1. Crisi Economica e Partiti in Italia
Leonardo Morlino, LUISS G. Carli, Rome
SAPIENZA UNIVERSITÀ DI ROMA
25-26 NOVEMBRE 2016
CONVEGNO SCIENTIFICO
LA SOCIETÀ ITALIANA E LE GRANDI CRISI ECONOMICHE

2. 1 How to analyze the impact

3. GDP - % change (constant prices)
Figure 1.1: Changes of GDP and Unemployment rate in South Europe ( )
GDP - % change (constant prices)

4. Unemployment rate (% total labor force)
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database (April 2016)

5. Figure 1.2: The growth of public debt in South Europe, as % of GDP (1995-2018)
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database (April 2016)

6. Table 1.1: Qualities and relevant empirical dimensions
Sub-dimensions
Rule of Law
Individual security and civil order
Independent judiciary
Institutional and administrative capacity
Integrity and absence of corruption
Electoral Accountability
Free, fair and recurrent elections
Freedom of party organization
Presence and stability of alternatives
Inter-Institutional Accountability
Legislative-executive relations
Constitutional or Supreme court
Modes and extent of decentralization
Plural and independent information
Participation
Opportunities for participation
Electoral participation
Party membership
Non-conventional participation
Social participation,
interest groups activism
Competition
Competition among actors
Opposition strength
Fairness of political competition
Competition among interest groups
Freedom
Personal dignity
Civil rights
Political rights
Equality
Distribution of resources
Existence of economic discrimination
Social, security, and cultural rights
Responsiveness
Confidence in institutions
Perceived satisfaction with democracy

7. Table 1.2: The relevant dimensions affected by the economic crisis
Qualities
Relevant empirical dimensions
Rule of law
Efficiency of judiciary system
Fight against corruption
Government efficiency
Electoral accountability
Presence and stability of alternatives
Inter-institutional accountability
Legislative-executive relations
Constitutional or supreme court
Modes and extent of decentralization
Watchdog role of media
Participation
Electoral participation
Other forms of conventional participation
Non-conventional participation
Interest group activism
Competition
Radicalization of political competition
Weakening of interest group competition
Equality
Social and economic rights
Responsiveness
Satisfaction with democracy
Confidence in institutions

8. Table 1.3: Expectations about the impact on the relevant dimensions (2008–15)

9. Table 1.4: Expected impact (2008-15) and background conditions (2000-08)

10. Table 1.5: Dimensions to be explored
Qualities
Relevant empirical dimensions
Expected impact
Participation
Electoral participation
Other forms of conventional participation
Non-conventional participation
Interest groups activism
strong decline
strong growth and decline
Competition
Fairness of political competition
Interest group
radicalization
new protest parties
tripolar party system
new interest groups
end of concertation

11. Figure 1.3: The catalyzing effects of the economic crisis

12. 2 Parties and party systems

13. Figure 2.1: Trends in electoral turnout: South Europe plus Germany and Sweden (1993-2016)
Legend: GRE: 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2007, 2009, 2012a, 2012b, 2015a, 2015b; ITA: 1994, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008, 2013; POR: 1995, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2011, 2015; SPA: 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2015, 2016; GER: 1994, 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013; SWE: 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014.
Source: official data

14. Table 2.1: Trends in electoral turnout: European elections
1994
1999
2004
2009
2014
Greece
71,2
74,8
73,9
61,9
60,0
Italy
73,6
69,8
71,7
65,1
57,2
Portugal
36,6
39,9
38,6
36,8
33,7
Spain
59,1
64,4
45,1
44,9
45,8
Germany 60
45,2 43
43,3
48,1
Sweden
41,6
38,8
37,9
45,5
51,1
Source: official data

15. Figure 2.2: Trend in Party membership (South Europe)
Notes: Gre: 1990, 1998, 2008; Ita: 1989, 1998, 2007; Port: 1991, 2000, 2008; Spa: 1990, 2000, 2008; Ger: 1989 (West), 1999, 2007; Swe: 1989, 1998, 2008.
Source: van Biezen, Mair, Poguntke 2012, Appendix (from tab. 1).

16. Figure 2.3: Confidence in Parties: South Europe plus Germany and Sweden (1997-2015)
Source: Eurobarometer, various years

17. Figure 2.4- Trends in electoral volatility: South Europe (2005-16)
Notes: Greece: 2004, 2007, 2009, 2012, 2012, 2015a, 2015b; Italy: 2006, 2008, 2013; Portugal: 2005, 2009, 2011, 2015; Spain: 2004, 2008, 2011, 2015, 2016.
Source: europe
Spagna, 2016 : 5,6
Grecia, 2015b: 6,7

18. Table 2.2: Electoral radicalization in South Europe plus Germany and Sweden (1993-2016)1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Average
St.Dev.
Greece
4,5
5,6
5,5
9,2
13,2
12,4
42,9
45,8
52,9
51,8
24,4
21,00
Italy 11
14,4
18,7
10,6 15
12,7
32,9
16,5
7,75
Portugal
8,8
8,6
11,4
9,8 14
17,7
13,1
19,9
12,9
4,15
Spain
9,6
10,5
3,8
6,9
38,3
34,2
14,2
13,82
Germany
4,9
6,4
7,3
13,9
14,9
9,1
4,19
Sweden
11,3
7,7
9,4
18,8
11,5
3,56
Legend: Here, only were the parties that won seats included (Lower Chamber).
1) Elections: GRE: 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2007, 2009, 2012a, 2012b, 2015a, 2015b; ITA: 1994, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008, 2013; POR: 1995, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2011, 2015; SPA: 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2015, 2016; GER: 1994, 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013; SWE: 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014.
2) Parties: Grecia: 2015(I e II)-2009: Syriza, Kke, GD (CHA), ANEL; : Syriza, Kke; : Kke. Italia: 1992: Rc, Ln, Msi Ft; 1994: Rc, Ln; 1996: Rc, Ln; 2001: Rc, Ln, Ci; 2006: Rc, Idv, Ln, Ci; 2008: Idv, Ln; 2013: Sel, Ln, M5s, 25. Portogallo: : Cdu (Pcp, Apu), Be, Pan; ; Spagna: : Iu (Pce); : Podemos, IU, C’S.
Source: official data

19. Party polarization index (2000-2015)

20. Figure 2.5: the growing salience of left/right cleavage before and during the crisis
Source: Volkens, A. , Lehmann, P., Matthieß, T. , Merz, N., Regel, S, with Werner, A. (2016): The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project, Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)

21. Table 2.3: From bipolarization to tripolarization: the vote for the two largest parties (1993-2016)4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Average
St.Dev.
Greece
86,2
79,6
86,5 86
79,9
77,4
35,7
56,6
64,1
63,6
71,6
16,48
Italy
41,4
41,7
46,0
55,0
70,6
51,0
10,99
Portugal
77,9
76,4
78,0
73,8
65,7
66,8
70,9
72,8
5,12
Spain
73,6
78,7
80,3
83,8
71,3
50,7
55,7
11,90
Germany
76,0
77,0
69,4
56,8
67,6
70,8
8,05
Sweden
59,3
55,2
61,2
60,8
54,3
59,7
4,80
Legend: GRE: 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2007, 2009, 2012a, 2012b, 2015a, 2015b; ITA: 1994, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008, 2013; POR: 1995, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2011, 2015; SPA: 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2015, 2016; GER: 1994, 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013; SWE: 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014.
Source: official data

22.   Figure 2.6: Party fragmentation: South Europe plus Sweden and Germany (1993-2016)
Legend: GRE: 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2007, 2009, 2012a, 2012b, 2015a, 2015b; ITA: 1994, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008, 2013; POR: 1995, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2011, 2015; SPA: 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2015, 2016; GER: 1994, 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013; SWE: 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014.
Source: see  and our calculations for last elections. 

23. Figure 2.7: Satisfaction with Democracy in South Europe plus Germany and Sweden (1992-2015)
Notes: % of those who replied ‘very or fairly satisfied’; German data since 1992 through 2010 are the average of values of West Germany and ex-East Germany; the Swedish data start in 1995.
Source: Eurobarometer, various years

24. Figure 2.8: Confidence in Government and Parliament, South Europe plus Germany and Sweden ( )
Source: Eurobarometer, various years

25. 3 the new protest parties

26. Neopopulist party
Protest
party
New
Movement party
Figure 3.1: Semantic field of different party definitions

27. Greece Italy Spain Portugal Source: Official data
Figure 3.2: Votes for the main incumbent and protest parties in South Europe: national and European elections
Source: Official data

28. Figure 3 3: Opinion of Greek electors on negotiations between the government and European Institutions (2015).
Source: to be added.

29. Table 3.1: Membership of protest parties (selected years).
Legenda: Syriza: 2013, 2016; Cha: 2016; M5s: 2014; Ln: 2011, , 2003, 2001, 1999; Podemos: 2014, 2015, 2016; C's: 2006, 2008, 2010, 2015, 2016; Pdr: 2015, Livre: na
(*) Data in parenthesis refer to members with voting rights in online consultations. The other data are on the membership, which is free.

30. Table 3.2- Features, types of neo-populism and empirical cases
Components of the definition
Open or inclusive populism
(new left-populist parties)
Closed or exclusive populism
(new right-populist parties)
Situational
- crisis of representative institutions
- economic crisis and his consequences
- economic denationalization
economic crisis and his consequences
- cultural/political denationalization
Cultural/
Cognitive
- people-class
- community of citizenship
- anti-politics
- people-nation
- community of faith
- anti-élites
Organization/ mobilization
- participatory democracy
- network
- cosmopolitan/social protection
- leader democracy
- hierarchy
- protectionism/ nationalism
Strategic politics/policy
- defense of welfare state
- reaction to neoliberal economic reform
- soft Euroscepticism
- pro-immigration
- availability to ally
- defense of nation-state
- hard Euroscepticism
- anti-immigration
- no availability to ally
Allocation of empirical cases
Syriza
ChA
M5S LN
Podemos,
C’S
MPT/PDR
Livre

31. The Catalysing Effect of Economic Crisis
Background conditions
catalysis
Manifestations of democratic crisis
decline political participation
decline electoral participation
decline party membership
fading away of party membership
electoral destabilization
growth of electoral volatility
historical dissatisfaction (if existing) +
new dissatisfaction
social movements
new protest parties
non institutionalized participation
tripolarization
anti-establishment cleavage