1. U.S. Nuclear Strategy toward China
Charles Glaser (Elliott School, George Washington University)
April 21, 2017

2. Basic purposes of US nuclear strategy
Deter nuclear attacks against the US homeland
Deter attacks against US allies—that is, extend deterrence
Reassure US allies about the effectiveness of its deterrent, thereby helping preserve the alliance
Reduce the damage/costs the US would suffer in a nuclear war, either by:
Averting escalation to all-out nuclear war
Reducing the adversary’s ability to damage the United States

3. Basic strategy questions about US nuclear policy toward China
Should the United States pursue a “damage-limitation” capability?
Should the US threaten first use of nuclear weapons to deter conventional attacks against its allies?
The questions are related: a damage-limitation capability might enhance extended deterrence
I will spend most of my talk on the first question and sketch an analysis of the second question

4. Roadmap of analysis damage-limitation question
Glaser and Steve Fetter, “Should the United States Reject MAD? Damage Limitation and U.S. Nuclear Strategy Toward China,” International Security (Summer 2016)
Is damage limitation feasible?
What counts as damage limitation?
Vulnerability of Chinese forces: fixed silos, mobile missiles, SSBNs, C2
Ballistic missile defense
How large would the benefits be?
Reducing costs of all out war
Deterrence—homeland and extended
Reassuring allies
How large would the costs be?
Accidental and unauthorized attacks; tactical windows
Political costs of military competition

5. Background
Why the question of US-China nuclear strategy is becoming more important
Why damage limitation is the key question
Policy is less straight forward than during Cold War
The Soviet Union deployed over 10,000 warheads on thousands of long-range missiles
China now deploys about 20 silo-based ICBMs and 25 mobile ICBMs; it may soon deploy up to 60 SLBMs
Given current projections, China is likely to have around 100 warheads on mobile missiles by 2030
Technological advances have increased the ability to find forces compared to hide them

6. What counts as damage limitation?
Cold War levels:
McNamara: 20-25% of Soviet population and 50% of industry  200 EMT; “corrected”  40 EMT
How should we define damage limitation?
Level at which the costs of additional damage are insignificant
Level at which a modern state cannot recover
Need for comprehensive technical analysis

7. Survivability of ICBMs
All fixed silos are highly vulnerable
Mobile missiles: survivability depends on:
How China operates its forces during a crisis
Whether China can launch from unprepared positions
US ability to locate missiles:
US space-based surveillance, and possibly other surveillance
Chinese countermeasures

8. Survivability of SSBNs and C2
China is deploying a second-generation ballistic missile submarine:
BUT, it will be vulnerable to US ASW
China’s nuclear command and control is vulnerable; “solutions” are available:
Ensuring the survivability of links between political leaders and launch commanders – mobility, diversity, redundancy
Predelegation
Launch on warning

9. Effectiveness of US Ballistic Missile Defense
Current US BMD systems is not oriented against China
China will be able to defeat an expanded version of the current US system:
Extreme difficulty of midcourse discrimination
Attacks against BMD radars

10. Benefits of a Damage-Limitation capability
Reducing costs of all out war:
US ability is relatively small and declining
Homeland Deterrence: generally quite easy—retaliatory threats are highly credible
Extended Deterrence: Benefits are small because deterrence is already highly effective
US-Japan alliance conventional forces can defend Japan against conventional attack
The possibility of nuclear war will cast a deterrent shadow over major crises, even if the United States can not limit damage
Limited nuclear options can add credibility to US nuclear threats
Taiwan is the exception
Reassuring allies: benefits are small, because US commitments can be highly credible w/o D-L

11. Cost of a damage-limitation capability
Escalatory pressures and risks
Accidental Chinese launch via pressure to launch quickly
Unauthorized Chinese launch via predelegation of launch authority
Incentives for US to attack early, before Chinese forces become survivable
Political costs:
China will view US efforts to maintain a significant damage-limitation capability as reflecting malign motives
Nuclear competition will strain the US-China relations, increasing the probability of dangerous crises

12. Conclusions re damage limitation
Prospects for significant damage limitation over the medium to long term appear to be poor
Does depend, however, on where the D-L threshold is set
Benefits of feasible damage-limitation capabilities are small:
US already possess effective deterrent capabilities
Costs are significant:
A damage-limitation posture generates an array of escalatory pressures and strains political relations
Bottom-line: US should forego efforts to preserve its damage-limitation capability
However, other analysts disagree along all of these dimensions

13. No First Use?
The US has extended deterrence commitments to Japan and South Korea
A policy dedicated to deterring conventional attacks requires a policy of first use:
This was NATO strategy for deterring the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact during the Cold War
The marginal deterrent value of FU threats depends on:
Whether conventional forces are sufficiently effective to deter Chinese conventional attack
Whether nuclear weapons, essentially independent of US doctrine, contribute to deterrence of conventional war when the US lacks a D-L capability
Reassurance: do US allies believe FU is necessary?
Risks of FU: early use, unauthorized use