1. Drone D-Fence EMP Based Drone Defense System
Team: Aero Outcasts
Kevin Johnson, Jamey Mulloy, Pete Opper
ES678 Agile Systems and Enterprises

2. System: Drone D-Fence System
Strategic Values/Objectives
Rapid Deployment
Scalable
Reconfigurable
Multi-platform compatibility (interfaces with existing radar systems)
Descriptive Statement
The Drone EMP D-Fence System is a system that defends assets against drone and drone swarm attacks. A modular array of EMP transmission pods disable drone functionality by overwhelming its electrical systems with high amplitude electromagnetic pulses.

3. CURVE High-Level System/Process Environment
Capriciousness: unknowable situations
Future Drone Technologies and Evolving Enemy Tactics (reactive)
Robust features developed by design team (proactive)
Uncertainty: randomness with unknowable probabilities
When and where attack occurs (reactive)
Modular Architecture allows future component upgrades (proactive)
Risk: randomness with knowable probabilities
Probability of attack (reactive)
Variation: knowable variables and variance range
Quantity and size of attackers (reactive)
Quantity and size of attackers (proactive)
Evolution: gradual (relatively) successive developments
Integration of more advanced technology (reactive)
Improved developmental processes (Proactive)

4. System: Drone Defense Reality Factors
Human (Including Customer) Behavior – Human error, whimsy, expediency, arrogance...
Judgement of system operators
Fatigued system operators
Organizational Behavior – Survival rules rule, nobody's in absolute control...
Operator may be multi-tasking multiple systems
Technology Pace – Accelerating technology and security-vulnerability introductions, sparse testing...
New drone technology may counter EMP defense
Specific attack to disable system could be developed
System Complexity – Incomprehensible, highly networked, unintended consequences, emergence...
Large scales of multiple assets at single site
Globalization – Partners with different ethics, values, infrastructures, cultural assumptions...
Logistical Complications
Partially-Agile Enterprise Faddish Practices – Outsourcing, web services, transparency, COTS policies/affects...
Offsite system support
High use of COTS
Agile Customers/Competitors/Adversaries – Distributed, collaborative, self organizing, proactive, impatient, innovative...
System technology is easily copied
Other?

5. Response Situation Analysis for System: Drone D-Fence
with [t,c,p,s] metric-priorities for each issue, t = time of change, c = cost of change, p = predictability of change, s = scope of change
Change Domain
Change/Response Issue
Proactive
Reactive
Creation
(and Elimination)
What must the system be creating or eliminating in the course of its operational activity?
Creates model of threat environment [t,p]
Creates security for assets and personnel (piece of mind) [t, p]
Improvement
What performance characteristics will the system be expected to improve during operational life cycle?
Defend against potentially more capable drones [c,p,s]
Reaction time [t]
Coverage range (defense perimeter) [c]
Migration
What major events coming down the road will require a change in the system infrastructure?
Government Regulations (affecting use of EMP based Defense Devices) [t,p]
Disruptive technologies employed by attackers [c,p]
Modification
(Add/Sub Capability)
What modifications in resources-employed might need made as the system is used?
Mounting Configurations (Compatible with different types of assets) [c,s]
Correction
What can go wrong that will need an automatic systemic detection and response? [Wrong – needs to be about correcting something that was broke and didn’t work with agility]
Add capabilities to address counter-tactics developed by attackers [t,p,s]
Add capabilities to address improved drone technologies (higher velocities, hardening) [t,p,s]
Firmware updates (for software bugs) [s]
Variation
What process variables will range across what values and need accommodation?
Weather conditions (could affect detection and targeting systems) [t,p]
Surrounding Terrain [s]
Expansion
(and Contraction
of Capacity)
What are “quantity-based” elastic-capacity range needs on resources/output/activity/other? – Wrong – needs to be about deploying modules or parts of system and addressing it in operational system design
Shortages of components such as CPUs, displays [t,c]
Pricing impacts due to low volume sales [c]
Reconfigu-ration
What types of resource relationship configurations will need changed during operation?
Interface to existing radar systems [s]
Firmware updates (to counter new attacker tactics and drone types) [s]
Component upgrades (to counter new attacker tactics and drone types) [c]

6. System: Drone D-Fence (Think … Drag-and-Drop / Plug-and-Play)
Encapsulated Modules
Turrets
Defense Tactics Modules (software)
Scalable
Reusable
Evolving Infrastructure Standards
Sockets: Standard Turret Interface
Signals: Common Data Bus
Security: Turrets perform a standard set of functions
Safety: Lockout/tagout system
Service: Provide security for land and sea based assets of various size and configurations
sockets (physical interconnect)
signals (data/stuff flow between modules)
security (trust interconnect)
safety (of user, system, and environment)
service (system assembly ConOps and evolutionary agility sustainment)

7. Sample Graphics for your modification into your system needs
System: Drone D-Fence
Sample Graphics for your modification into your system needs
Resources
Integrity
Management
Installers
Operators
Turrets
Controller
Radar
fff
Situational awareness
Resource mix evolution
Resource readiness
Activity assembly
Infrastructure evolution
Who?
Who?
Who?
Who?
Active
Infrastructure
Passive
Small Ship
Airfield
Fwd Operating Base
Sockets
Signals
Security
Safety
Service
Standard Turret Interface
Common Data Bus
Turrets perform a standard set of functions
Lockout/tagout system
Provide security for land and sea based assets of various size and configurations
Rules/Standards