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The Future of US-Russia Nuclear Arms Control

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Presentation on theme: "The Future of US-Russia Nuclear Arms Control"— Presentation transcript:

1 The Future of US-Russia Nuclear Arms Control
Steven Pifer Director, Brookings Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative April 21, 2017

2 First Steps SALT I (1972) SALT II (1979) ABM Treaty
Interim Offensive Agreement SALT II (1979)

3 Breakthrough Years INF Treaty (1987) START I (1991) PNIs ( )

4 Recent Arms Control ABM Treaty Withdrawal (2002) SORT (2002)
New START (2010)

5 US and Russian Warhead Numbers

6 INF Treaty Bans ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with range of kms ~2700 missiles eliminated SS-20, GLCM, PII

7 US Charges Russian INF Treaty Violation
Russia tested, deployed ground-launched cruise missile of intermediate range Variant of Iskander K? (SSC-8?)

8 Russian Charges US INF Treaty Violations
Russia charges three US violations: Targets for missile defense tests Armed UAVs Aegis Ashore

9 Leverage on Russia? INF missile
Additional conventional capabilities in Europe Multilateral diplomatic push

10 Notional SSC-8 Coverage

11 Resolving SSC-8 Issue SVC works out procedures for exhibition and briefing on SSC-8 characteristics If US side satisfied, issue resolved If further questions, return to SVC If SSC-8 range exceeds 500 kms, need to eliminate it and launcher

12 Resolving MD Tests Issue
SVC develops language to differentiate allowed target missiles from banned INF ballistic missiles Numerical limit on target missiles? Locational limits

13 Resolving Armed UAVs Issue
SVC develops language to differentiate allowed armed UAVs from prohibited ground-launched intermediate-range cruise missiles

14 Resolving Aegis Ashore Issue
SVC works out: Functionally-related observable differences Observable differences Procedures for visits to show Aegis Ashore contains only SM-3s

15 New START Limits 1550 deployed strategic warheads
700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers 800 ICBM/SLBM launchers plus bombers

16 New START Time Period Limits take effect in Feb 2018
Sides appear on track to meet Treaty in force until Feb 2021 Can be extended by up to 5 years

17 New START Levels, March 2017 New START Limit US Russia Deployed strategic delivery vehicles (700) Deployed warheads (1550) Deployed and non-deployed launchers and bombers (800)

18 Russia Strategic Modernization
Borey-class SSBN Bulava SLBM SS-27, Sarmat ICBMs Reopen Tu-160 production Appears sized to New START limits

19 US Strategic Modernization
Columbia-class SSBN Ground-based strategic deterrent (ICBM) B-21 bomber Long-range standoff option (ALCM) Sized to New START limits

20 Planned US Triad, 2018 Minuteman ICBMs 400 454 Trident SLBMs 240 280
Deployed Dep/Non-Dep SDVs Launchers Minuteman ICBMs Trident SLBMs B-2/B-52H Bombers

21 Trump Administration View
Nuclear posture review Likely maintain strategic triad LRSO in question? New START => 2021; extend? Need 700 missiles and bombers? Unlikely to move to lower number unless costs get out of hand

22 Nuclear Stockpile Size
US Russia Deployed strategic* ~ ~1950 Non-dep strategic ~ ~500 Nonstrategic ~ ~1850 Total stockpile ~ ~4300 [4018] * Estimated actual number, not New START accountable number Numbers drawn from Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “US Nuclear Forces, 2017” and “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2017”

23 “Big” Treaty USG very interested in 2011 Possible limits
2200 total nuclear warheads limit 1000 deployed strategic warhead sublimit SDVs limit Of interest to Moscow? Aggregate warhead limit => trade-off

24 Issues Linked by Russians
Three main issues Missile defense Precision-guided conventional arms Third-country nuclear forces Real concerns or pretext to block further reductions?

25 Phased Adaptive Approach
(1) SM-3 IA on board ships (2011) (2) SM-3 IB in Romania (2015) 24 SM-3 IB interceptors (3) SM-3 IIA in Poland (2018) 24 SM-3 IIA interceptors

26 MD Transparency Agreement
For key missile defense elements, sides provide annual declaration on: Current numbers Projected numbers for 10 years => time to act if threat emerging

27 Precision-Guided Conventional Weapons
Conventional Prompt Global Strike If ballistic missile warheads, New START captures If hypersonic glide vehicles, niche Conventionally-armed cruise missiles Strategic threat?

28 World Nuclear Stockpiles

29 Third-Country Nuclear Forces
Russia says next nuclear reduction negotiation must be multilateral Obama administration believed at least one more bilateral agreement possible Possible solution: third country unilateral political commitments

30 Stockpile Stewardship Program
Ensure reliability of arsenal without nuclear explosive testing

31 CTBT Monitoring

32 Risks of AC Regime Collapse
Lose caps, transparency Back to worst-case assumptions Open path to nuclear arms race? Affordability? Allies’, Democrats’ views? Play to Russia comparative advantage? Effect on NPT? Third-country reaction, especially China?

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