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Cognitive Load and Mixed Strategies: On Brains and Minimax
Sean Duffy J.J. Naddeo David Owens John Smith Rutgers-Camden Rutgers-Camden Haverford Rutgers-Camden Psychology Economics Economics Economics
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Beauty contest-Laboratory outcomes
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Strategic behavior and cognitive ability
Examine relationship between measures of cognitive ability and strategic behavior Al-Ubaydli, Jones, and Weel (2016), Ballinger et al. (2011), Baghestanian and Frey (2016), Bayer and Renou (2016a,2016b), Benito-Ostolaza, Hernández, and Sanchis-Llopis (2016), Brañas-Garza, Espinosa, and Rey-Biel (2011), Brañas-Garza, Garcia-Muñoz, and Hernan Gonzalez (2012), Brañas-Garza and Smith (2016), Burks et al. (2009), Burnham et al. (2009), Carpenter, Graham, and Wolf (2013), Chen, Huang, and Wang (2013), Corgnet et al. (2016), Coricelli and Nagel (2009), Devetag and Warglien (2003), Fehr and Huck (2016), Georganas, Healy, and Weber (2015), Gill and Prowse (2016), Grimm and Mengel (2012), Jones (2014), Jones (2008), Kiss, Rodriguez-Lara, and Rosa-García (2016), Lohse (2016), Palacios-Huerta (2003b), Proto, Rustichini, and Sofianos (2014), Putterman, Tyran, and Kamei (2011), Rydval (2011), Rydval and Ortmann (2004), and Schnusenberg and Gallo (2011).
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Experimental Differences between Spock and Homer
Rather than measure cognitive ability We manipulate it Advantage to manipulating cognitive ability Cognitive ability related to lots of other things Maybe X determines strategic sophistication And X merely related to cognitive ability Differences between Spock and Homer Are not confined to cognitive ability
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How to think about the manipulation?
Discovered crayon in Homer Simpson’s brain Was causing cognitive shortcomings Homer without crayon in brain Homer with crayon in brain
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How to manipulate cognitive resources?
Cognitive Load Task that occupies cognitive resources Unable to devote to deliberation Observe behavior Require subjects to memorize a number Big number Small number Differences in behavior?
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Cognitive load and games
Milinski and Wedekind (1998) Roch et al. (2000) Cappelletti, Güth, and Ploner (2011) Carpenter, Graham, and Wolf (2013) Duffy and Smith (2014) Buckert, Oechssler, and Schwieren (2014) Samson and Kostyszyn (2015) Allred, Duffy, and Smith (2016)
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Duffy and Smith (2014) JoBEE
Repeated 4-player prisoner’s dilemma Under differential cognitive load Given number Play game Asked to recall number Between-subject design Subjects only in one treatment
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Duffy and Smith (2014) JoBEE
Choice of low load subjects Differentially converged to SPNE prediction Low load “closer” to equilibrium Low load subjects better able to condition on previous outcomes Low load better able to sustain some periods of cooperation
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Allred, Duffy, and Smith (2016) JEBO
Play several one-shot games under differential load Within-subject design Subjects in both load treatments
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Allred, Duffy, and Smith (2016) JEBO
What are the beliefs about the distribution of the cognitive load? effect of the cognitive load on opponent?
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Mixing is difficult for subjects
Often subjects have difficulty playing mixed strategies in the laboratory Individual mixing proportions Actions with serial correlation O'Neill (1987), Brown and Rosenthal (1990), Batzilis et al. (2013), Binmore, Swierzbinski, and Proulx (2001), Geng, Peng, Shachat, and Zhong (2014), Mookherjee and Sopher (1994, 1997), O'Neill (1991), Ochs (1995), Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2008), Rapoport and Amaldoss (2000, 2004), Rapoport and Boebel (1992), Rosenthal, Shachat, and Walker (2003), Shachat (2002), Van Essen and Wooders (2013).
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Cognitive resources and mixed strategies
We seek to better understand mixing behavior By examining the role of cognitive resources
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Experimental Design 100 repetitions of Hide-and-Seek Game
Block of 50 under high load Block of 50 under low load Block of 50 playing naive computer Either Up-Down-Down or 50-50 Block of 50 playing exploitative computer Either BR to mixture or BR to WSLS Computer’s Actions (Pursuer) Up Down Your Actions (Evader) 1 2
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Experimental Design Play against computer opponent Subjects told
“How does the computer decide what to play? A number of possible strategies have been programmed. Some computer strategies can be exploited by you. Some computer strategies are designed to exploit you.”
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Screenshot
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Experimental Design Low load High load
1-digit number High load 6-digit number Also scanned all 130 right hands Different paper
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Experimental Design Strongly incentivized memorization task
Performance in memorization task unrelated to payment for game outcome in that period Paid for 30 randomly selected game outcomes if 100 memorization tasks correct Paid for 29 if 99 correct … Paid for 1 if 71 correct Paid for none if 70 or fewer correct
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Experimental Design Timing within each period:
Given new number to remember Play game Receive feedback about that outcome Asked for number Repeat
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Details 130 Subjects 78 Rutgers-Camden 52 Haverford
13,000 game observations z-Tree Fischbacher (2007) Earned average $33 From $5 to $54
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Hypotheses High load earn less against
Exploitative computers and exploitable computers High load farther from equilibrium proportions High load more serial correlation
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Summary statistics BR in Naïve Pattern Correct Down in Exp. WSLS
High load 62.8% Low load 55.1% p<0.001 Down in Exp. WSLS 33% is “optimal” High load 55.9% Low load 56.8% p=0.60 Down in Exp. Mix High load 52.3% Low load 56.1% p=0.03 Correct High load 88.0% Low load 97.9% p<0.001 Down in Naïve 50-50 100% is “optimal” High load 61.5% Low load 58.5% p=0.07 Down in Naïve Pattern 33% is “optimal” High load 49.3% Low load 52.4% p=0.11
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Proportions and serial correlation
Test of runs against exploitative opponents One-sample K-S test High load not indep. p<0.001 Low load not indep. p=0.07 Not different Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov p=0.42 Binomial chi-square against exploitative opponents High load different p<0.001 Low load different Not different Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov p=0.37
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Earned by treatment Coefficient estimates and p-values DV: Earned
High Load 0.0626 (p=0.03) 0.0692 (p=0.04) 0.0791 (p=0.02) Strategy dums? Yes Repeated meas? No Treatment dums? AIC Higher earnings for high load
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Earned across rounds Round: period under same treatment (1-50)
Coefficient estimates and p-values DV: Earned Round (p=0.006) High Load 0.114 (p=0.003) 0.120 (p=0.004) 0.130 (p=0.002) Round*High Load (p=0.04) Strategy dums? Yes Repeated meas? No Treatment dums? AIC Higher earnings across periods Higher earnings for high load No improvement for high load
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Response time across rounds
Time remaining when decision was made Coefficient estimates and p-values DV: Time remaining Round 0.0227 (p<0.001) High Load 0.519 0.664 0.593 Round*High Load -0.005 (p=0.004) (p=0.001) (p=0.002) Strategy dums? Yes Repeated meas? No Treatment dums? AIC Faster decisions across periods Faster decisions for high load Slower increase for high load
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Conclusions Available cognitive resources
not related to standard measures of serial correlation not related to standard measures of mixing proportions No evidence that available cognitive resources related to standard results
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Conclusions Available cognitive resources
Not necessarily related to higher earnings
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Conclusions Available cognitive resources
related to improvements in earnings over time Subjects with greater available cognitive resources exhibit more learning
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Cognitive load: What next?
Settings where learning is important Bandit problems Search Coordination games Monotonic? 1, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15 digits
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Cognitive load Cognitive load manipulation Can help give clues
about implications of limited cognitive resources
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Definitions: target, start, response
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Central Tendency Bias (CTB)
Stylized summary of hundreds of visual judgment papers Slope = 1 Short lines overestimated Response Long lines underestimated Target
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Why economists should care about visual judgments?
Real decision payoffs and probabilities are not given Unlike what we do in the lab First there is a judgment then there is a decision Present these quantities as a visual judgment Do estimates of probability or payoffs have same biases? Other applications that will occur to you?
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Cognitive load affects visual judgments
Allred et al. (2016) Judgments of line length While under cognitive load Some judgments under high load Remembering 6 digit number Some judgments under low load Remembering 2 digit number Randomized start line
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Allred, Crawford, Duffy, Smith (2016)
Worse visual judgments under high load Slope = 1 Low load High load Response Cognitive load increases the CTB Target
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