1. PHIL 2610 Philosophy of Language 1st Term 2016
The Use Theory
PHIL 2610
Philosophy of Language
1st Term 2016

2. Ludwig Wittgenstein One of the richest people in Europe at the time
Gave away his entire fortune
3 of his brothers committed suicide
Fought in both World Wars and hid that he was one of the most famous philosophers in the world

3. Language as Representation
Last time I suggested the “general structure” of a theory of meaning involved a mental aspect that a word connotes, and a non-mental object that the word denotes.

4. Connotes
Dog
Mind
Dog
Idea of a Dog

5. Denotes
Dog
Mind
Dog
Idea of a Dog

6. Wittgenstein vs. Representation
Wittgenstein thinks this “representational view” of language is incorrect. The meaning of a sentence is how we use it. Often there is no sense to be made of which thing is named or denoted by the word.

7. At the apple store…

8. I need 5 red apples please!

10. I need 5 red apples please!

11. “One!”

14. “Two!”

15. Some time later…

17. “Five!”

18. Wittgenstein vs. Representation
“But how does he know where and how he is to look up the word ‘red’ and what he is to do with the word ‘five’?” --Well, I assume that he ‘acts’ as I have described. Explanations come to an end somewhere.

19. Wittgenstein vs. Representation
But what is the meaning of the word ‘five’? --No such thing was in question here, only how the word ‘five’ is used.

20. Dis-Solving Philosophical Problems
This is the general structure of how the use theory attempts to dis-solve philosophical problems. STEP 1: Explain how we use some particular bit of language. STEP 2: Claim that “explanation has to stop somewhere”: here.

21. Meaning Is Use
Importantly, every theory of meaning thinks that how we use our words plays some role in what they mean. How could it not? The use theory is importantly different because it identifies use with meaning.

22. The Use Theory of Meaning

23. In language we play games with words.

24. Language Games
Wittgenstein thinks that language is made up of a variety of different language games, with differing rules.
To understand language more generally, he looks at different make-believe primitive languages and ways of teaching children language.

25. The Slab Language
The language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B. A is building with building-stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stones, in the order in which A needs them.

26. The Slab Language
For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words "block", "pillar" "slab", "beam". A calls them out; — B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call. Conceive this as a complete primitive language.

28. Displacement
Animals can communicate messages about things and events in their current environment, but not:
Things that are not around right now
Events in the past
Events in the future
Things that don’t exist

29. Displacement

30. The Game Analogy
To understand Wittgenstein’s analogy of language and games, we need to understand two concepts:
Family Resemblance
Criteria vs. Symptoms

31. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
Some concepts have necessary and sufficient conditions for applying to things: Necessary: If the concept applies, then you meet the condition. Sufficient: If you meet the condition, then the concept applies.

32. Example: Dogs
Being a mammal is a necessary condition for being a dog, because every dog is a mammal. Being a Chihuahua is a sufficient condition for being a dog, because every Chihuahua is a dog.

33. Family Resemblance
But on Wittgenstein’s view, “game” is not a concept like this: there is nothing that all games have in common. Being a game is a matter of “family resemblance”: you must be similar enough to other games to count.

34. Game Features Points/ score Winners and losers Enjoyable
Involves skill
Uncertain outcome
Occurs at specific time and place
Voluntary participation
Rules

35. Language Games
[The representationalist philosopher], we might say, does describe a system of communication; only not everything that we call language is this system.   

36. Language Games
And one has to say this in many cases where the question arises 'Is this an appropriate description or not?' The answer is: 'Yes, it is appropriate, but only for this narrowly circumscribed region, not for the whole of what you were claiming to describe."

37. Language Games
It is as if someone were to say: "A game consists in moving objects about on a surface according to certain rules..." --and we replied: You seem to be thinking of board games, but there are others.

38. Criteria vs. Symptoms
There are different ways of telling that a field goal has been scored in basketball:
Watching the scoreboard
Listening to the crowd
Hearing the announcer say “a field goal has been scored”
Seeing the ball go through the hoop.

39. “If a philosopher asks, ‘Why does the fact that the ball went through the basket show that a field goal has been scored?” a natural reply would be, “That is what the rules of the game say; that is the way the game is played

40. Criteria
“Once we understand the rules for playing chess, the question whether a player has won when he has achieved checkmate cannot arise.”

41. Criteria
The ball going through the hoop is criterial of a goal being scored. There is a logical or conceptual connection between the two. BUT: This doesn’t mean going through the hoop always counts as scoring a basket!

42. Satisfying Criterion Not Sufficient
First scenario: the ball must be “in play”– for example, not after the buzzer has sounded, not shot from out-of-bounds, etc. Second scenario: the ball must be in a situation where “the rules apply”: not flying around the stadium and changing shape.

43. Relation Between Criteria and Symptoms
A symptom is “a phenomenon of which experience has taught us that it coincided in some way or other, with the phenomenon which is our defining criterion.” Symptoms are correlations between criteria and non-criteria.

44. Relation Between Criteria and Meaning
Giving the criterion for someone else having a toothache “is to give a grammatical explanation about the word ‘toothache’ and, in this sense, an explanation concerning the meaning of the word ‘toothache’.”

45. Satisfying Particular Criterion Not Necessary
“[I]n different circumstances, we apply different criteria.”

46. Satisfying Criterion Not Sufficient

47. Wittgenstein on the Meter Rod in Paris
“There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long, and that is the standard metre in Paris. –But this is, of course, not to ascribe any extraordinary property to it, but only to mark its peculiar role in the language-game of measuring with a metre-rule.”

48. Changing Criteria is Changing Meaning
If we introduce a new criterion for being a meter (as we now have), we can measure the rod in Paris, and determine whether it is or isn’t one meter. In this language-game, ‘meter’ means something different.

49. Fodor and Chihara’s Summary
X is a criterion of Y in situations of type S if the very meaning or definition of ‘Y’ justifies the claim that one can recognize, see, detect, or determine the applicability of ‘Y’ on the basis of X in normal situations of type S. In a normal situation, the problem of gathering evidence which justifies concluding Y from X simply does not arise.

50. The Use Theory vs. The Problem of Other Minds

51. The Problem
We know that we have sensations, desires, and beliefs because we experience them. But we don’t experience other people’s mental states, so how do we know that they have them?

52. Russell and the Argument From Analogy
Only A’s cause B’s I observe a B. Therefore, I know that B was caused by an A.

53. Russell and the Argument From Analogy
Only lightning causes thunder. I hear some thunder in the distance (but I didn’t see any lightning). Therefore, there must have been some unobserved lightning that was the cause of the thunder.

54. Russell and the Argument From Analogy
Premise 1: Only the sensation of thirst causes water-drinking behavior. Premise 2: That other person is drinking water (but I don’t experience their thirst). Conclusion: Therefore, that person’s water-drinking behavior was caused by an unobserved thirst.

55. The Other Argument From Analogy
All A’s cause B’s. I observe an A (but can’t observe B). Therefore, there was an unobserved B

56. The Other Argument From Analogy
Premise 1: Walking through the desert for four hours with no water causes a sensation of thirst. Premise 2: That person walked through the desert for four hours with no water. Conclusion: That person is thirsty.

57. Problems for the Argument
In general, we can’t infer from what happens in our house / our society / our planet to what happens elsewhere. Why is this any different for minds?

58. Wittgenstein on the Problem
Now one may go on and ask: “How do you know that he has got a toothache when he holds his cheek?” The answer to this might be, “I say he has a toothache when he holds his cheek because I hold my cheek when I have a toothache.”

59. Wittgenstein on the Problem
But what if we went on asking: “And why do you suppose that his toothache corresponds to his holding his check just because your toothache corresponds to your holding your cheek?”

60. Wittgenstein on the Problem
You will be at a loss to answer this question, and find that here we strike rock bottom, that is we have come down to conventions.

61. Wittgenstein on the Problem
Basic idea: “holding your cheek” (for someone else) is criterial for them having a toothache. This is compatible with there being other criteria, e.g. crying out. This is compatible with none of the criteria being satisfied, in abnormal situations.