purpose
　→easier to find solution
Behavior Gap
①Honest and free to discuss
　discuss on concern
　friendly fighting
　→Easy to identify problem
②Ask original purpose
　Definition, purpose, value,
etc. 　
Free flow of ideas
　→easier to find solution
③Self-motivated action
“Let us try!” “Lest us do together!”
④Result improves as a result
　Enhancing safety
　Newly added value！
③Self-motivated action
“Let us try!” “Lest us do together!”

10. 4. Unique Challenge to TEPCO – Safety Culture (3)
Clear goal and shared among entire organization (team)
Ownership by each individual
・lead by top leader to show that it is real
High Quality Relationship
・Unified team
・Trusting among all
・Be able to say anything
NSOO is learning Organizational Development theory, especially Appreciative Inquiry (AI), for assessing and promoting safety culture.

11. 5. Conclusion : NSOO’s Critical Issues
Implementation of NSOO Management Model
Deep insight for Governance Tools and Safety Culture
Plus,
Recovery from 30-40% staff rotation of every year
Productivity enhancement (minimizing paper work)
Thank you!

12. <Ref.> Findings / Recommendations by NSOO (1/2)
Fukushima Daiichi NPS (1F)
Rigorousness in assessment and management of nuclear risks
Prompt introduction of individual dose target
Effectiveness in training for unique designs / activities for damaged plant
Enhancement of emergency preparedness based on risk assessment
Improvement of design and procurement process as intelligent customer
Fukushima Daini NPS (2F)
Enhancement of reality for emergency preparedness
Improvement of sensitivity to minor risks (Fire protection, safety system component protection, etc.,)

13. <Ref.> Findings / Recommendations by NSOO (2/2)
Kashiwazaki Kariwa NPS (KK)
Robust project management for large-scale safety enhancement construction
Robust maintenance program after long shutdown
Corporate
Company-wide strategy and consistent implementation on how to introduce new Management Model
Management of individual competency for emergency preparedness
Stress management for TEPCO employee
Safety culture for contractors